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NATIONAL RESILIENCE OF UKRAINE: CONTENT AND SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF A WAR AND POST-WAR RECOVERY

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Abstract

The article examines the problem of strengthening the national resilience of modern states in the context of a sharp increase in security challenges and risks using the case of Ukraine as an example. The purpose of the research is to find out the characteristics of Ukraine's national resilience, the specifics of the strategy for its strengthening under the conditions of resistance to Russia's armed aggression and preparation for future post-war recovery. It is emphasized that the resilience of Ukraine is subject to the simultaneous pressure of security, resource, climate, social, demographic and other challenges. The importance of strengthening national resilience to threats and dangers in the physical and digital world, within and outside the state (internal and external dimensions of national resilience) is stated. It is noted that the national resilience of Ukraine depends not only on internal potential, consolidation of national resources but also on the volume and timeliness of external support. The authors proved that for Ukraine, the issue of national stability is an existential issue in view of external aggression, the long-term struggle to restore the territorial integrity of the state, the need to carry out post-war recovery, restore the demographic resource, etc. The key vectors of strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine are identified. The authors identified the factors on which Ukraine's national resilience depends: national unity and consolidation of society; international support (diplomatic, financial, military, etc. assistance, availability of reliable guarantees of Ukraine's security); the state's ability to strengthen defence capabilities; preservation and enhancement of human potential; information resilience (ability to counter propaganda, disinformation, etc.); institutional strength (effectiveness of state institutions, effective strategy for preventing and combating corruption, deepening digitalisation of the public sector, etc.

Keywords: national resilience, consolidation of Ukrainian society, national unity, national security, Russian armed aggression, post-war recovery, multi-layered threats, civil society.

Introduction

The study of the peculiarities of Ukraine's national resilience and ways of its strengthening has acquired special importance in the context of the long-term functioning of the state and society under Russian armed aggression. During this time, numerous problems of various types and scales have arisen, which

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require solutions in different timeframes – from the immediate to the post-war period. The significance of the study of the strengthening of national resilience is also due to the prospect of the future large-scale post-war recovery. This process will require extensive human, financial, logistical and other resources, and therefore requires preparation. Today, there is a strong social demand for an understanding of the mechanisms and tools for strengthening national resilience in the face of severe security challenges. Ukraine is currently the first to face such challenges, but the reality is that conflicts and crises in many countries are escalating as a result of the ambitions of neo-authoritarian leaders. In the context of the study of Ukraine's resilience, the impact of the rapid dynamics of events on the research is worth mentioning, because the war continues and the number of challenges for the national resilience of Ukraine increases with each passing day. Consequently, a wide range of issues related to ensuring Ukraine's resilience in the face of existing problems, the role of Ukraine's partners in strengthening resilience, prospects for rapid post-war recovery, etc., need to be studied.

The purpose of the study is to identify the peculiarities of Ukraine's national resilience and the strategy of its strengthening under the conditions of resistance to external armed aggression and preparation for the future post-war recovery. To achieve this goal, the following tasks are set: to find out the peculiarities of national resilience under the conditions of war as an extraordinary challenge for the state and society; to study the factors on which the national resilience of a state that is subjected to external armed and other forms of aggression depends; to determine the key areas of strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine under the conditions of war; to investigate the vectors of strengthening national resilience for effective post-war recovery. The research methodology is based on institutional analysis. It is aimed at studying the initiatives of both governmental and non-governmental actors to strengthen the resilience of Ukraine at the national and international levels.

Literature Review

Scientific research on the problem of resilience began with studying psychological aspects of resilience at the individual level. Security, socio-economic, geopolitical and other vectors of analysis also quickly became the object of study. Research on resilience expanded to the level of communities and socio-political institutions. Not only individual studies but also specialized scientific publications, such as *The Journal of National Resilience, Politics and Society*, appeared on the problems of national resilience.

