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## THE FORMATION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER SYSTEM AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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### Abstract

This paper examines the prospects for constructing a new system of world order and the potential for updating the international security system. Particular attention is given to a retrospective analysis of the development of the security architecture of the world order during different historical epochs. Well-known systems of world order are analyzed, including the Westphalian, Vienna, Versailles-Washington, and Yalta-Potsdam systems. The authors consider the historical formation and operational nature of the key elements in the architecture of the existing security model – such as the UN, NATO, CSTO, and the OSCE – and highlight the need for their reform. The main trends in the development of the modern world order are revealed. The prospects of establishing a uni-, bi-, multi-, or non-polar system are analyzed and outlined. The debatable character of the issues concerning the establishment of a new world order has been highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the absence of universally recognized leading states that could serve as future “poles of influence” within the global system. Based on statistical data concerning the military potential of the G7 and BRICS member countries, the paper substantiates the prospects of their involvement in building a renewed security architecture. The authors analyzed the potential of the most powerful states and assessed their competitiveness in the contest for global leadership. The conclusion is made that the absence of clearly defined centers of influence hinders the establishment of a new world order system and complicates the process of forming a new security architecture. Finally, the authors provide recommendations that should be considered when seeking a new balance of power and updating the international security system.

**Keywords:** world order, security architecture, transformation, multipolarity, conflict, international security, universalism, state, international institutions.

### Introduction

The current system of international relations is increasingly showing signs of fragmentation. The world order established after the Second World War is losing its legitimacy, and the contemporary global structure is undergoing a profound transformation. Historically, systems of world order have usually emerged following global wars, which resulted in the redistribution of territories and the division of states into winners and defeated parties. The former would set the global agenda, while the latter often nurtured revanchist sentiments, leading to new military and political conflicts. Today's situation differs fundamentally. Since the end of the Cold War, international processes have developed inertially, with no country decisively raising the issue of revising the existing world order. Instead, states focused on accumulating military and political potential, modernizing their economies, and strengthening their defense sectors. Nevertheless, global

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processes continued to evolve. Existing military-political alliances were reformed, and new international security organizations were established. At the regional level, tensions between key stakeholders often escalated into armed conflicts, with new methods of warfare being developed. Yet, on a global scale, no system of control and deterrence was formed that could de-escalate conflicts. Furthermore, no clearly recognized global decision-making centers have emerged – states that would be acknowledged by the international community as legitimate leaders capable of resolving global tensions.

Prolonged conflicts and wars, increased geopolitical competition, and the erosion of international institutions have called into question the stability of the post-war security architecture. In today's highly interconnected world, the pursuit of peace, prosperity, and human freedom requires new thinking and new instruments (Scholz, 2023).

Against this backdrop, the need for a critical reassessment of the existing world order and its associated security architecture has become evident, along with the development of mechanisms and conditions for achieving global consensus on peaceful coexistence.

The issue of security, in the context of building a modern global order, is addressed by various scholars.

For example, American political scientist Wolfers (1962) argued that security, in an objective sense, means the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense – the absence of fear that these values may be harmed or destroyed. He also viewed security as a fundamental public good that should form the basis of any system of world order. Wolfers likened international relations to the interaction of billiard balls, asserting that each state is a “closed, impermeable, and sovereign entity”. British scholar Rothschild (1995), in her study of security, proposed a conceptual four-dimensional model of national security, emphasizing the relationship between the state and international institutions. American researchers Buzan and Wæver (2003) focused on conceptualizing international security and examined the role of regional factors in the global security framework. Ukrainian scholar Sytnyk analyzed and reinterpreted historical perspectives on the formation of security architectures and discussed the main trends in the transformation of the international relations system (Sytnyk & Orel, 2021).

As for the formation of a new world order, it is the subject of research by scholars such as Gilpin (1994), who analyzed changes in the international order since World War II; Haass (2008), who explored the transition from a unipolar to a nonpolar global system; and Ikenberry (2010), who proposed a model of international relations in which the United States plays a dominant strategic role. Bulvinskyi (2017) examined the architecture of international relations in the context of the political modernization of post-Soviet states. However, insufficient attention has been given to the need to adapt international institutions to current security challenges and to the prospects of building a new world order amidst rising geopolitical competition.