In the 2020s, the concept of resilience received a new reading under the influence of the coronavirus pandemic, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the growth of security challenges (in the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, the region of the Baltic and North Seas, etc.). Although resilience is not only about war or security, this problem became actualized precisely "with the growing turbulence in international relations and the aggravation of confrontation between the major geopolitical players" (Gerasymchuk, 2022, p. 18-19). The problem of resilience is therefore studied from the standpoint of political science, international relations, and security studies, though social and psychological aspects have not lost their relevance.

It is evident that, first of all, researchers from countries facing severe security challenges are showing interest in the issue of resilience in response to the existing social demand. Thus, before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, studies of national resilience under the conditions of wars, armed conflicts, etc. were scarce (Kimhi & Eshel, 2009). However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine gave impetus to the study of the nature of Ukraine's resilience (Brovko, 2024; Goodwin et al., 2023; Joseph & Juncos, 2020; Khoma, 2023; Kurnyshova, 2022; Natorski, 2022; Nazarov, 2023; Reznikova, 2022), increased scientific interest in assessing the ability of various states to resist new challenges to global security. This was especially relevant due to the cooperation of non-democratic states (Russia, China, the DPRK, Iran, etc.) and their increasingly bold pressure on the established international order, democratic values, human rights, etc. (Khoma & Nikolaieva, 2023; Khoma & Vdovychyn, 2024).

The growing research interest in the determinants of resilience is noteworthy (Barnea et al., 2020). Resilience is studied at different levels – individual, state, territorial community, etc. (Southwick et al., 2014). Researchers emphasize that at each of these levels, the nature of resilience has different characteristics, however, at any scale, resilience invariably involves the ability to adapt to different situations, to cope with the consequences of various negative events (Kimhi, 2016). We agree with the statements that national resilience is a dynamic structure that changes in response to changes in context (Canetti, et al., 2014; Fletcher, & Sarkar, 2013).

Hence, the historiography of this study includes works on: (1) the nature and content of resilience, national resilience (Barnea et al., 2020; Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013; Friedland, 2005; Kimhi, 2016; Kimhi & Eshel, 2018; Masten, Best & Garmezy, 1990; Myers-Smith, Trefry & Swarbrick, 2012; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum et al., 2008; Southwick, Bonanno, Masten et al., 2014); (2) features of resilience and its strengthening under conditions of significant security challenges (Ben-Dor et al., 2002; Canetti et al., 2014; De Coning, 2016; Eshel & Kimhi, 2016; Greene, Ribakova & Rzegocki, 2024; Joseph & Juncos, 2020; Kimhi & Eshel, 2009); (3) the national resilience of Ukraine since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014 (Gatskov & Gatskova 2020; Gil, 2015; German Marshall Fund..., 2024; Reznikova, 2022; Romanova, 2022; Gerasymchuk, 2022; Nazarov, 2020, 2022; Pyrozhkov, 2022; Pyrozhkov, et al., 2022); (4) strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine in the face of full-scale Russian aggression (Brovko, 2024; Goodwin et al., 2023; Grävingholt et al., 2023; Kistersky & Zadoia, 2024; Kurnyshova, 2022; Landesmann, 2024; Natorski, 2022; Sociological Group Rating, 2023; Nazarov, 2023; Tkach et al., 2024; Jakupiec, 2024); (5) regulatory acts on strengthening resilience to current challenges (Cabinet Office, 2021; European Commission, 2012, 2024; President of Ukraine, 2020; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2021; Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023).

Materials and Methods

The concept of "resilience" is part of the concept of adaptation, adjustment. Resilience in the broadest interpretation is "the process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances" (Masten et al., 1990, p. 426). The term "resilience" is used by researchers in various fields of knowledge (ecology, physics, health care, social sciences, etc.) (Norris et al., 2008) but terminological connotations differ. The term "resilience" is primarily used in the sense of vitality, the ability to function under challenging conditions and to recover from various aggressive influences (armed aggression, natural disasters, cyberattacks, acts of terrorism, etc.), to prevent or effectively respond to threats in a timely manner, to forecast them for timely prevention or mitigation of consequences. Resilience is rightly defined as "a key conceptual point of reference in the research and practice of international politics" (Natorski, 2022, p. 1088). We share the approach to the analysis of resilience precisely as a "quality of a complex system" (Natorski, 2022, p. 1087).

The concept of "national resilience" initially referred predominantly to the military potential of states (Kimhi & Eshel, 2009), but the scope of its application has expanded over time. Nowadays, national resilience is understood, first of all, as a society's ability "to withstand adversities and crises in diverse realms by implementing changes and adaptations without harming the society's core values and institutions" (Friedland, 2005). Resilience is associated with the process of adapting to challenges or changes caused by external threats (Canetti et al., 2014, p. 505).

In studies of armed conflict, war, and peacebuilding, resilience is viewed as "the ability of individuals or a community to cope with or adapt to violent conflicts in order to foster a more sustainable peace" (Joseph & Juncos, 2020, p. 289). In a broader sense, resilience is interpreted as "the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the shocks and setbacks they are likely to face" (De Coning, 2016, p. 29).

Not only states but also international organizations and integration associations develop their approaches to understanding resilience. For example, the EU initially interpreted resilience as "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks" (European Commission, 2012). In 2016, this definition was revised in the Global strategy for the foreign and security policy of the European Union: "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises" (European Union, 2016, p. 23).

In the era of rising global instability, rapid changes of various types (geopolitical, climatic, technological, etc.), the deterioration of the quality of democracy on a global scale, the rise of neo-authoritarianism, the strengthening of cooperation between autocratic leaders, the growing threat of the use of nuclear weapons and other destructive trends, it is important to develop effective mechanisms for preventing and countering such influences, mitigating their consequences. Nowadays, the national resilience of states is constantly being tested by a wide range of new challenges: threats to peace and security, rising terrorism; increasing competition between superpowers; climatic cataclysms; migration crises; spread of diseases; undermining of energy security (weaponization of energy); challenges caused by digitization, artificial intelligence and cyberterrorism; scarcity of various resources and struggle for them; growing influence of nationalist, populist political forces; resolution of hybrid wars, etc.

The effectiveness of national resilience systems is evidenced by their ability to identify, prioritize, prevent, and effectively respond to threats and risks of one or another nature. Measures to ensure national resilience in modern states are aimed at fulfilling at least two tasks: (1) to develop the necessary ability of the state, society and individual to predict and prevent threats and risks of any nature; (2) in the event of specific threats, to be able to respond promptly and recover quickly.

A high level of resilience of the state, society and citizens is characterised by their ability to counteract threats of almost any origin and nature, to adapt to sudden and unpredictable changes in the environment, to maintain stable functioning before, during and after a crisis, to quickly recover to the desired balance. Therefore, the main indicators of resilience can be considered the scale of losses, recovery times, etc. The qualitative characteristics of national resilience are the lowest possible losses and the fastest possible normalization of the situation.

We agree with researchers (Kimhi & Eshel, 2018) that national resilience can be undermined in situations of acute, long-lasting threats if adequate work has not been done to prevent them. At the same time, various crises and turning points in history become a reliable test of the existing level of resilience at all levels, from the national to the individual. In this context, it is appropriate to analyse resilience precisely as a quality of a complex system (Natorski, 2022, p. 1087).

Resilience, from being a trending word in public and political discourse over the last decade, began to be consolidated in concrete mechanisms and tools. Given the scale of the challenges we face on a global scale, strengthening resilience becomes a political approach, not only a piece of public rhetoric. In recent years, more and more countries have adopted comprehensive national resilience strategies. They cover the issues of countering sabotage, cyberattacks, influence operations by neo-authoritarian states, preventing external interference in election campaigns, etc. These strategies take on a new configuration every year, for example, the focus of attention already includes artificial intelligence with its threats and opportunities. The dominant idea in the current resilience strategies of democratic states is the need to strengthen preparedness for threats and dangers both in the physical and digital worlds, within and outside the borders of the state. An example of this is UK's National Resilience Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2021). Resilience strategies are also being adopted in certain areas, for example, to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure due to changes in the geopolitical landscape, climate change, etc.