The aim of this study is to define the current conditions and prospects for constructing a new system of world order and security architecture.

### **Research Methods**

This article employs a range of general scientific and specialized methods. The historical method was used to analyze systems of world order from the 17th century to the present, examining their characteristics and influence on the evolution of interstate relations and the resolution of global security issues.

The comparative method was applied to examine international institutions such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, WTO, and the CSTO. This enabled the identification of differences among these institutions, their founding goals and activities, their relevance to current security challenges, and their capacity to shape a new world order.

To study the transformation trends in the current global system and the existing security architecture, the analytical method was used. It helped assess the extent of transformation in military-political alliances, determine the level of escalation in armed conflicts, understand their impact on the global order, and identify problem areas in the process of constructing a new system and defining new “poles of influence”.

Finally, the generalization method was employed to formulate recommendations and conclusions concerning the contemporary prospects for developing a new system of world order and security architecture, particularly in terms of establishing new centers of global and regional influence.

### **Results**

In studying the formation of a new world order and security architecture, particular attention should be given to its establishment, normative framework, and prospects for development. The security

architecture of the world order is a combination of institutionalized and informal international mechanisms that regulate security relations at the global and regional levels, maintaining stability and reducing the risks of conflicts, threats, and crises (Bull, 1966; Northedge & Grieve, 1972; Hinsley, 1973). It includes normative foundations (international law, the UN Charter), institutions (the UN, NATO, OSCE), geopolitical balances, and ideological paradigms of global governance (Waltz, 1967; Burton, 1972; Walzer, 1977; Bull, 1979). According to Waltz, the structure of the international system determines its security architecture, which under conditions of anarchy is ensured by a balance of power (Waltz, 1979). Bull also described the security architecture as an anarchic society of states based on common interests, rules, and norms (Bull, 1977). At the same time, political scientist Lake emphasized (Lake, 2019) that it is inaccurate to call the international arena anarchic. On the contrary, this system shapes regional reserves of peace and cooperation. International hierarchical alliances act as a powerful force for maintaining peace both within and between confederations – instead of dozens of conflicting countries, negotiations are conducted by several coalitions.

We agree with Lake's explanation that powerful states benefit from weaker relations, while imperial coercion has not disappeared. Neighboring countries cede political questions to the hegemon, recognize its trade leadership, and act as allies in conflicts with other hegemonies, receiving opportunities to develop their economies, reduce spending on national defense and security, and more in return. Such reciprocal relations are legitimate and even popular. At the same time, Buzan and Wæver proposed the concept of regional security complexes, which form localized clusters of interdependence and risks (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). The authors offer a distinctive interpretation of international security after the Cold War, avoiding both extreme simplifications of a unipolar perspective and excessive deterritorialization seen in many globalist visions of new world disorder.

If we briefly examine the history of forming security systems of the world order, in most cases, it was a consequence of particular historical events, primarily major wars, followed by the redistribution of territories among the victorious states. Among the well-known systems that shaped the then-existing security architecture are the Westphalian, Vienna, Versailles-Washington, and Yalta-Potsdam systems. Each of them created specific rules for coexistence among states.

For example, the Westphalian system was formed after the Thirty Years' War as a result of signing the Peace of Westphalia, which established certain rules defining state sovereignty and the conditions for their participation in international processes, as well as a redistribution of territories and the designation of key centers of power. The goal of these transformations was to react promptly to problematic issues and potential conflicts through agreements resolved exclusively by peaceful means (Taran & Popov, 2023). The Peace of Westphalia had a significant impact on the development of international law and diplomacy, laying the foundations for the world order of that time, where the principle of national sovereignty made all countries equal and emphasized the inadmissibility of interference by European states in each other's internal affairs (Shumskyi, 2020).