Strengthening national resilience requires, first of all, domestic consolidation, coordinated work at all levels of the state and society. It is important to be ready to respond to various dangers, to be able to identify vulnerabilities in a timely manner, to establish effective crisis management, to create the necessary reserves, to consider alternatives and action plans, to implement universal coordination protocols, etc. This is the basis of the system of ensuring national resilience. The modern state, as a mechanism that strives for viability, must have a comprehensive mechanism of interaction between state and non-state actors to guarantee the security, continuity of functioning of the main spheres of life in society and the state, regardless of whether there are crises or not. Equally important is the well-established cooperation between the partner states and the implementation of the principle of solidarity by them¹. The availability of appropriate resilience strategies and anticipatory actions allows better preparation for potential threats and emergencies. As a result, losses can be reduced, and recovery from crises can be faster and less painful. However, often efforts only at the level of a single state are not enough, and resilience depends on external support, assistance from partners, and interstate interactions.

Peculiarities of Ukraine's National Resilience Under the Conditions of Resistance to Russian Aggression

The case of Ukraine illustrates the thesis "that the experience of war may change the relative importance of components of national resilience" (Eshel & Kimhi, 2016, p. 834). During the years of Ukraine's resistance to Russian aggression, the concept of "resilience" has become a marker word for Ukraine and Ukrainians, and their perception in democratic communities. It refers to the resilience of Ukraine under the conditions of Russian military aggression, the resilience of Ukrainian state institutions, communities, the volunteer movement, etc., the resilience of citizens, the resilience of people of certain professions (rescuers, railway workers, doctors, energy workers, farmers, etc.). At the same time, a wide range of problems with the fragility of resilience in its many dimensions has become evident, expanding with each day of the war, with each new massive shelling.

¹ As an example, we can cite the common energy policy of the EU, which is implemented on the basis of the principle of solidarity. This policy contributed to the reduction of the energy resource deficit in 2021-2024 in the context of Russia's weaponization of energy and the use of fossil fuels as one of the weapons in the hybrid war against the West.

The role of resilience was emphasized in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine. Resilience in this document is defined as "the ability of society and the state to quickly adapt to changes in the security environment and maintain sustainable functioning, in particular by minimizing external and internal vulnerabilities" (President of Ukraine, 2020b). The institutionalization of the National Resilience System in Ukraine started in 2021 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2021). Challenges of the full-scale war required specific mechanisms and tools. In particular, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Concept of the National Resilience System by 2025 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023) was approved. Although the priority areas of ensuring the national resilience system of Ukraine are determined, their number is increasing under the conditions of wartime challenges, and priorities are also shifting. Currently, these priorities include, for example, the protection of critical infrastructure; cybersecurity; sustainable functioning of electronic communication networks; information protection in the cloud environment; restoration of de-occupied territories; countering disinformation of the population; training of specialists responsible for ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure facilities; expanding access to mental health support services, etc. Important tasks for strengthening the resilience of Ukraine include: strengthening the ability of state bodies to identify threats, identify vulnerabilities and assess risks to national security; increasing the readiness of state bodies, local self-government bodies, and business entities to crisis situations, preventing risks and minimising their negative consequences; ensuring the development of the capacities of state bodies to ensure sustainable functioning before, during and after the onset of a crisis situation, etc.

The Russian full-scale invasion brought into focus the issue of "the robustness of Ukrainian society, the scale of the volunteer movement and the functionality of Ukrainian public institutions" (Kurnyshova, 2022, p. 81), local self-government bodies (Brovko, 2024). Ukraine's ability to function under the conditions of such a scale of external armed aggression was the result of resilience at all levels – state, non-state, international. This ability was the result of the local self-organization of Ukrainian society and the organization of territorial defence.

Local leadership of mayors and bottom-up civil society entities reinforced the general resilience of Ukraine to combat the Russian army and provided additional means for central authorities to preserve the continuity of state functions (Romanova, 2022). The struggle of Ukraine and Ukrainians against Russia's full-scale aggression opened up a new perception of Ukraine's resilience to the world. Researchers note that until now, there was no such perception (Kurnyshova, 2022, p. 80), and the resilience of Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014 was evaluated quite critically (Gil, 2015). However, when it comes to resilience at the individual level in times of war, the results of sociological research (Sociological Group Rating, 2023) show that what helps Ukrainians remain resilient is, first of all, faith in the Ukrainian military, as well as family and loved ones, and to a much lesser extent – faith in government institutions or international assistance.