The Vienna system was formed after the Napoleonic Wars through the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, which established a new distribution of political forces and an updated European order – another territorial redistribution among the leading states. The new security order was maintained by the Quadruple Alliance, which included the most influential powers of the continent: Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, each pursuing its own national interests. Later, France also joined in shaping the European order (Kissinger, 2017). This system lasted until the outbreak of the First World War, after which several empires collapsed, new states were created, another territorial redistribution took place by the victorious countries, and political regimes changed in many states.

The end of the First World War was marked by the formation of the new Versailles-Washington system. During this period, the first institution for collective security was also established – the League of Nations. However, this system was later criticized for the actual absence of conditions for the use of force to maintain peace and stable global coexistence. This point was also highlighted by renowned American diplomat and international relations expert Kissinger: "Rarely has a diplomatic document so completely failed to achieve its aims as the Versailles Treaty. Too punitive for reconciliation, yet too lenient to deter renewed German ambitions. The Versailles Treaty condemned the exhausted democracies to perpetual anxiety over an irreconcilable and revanchist Germany and a revolutionary Soviet Union" (Kissinger, 2017). One of the significant consequences of the weaknesses of the Versailles-Washington system, along with the irrepressible desire of certain states for a new redistribution of the world, was the outbreak of the Second World War.

A new system – the Yalta-Potsdam – was established as a result of the Second World War by the victorious states (USSR, USA, Great Britain). It fixed a new order based on a revised balance of power and the interests of the victorious states, primarily the USA and USSR. The world was divided into capitalist and socialist systems – ideologically opposed and competing with each other until nearly the end of the 20th century (Krushynskyi & Manzhola, 2007). At the institutional level, the responsibility for maintaining world order and safe coexistence was assigned to the United Nations (Taran, 2022). It should be noted that the UN has not become a maximally effective institution for resolving international conflicts and ensuring stable security. The biggest weakness in its functioning is seen by researchers in the privileged position of the victorious states of the Second World War, as they are not obliged to comply with the provisions of the global order. Moreover, they hold veto power, so enforcement measures are hardly applicable to them as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The involvement of these states in major global conflicts under conditions requiring unanimous decision-making directly indicates the ineffectiveness of the UN (Diurozel, 1995).

Additionally, a distinctive feature of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international security was the creation of an extensive network of structural military-political elements for ensuring regional military security. In post-war Europe, the foundation of the new security model's architecture was the creation in 1948 of the Western European Union (WEU) based on the Treaty of Brussels on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and collective self-defense between France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Over time, the number of member states in this European regional military-political organization increased, and by 2006 it included 10 member states, 3 associate members, and 8 observers (Denysov, 2005).

Despite the predominantly consultative and research-oriented nature of this Union's activities, it became the first attempt to create a modern regional system of collective security. It played a deterrent role and laid the groundwork for the development of new forms and institutions of security. Thus, in 1949, based on the Western European Union and with the active participation of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. At that time, its members included the United Kingdom, the French and Portuguese Republics, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, the United States of America, and Canada. The distinctive features of the new security model, which emerged with the establishment of NATO, included the significant expansion of the region's boundaries from a European to a Transatlantic scope, the adherence to the principle of equality among all member states, and the provision of security and protection for the Alliance's members against potential aggression.

From the moment the relevant cooperation agreement was signed in 1955 until the collapse of the USSR, NATO's opponent was the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO). Its members included the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Albania. According to the treaty, the participating states committed to refraining from the threat or use of force within international relations and to assisting one another – including through armed forces – in the event of an armed attack against any member (Melnykova, 2004).

However, many researchers noted frequent and serious violations of these fundamental principles by the member states of the WTO, which in part provoked the withdrawal of certain countries from the treaty and ultimately led to the organization's dissolution (Pavlenko, 2005).

The tough confrontation between the two military-political blocs led to increased military spending and accelerated the arms race. Both the USA and the USSR built extensive networks of military bases in other countries. As a result, the primacy of international law, declared at the founding of the United Nations as the basis of its activities (United Nations, 2021), was gradually replaced by the primacy of military force. The Helsinki Act of 1975 later established the foundation for the international security system – the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

This global division came to be characterized as a bipolar world order system, as two powerful superpowers functioned on the geopolitical stage, forming camps of supporters in the form of satellite states. It is considered that this was the most stable and secure system since a clear balance of power operated, and emerging local conflicts were manageable and took place with the support of the superpowers. A widely held view is that under a bipolar system, global security conditions are more stable and controllable than under a multipolar system. A key feature of the bipolar world, which existed from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the USSR, was that only two states had the greatest influence on global political processes and controlled the stability of international security. After the collapse of the USSR, the world

order began to be described as unipolar, with the United States occupying a dominant role in military, technological, and financial spheres.