The Internal Dimension of Strengthening the Resilience of Ukraine Under the Conditions of War and At the Stage of Post-War Recovery

The functioning of Ukraine under the conditions of armed aggression actualizes a much wider range of tasks to ensure national resilience than those faced by states that are not arenas of armed conflicts. The difficulty of ensuring the necessary level of resilience is caused by numerous problems in wartime: evacuation of the population from the zone of combat clashes; recording and investigation of war crimes; response to malfunctioning or destruction of transport infrastructure; restoration of critical infrastructure; organization of the educational process under the conditions of shelling and energy shortage; response to demographic changes and changes in the labour market; ecocide; rehabilitation of war injuries; implementation of social payments under the conditions of very limited budgetary resources, etc. Therefore, the strategy for strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine attempts to balance diverse tasks, even though it is extremely difficult.

The resilience that Ukraine has demonstrated since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 is subject to many minute-by-minute challenges. Any aspect of the life of society and the state can at any moment be put to a test of resilience by a missile or other attack. The reality also reveals not always effective management decisions and coordinated work of authorities, the growth of poverty and inequality among Ukrainians, huge losses of human capital, a significant number of territories temporarily occupied by Russia, etc. The number of those in need of humanitarian assistance is constantly growing; the scale of destruction of critical and civil infrastructure objects, the private sector, etc. is expanding. With the rising number of challenges, responding to them (and in a short period of time) is becoming an increasingly difficult task for state and non-state institutions.

The strength of Ukraine's resilience depends on the extent to which it can combine a large range of military and civilian tasks, as well as on the extent to which this resilience will be supported by the international community. Under the conditions of the state's armed struggle against the external enemy, strengthening resilience requires a systemic approach, political will at the state level, consolidation at the level of society, zero tolerance for corruption, and many other components. It is necessary to take into account the interdependence of all aspects of resilience, such as climate, ecosystem, social sphere, infrastructure, demography, labour market, etc. For Ukraine, the issue of national resilience is an existential issue. National resilience is not only about the state, but also about business, the non-governmental sector, the veteran community, internally displaced persons, forced migrants, the abundance of people who have lost their homes, etc., and every citizen, taking into account the complexity and simultaneous number of tasks, as well as the nature of security challenges.

The war in Ukraine demonstrated the need for new approaches to strengthening resilience. For example, the steps to respond to the energy terror of the aggressor state include a wide scope of measures, such as the logistical ability to eliminate the consequences of attacks by various types of weapons, the availability of backup schemes for restoring energy supply to consumers, the import of electricity from other states, the rapid development of green generation, the installation of backup generators, etc. The level of resilience is then indicated by the ability to mitigate or solve the problem in the shortest possible time so that it has the least destructive consequences. Such extraordinary situations each time become a stress test for the qualitative aspect of resilience.

Despite the existing successes in preventing and countering corruption, ongoing largescale corrupt practices have already caused reputational losses for Ukraine in the international arena. In particular, when discussing the topic of strengthening Ukraine's resilience through external assistance, concerns are voiced that "massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones" (Grävingholt et al., 2023). The problem of corruption, which is not completely solved, can become a strong destructive factor that will weaken the resilience of Ukraine. Ukrainian partners therefore offer their own tools to prevent fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other violations. For example, the EU created a new body (Ukraine Facility Audit Board) to monitor financing within the Ukraine Facility (budget – 50 billion euros) to prevent various forms of dishonesty (European Commission, 2024).

The International Dimension of Strengthening the Resilience of Ukraine Under the Conditions of War and At the Stage of Post-War Recovery

Currently, the resilience of Ukraine as a state fighting for its sovereignty and territorial integrity is highly dependent on foreign donors. Of great importance are timely decisions regarding the provision of weapons, financing of the social and humanitarian sphere of Ukraine, investment in the Ukrainian economy and recovery, political will to strengthen anti-Russian sanctions and confiscation of Russian assets, etc.