It should be noted that new conditions required reform and modernization of the existing collective security system and a transition to a new security architecture. This process of transformation directly affected both NATO and the WTO. The latter completely ceased its activity after the collapse of the USSR. Following the dissolution of the WTO, in 1992, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was established in the post-Soviet space. This military-political international organization was intended to serve as an alternative to NATO.

Initially, military-political cooperation among states was regulated by the signed Collective Security Treaty (CST), and in 2002, the CST was transformed into a full-fledged international organization – the CSTO – with a Charter and an Agreement on the legal status of the organization, which were ratified by its member states. The original signatories of the CST included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia. Later, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus also joined. However, the composition of member states changed over the years, and as of April 2025, the CSTO includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

In order to enhance the CSTO's weight in the system of international relations, it obtained observer status at the United Nations General Assembly in 2004. In 2009, the leaders of CSTO member states signed an agreement on the creation of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (Konstantynov, 2004).

However, in its current form and condition, the CSTO can hardly be considered a genuine alternative to NATO. This is not only due to the scale of its operations and its level of influence but also because of internal crises caused by significant disagreements among its members, who primarily pursue their own, rather than collective, military-political goals in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (former members of the organization).

Regarding NATO, the restructuring of the European security system and the transition to a new architecture at the end of the 20th century provoked changes within the organization itself. At the London Summit in 1990, it was recognized that it was necessary to revise NATO's strategy and adapt to new conditions. Issues such as the reduction of armed forces due to the decreasing level of external threats and the need to strengthen cooperation with the newly established democracies of Eastern Europe were brought to the agenda.

The next step was the Rome Summit in 1991, where the Strategic Concept and the Declaration on Peace and Cooperation were adopted, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), aimed at fostering cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Later, this body was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which focused on consultations regarding the control and limitation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (Dzvinchuk, 2012).

Another important initiative in reforming the security system was NATO's Partnership for Peace program, designed to conduct joint military exercises, plan military development, and build trust among partner states. Additionally, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was introduced – a program of practical assistance and political dialogue for candidate states, implemented within individual frameworks with each country. As of now, NATO has 32 member states (NATO, 2024).

In the context of reforming the existing security system, it is also necessary to mention the world's largest regional intergovernmental security organization – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which includes 57 member states from North America, Europe, and Central Asia. Starting its work as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973, the organization set the goal of building a united, democratic, prosperous, and peaceful Europe. Under the auspices of the OSCE, dialogues on security issues, arms control, disarmament, and confidence-building measures have been conducted. Documents on the global exchange of military information, guidelines for nuclear non-proliferation, and a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security – which outlines obligations for the democratic control of armed forces and their use – have been adopted (Shemshuchenko, 2001).

According to the Helsinki Summit Declaration, the OSCE possesses a range of mechanisms for deploying official missions and personal representatives of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. These missions carry out monitoring, fact-finding, reporting, and mediating functions to prevent conflicts and resolve crisis situations (OSCE, 2005). It is logical to conclude that the OSCE could become an optimal platform for discussions and negotiations on the development of a new security architecture. However, on one hand, the OSCE is not a legally binding organization and does not have international legal personality. On the other

hand, a large number of member states with differing interests take part in the organization's activities, which creates divisions within the OSCE itself. For this reason, the issue of reforming the OSCE remains relevant, particularly in terms of agreeing on a new, universally acceptable, and effective agenda that meets today's challenges, along with defining common rules of engagement.