The issue of strengthening Ukraine's resilience is the central topic of international recovery conferences. Issues of transparency and digitization of recovery efforts, continuation of anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine, etc. were on the agenda of such events. The complexity of the case of Ukraine lies in the fact that dozens of issues are simultaneously acute: macroeconomic resilience, security, infrastructure, housing sector, energy security, green restoration, health care, education, support of small and medium-sized businesses, etc. The fact that such international conferences attract numerous participants testifies to the indifference of democratic actors to the issue of Ukraine's resilience. More than 2,000 participants from over 60 countries who are studying the investment landscape of Ukraine were present at URC2024 in Berlin alone. At the same time, on a global scale, support is not so extensive due to the position of most states of the Global South.

It should be noted that the question of the start of Ukraine's recovery is still being discussed among the partner states. At issue is whether to begin recovery immediately or after the cessation of hostilities (Greene et al., 2024). From Ukraine's point of view, a significant part of the projects can and should be implemented even before the end of the war, in particular, recovery after shelling, recovery of de-occupied territories, support of the energy sector, development of a system of physical and psychological rehabilitation, etc. These are mainly rapid recovery projects, the social sphere, and projects that will contribute to sustainable economic growth.

Strengthening national resistance to threats and dangers is important not only within the borders but also outside the borders of the state. That is, it is not only about the internal but also about the external dimensions

of national resilience. An example is the problems faced by Ukraine and the partner states in the preparation of global peace-building measures, given the resources involved by Russia to disrupt or weaken them. Thus, during the organization of the first Summit on Peace in Ukraine (June 15-16, 2024), the number of participants decreased under external influence. Russia made efforts to disrupt or at least weaken the Summit on Peace in Ukraine; for this purpose, influence was exerted on the states of the Global South. As a result, there were significantly fewer subjects present (92 states, 8 organizations), although 160 invitations were sent during the preparation phase of the forum. Switzerland, as the host country of the summit, faced an increase in cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns on the eve of this summit. Restrictions on the use of airspace were forcibly introduced, and a large number of military personnel were involved to ensure security. Such events are tests of the resilience of both the diplomatic corps of Ukraine and other states and international organizations in countering various destructive non-democratic forms of pressure.

Ukraine's resilience will be strengthened if it manages to unite as many states as possible around such key principles as the inviolability of peace, respect for sovereignty and existing borders, the primacy of international law over the law of force, and the importance of a global order based on rules. Initiatives such as the first Summit on Peace in Ukraine are aimed at rallying as numerous states as possible around those principles that are important today for achieving peace and enhancing security. Paradoxically, uniting states around the idea of peace is such a difficult task today. The reason for this is that states today interpret the fundamental concepts of democracy, human rights, security, etc. very differently.

Such events as the Summit on Peace in Ukraine highlight the split between the values, goals, and priorities of the Global North and the Global South. However, the resilience of Ukraine is strongly dependent on the extent to which the restoration of a just peace in Ukraine will be supported not only by the West but indeed on a global scale. In this context, Ukraine's success depends not least on the quality of communication with the states of the Global South, on removing them from the orbit of Russian and Chinese propaganda and various forms of economic and other pressure. The Global Peace Summit proved how complicated these processes are, because there were states that rejected the invitation to participate, did not sign the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework, and withdrew their signature after signing. Thanks to the intensification of communication with the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Ukraine conveys the philosophy of the peace formula. This has the potential to strengthen national resilience through increased support from the international community.

Throughout the full-scale war with Russia, the Ukrainian authorities have been actively lobbying their partner states for air defence equipment (Patriot systems) and other weapons to protect the airspace. Ukraine places the greatest emphasis on the timely adoption of effective decisions, enhancing the determination of Ukraine's partners, and the political will of the leadership of democratic states. For example, this applies to lifting restrictions on the use of certain types of weapons. Therefore, most of the decisions on strengthening the resilience of Ukraine required and will continue to require the political will, consistency and courage of Ukraine's partners, as well as the active position of Ukrainian diplomacy.