### **Peculiarities of the Formation of the Modern World Order**

In our view, the modern world order is forming under the influence of a changing global distribution of power, where a larger number of actors have the ability to impact key international issues (Brzezinski, 1997). At the same time, the world is also experiencing growing polarization – both at the international level and within the domestic politics of many countries (Fukuyama, 2018). In recent years, the concept of “multipolarity” has been increasingly used in professional high-level discussions. Moreover, some researchers believe that – judging by political speeches and strategic documents – a new multipolar order is either emerging now or already exists (Bunde et al., 2025). In contemporary political science discourse, various approaches can be found to explain the essence of multipolarity. These interpretations can be described in the following ways: as an expression of hope for global changes, as part of a “power game” aimed at involving countries of the so-called Global South, or as evidence of “intellectual avoidance” by those who prefer to ignore the growing dynamics of bloc confrontation (Bekkevold, 2023). In any case, these views reflect the multidimensionality of opinions regarding the existing and future world order.

Despite the large number of explanations, assumptions, and claims, researchers still find it difficult to interpret the nature of the current world order, which complicates outlining prospects for future coexistence and the construction of a new security architecture. At present, there is no unified agreement on whether today's world is uni-, bi-, multi-, or even non-polar. Moreover, no consensus exists regarding which actors can be considered as the respective poles in the current or future world order. This is connected to ongoing debates about defining great powers and the necessary criteria for states to claim such a status (Keersmaecker, 2016).

For some analysts, the world remains unipolar, and they do not see prospects for changes in the future. Although few still consider the United States an all-powerful superpower, these analysts argue that global shifts in the international system are less significant than often assumed. Relying on various indicators, members of this school of thought claim that the U.S. will remain the only superpower: “the world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, nor is it going to become either one” (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2023). Accordingly, the United States will become the core of the formation of a new security architecture – a guarantor of strength and stability not only in the Euro-Atlantic region but also globally. It should be noted that for several decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained a global network of partners and allies, as well as at least 128 foreign military bases in over 50 countries (The White House, 2022). Its military-technological superiority and rapid progress in the development of military technologies keep the U.S. far ahead of its nearest competitors – a situation quite different from previous eras before major world redistributions (Gilli, A. & Gilli, M., 2019).

Another group of analysts concludes that the direction of global changes points to the establishment of a bipolar system, where the United States and China acquire the status of superpowers, while for other states, the threshold of military and economic capacity remains unattainable (Lind, 2024; Kupchan, 2021). They consider “on the one hand, the narrowing power gap between China and the United States, and on the other – the widening gap between China and any third state” – which, in their view, leads to the formation of a new bipolar system (Tunsjø, 2018). In this situation, China does not consider it necessary to surpass the United States in military-economic power but rather to actively participate in international dialogue to become a serious competitor. In recent years, China has actively started to express its position on widespread global conflicts, whose parties are drawing more and more states to their side. Taking a stance of non-intervention, China proposes alternative measures and action plans for conflict resolution, including for Ukraine. For this reason, the United States takes a pragmatic view of the situation and perceives China as a real adversary. Thus, in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, the administration of then-President Biden identified China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so” (The White House, 2022). Under the new President Trump, China remains the main challenge to U.S. national security, as current military planning is largely focused on the indicators of China's military-economic potential. Already as a U.S. senator and now U.S. Secretary of State, Rubio openly stated: “Communist China is the most powerful adversary the United States has ever faced in living memory. This is not an exaggeration. We sometimes

forget that past enemies, including Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, had smaller economies than ours. Each tried to conquer neighbors and harm our country in the process. Each failed, because America outbuilt and outarmed them” (Rubio, 2024).

Another group of scholars believes that a multipolar world does not necessarily imply the existence of several states with approximately equal capabilities that could be classified as superpowers or “poles of influence”. In their view, a “multipolar world simply requires that significant power is concentrated in more than two states” (Ashford & Cooper, 2023). In this regard, countries such as Russia, France, Germany, India, Japan, or Brazil can be clearly recognized as “important global powers”.