The resilience of Ukraine can be extremely negatively affected by the scenario of freezing the conflict with Russia. Still, Ukraine makes maximum efforts to prevent it and responds decisively to alternative "peace formulas" to the Ukrainian one (Chinese and Brazilian). Instead, Ukraine's resilience is strengthened thanks to the signing of bilateral agreements on cooperation in the field of security with several states. These agreements are guarantees of providing Ukraine with extensive military, economic and humanitarian assistance, and therefore strengthen resilience both at the present stage and in the long-term perspective.

It should be mentioned that the issue of Ukraine's resilience is a challenge not only for Ukraine but also for the partner states. To strengthen Ukraine's resilience in the face of existing challenges, substantial external support from foreign governments, donor organizations, civil society, etc. is needed. Although "political commitment among Ukraine's Western allies to recovery is robust, material commitment, on the other hand, lags" (Greene et al., 2024, p. 6). Obtaining international support is highly dependent on reforms in Ukraine, which are related to financial integrity, transparency efforts, digitalization, strong governance, effective fight against corruption, etc. Ukraine's partners believe that "Ukraine's wartime resilience can be bolstered by reforms and awareness in the areas of public administration, anticorruption, and financial control" (German Marshall Fund..., 2024). Therefore, strengthening the resilience of Ukraine also depends on the success of internal reforms, which must be carried out despite the war.

When it comes to strengthening the resilience of Ukraine, under the conditions of continued Russian aggression, we are primarily talking about weapons, air defence equipment, the functioning of the energy sector, etc. However, there are many areas that have a supposedly lower priority under the conditions

of countering external aggression, but under the conditions of post-war recovery, they cannot be underestimated in any way. It is referred to the spheres of education, culture, science, sports, etc. For example, this is the sphere of Ukrainian culture that Russia is purposefully ruining in order to destroy Ukrainian heritage and identity. Given that post-war recovery will be carried out simultaneously in a large number of areas, strengthening the resilience of the cultural sphere is highly dependent on partner states and international donors. Many states and organizations are already working in this direction.

Conclusion

An indicator of the national resilience of modern states is their ability to effectively prevent potential threats, respond promptly to them, and recover quickly. However, the conditions under which Ukraine operates actualize a much wider range of tasks to ensure national resilience. These are completely different conditions from those under which states function, which, although facing a number of challenges, are not arenas of war. In wartime, the list of areas that become priorities for ensuring the national system of resilience grows dramatically. Of decisive importance is the strengthening of the state's ability to identify threats, detect vulnerabilities, and assess risks, the source of which is the aggressor state and its partners. It is crucial to strengthen the preparedness for crisis situations and the ability to prevent risks and minimize their impact. Under the conditions of war, any aspect of the life of society and the state can, at any moment, be subjected to a test of resilience.

Given the scale of challenges in wartime, strengthening resilience requires political will at the level of the government, consolidation at the level of society, and solidarity at the level of the international community. For Ukraine, the issue of national resilience is an existential issue in view of external aggression, the struggle to restore the territorial integrity of the state, the need for post-war recovery, etc.

The resilience of Ukraine in its long-term perspective depends on a system of factors: how resilient the state and society will be in wartime; how devastating the consequences of Russian aggression will be; what the speed and quality of post-war recovery of the country and the scale of international aid will be; to what extent the state and society will be able to support further sustainable development. The importance of the development of long-term resilience of Ukraine, and not only a temporary strengthening of resilience to counter Russian aggression, is obvious. The process of strengthening Ukraine's resilience includes many components: availability of reliable guarantees of Ukraine's security; enhancing of defence capabilities, strengthening of infrastructure to deter potential Russian aggression in the future; ensuring nuclear safety; preservation and increase of human potential; recovery of Ukraine based on new technologies and standards; implementation of reforms necessary for EU integration; achieving zero tolerance for corruption, etc.

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