Other researchers emphasize an even lower threshold for defining a state as a “pole of influence”, which is connected to the unprecedented level of interdependence between states due to globalization processes (Khylyko, M. & Khylyko, O., 2024). These processes have affected almost the entire world and have made relations between countries closer than ever before. As one scholar notes, “Any state that controls an important international resource or plays a significant international role in any field cannot be dismissed as a secondary player” (Kausikan, 2023). For example, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey – which were not previously considered “poles of influence” – now play an unusual yet influential role in international politics. Acting as mediators in military conflicts, performing peacekeeping missions, and economically stimulating the parties involved in conflicts, these countries directly influence the global security system and act as influential forces within their regional environment, and sometimes beyond it (Kausikan, 2023).

Finally, special attention should be paid to those scholars who argue that today’s club of great powers has far less influence than similar groups in the past because their “ability to settle issues of order among themselves and formalize relations of dominance over the rest of the system is now lower than it was in 1815, 1918, and 1948” (Græger et al., 2022). In this context, they emphasize the current trend toward nonpolarity, where major powers are more limited in their capacities and means of influence, as power is more widely distributed, can take different forms, but cannot be easily or quickly transferred from one sphere to another (Græger et al., 2022). These factors, according to researchers, explain the protracted nature of existing global conflicts and the high probability that they cannot be fully resolved. Scholars see the scenario of building a new world order architecture as problematic due to the lack of clearly expressed centers of influence with undeniable authority over the rest of the international community.

It should also be noted that the necessity of defining new outlines for the world order and its related security architecture remains on the agenda of many regional and global conferences and forums. For instance, in 2025, the Munich Security Conference Report was devoted to the challenges of multipolarity. The discussions held during the conference focused on identifying the character of the current global order, clarifying potential poles of the future world order, the degree of their polarization, possible consequences, and management methods in order to assess the level of necessity and the possibilities for constructing a new security architecture. A key issue of debate among the conference participants was the development of scenarios for the further evolution of the security system after passing the bifurcation point.

One method for identifying potential states capable of competing for military-political leadership and becoming a “pole of influence” in the new world order system is the calculation and comparison of states’ defense expenditures. In the 2025 Munich Security Report, among other criteria of state influence, data on the military spending of G7 and BRICS countries, aiming to play, if not leading, then at least significant roles in the new security system, were presented (see Fig. 1).

As shown in Fig. 1, the United States remains the undisputed leader in terms of military expenditure, surpassing its nearest competitors by more than three times. This indicator naturally presents the current state of affairs in a rather unipolar way. However, as mentioned earlier, for some countries such as China, it is not necessarily required to spend the same amount on defense. The pace of modernization in China’s military industry already causes serious concern among U.S. leadership. According to some analysts, as a result of the active build-up of military power, China has in certain areas already reached and in some cases surpassed the United States, which allows it to claim the status of a superpower (Bunde et al., 2025). Regarding the country with the third-largest defense budget – Russia – it remains the only nuclear superpower on par with the United States. Nonetheless, despite its nuclear arsenal, in the current global order, Russia is considered a regional power with significant national capabilities. Yet, in the new global distribution of power, it also seeks to claim the status of a “pole of influence”. The next country, India, while demonstrating steady growth and with the potential to shift the global system towards multipolarity in the future, currently spends only about one-third of China’s defense budget. As a result, it is unable to compete with the leading three powers, largely due to a range of domestic problems. The European Union



**Fig. 1. Military expenditures of G7 countries and key BRICS states**

*Source: Authors' development based on the 2025 Munich Security Report's data (Bunde et al., 2025).*

countries and the United Kingdom also show a relatively good result overall. However, individually, none of them can claim to be a “pole of influence” or play a large-scale role in shaping a new security system. Thus, according to this indicator, only three states can, to some extent, compete with one another, claim a worthy position in the new world order, and partially guarantee security for the global community.

Although the outlined considerations about possible scenarios for constructing a new world order and its related security architecture reveal common conclusions regarding the future of the international system, the debate on this issue remains unresolved. As Sørensen (2006) and Badie (2019) noted, “The current world order is an interregnum: a period when a new, stable order has not yet been established, while significant elements of the old order remain”. Therefore, in the search for a new balance of power, in our opinion, several aspects should be taken into account as recommendations.

First, while building a new security architecture, it is necessary to consider not only traditional but also new risks and threats caused by information development, globalization, and gradual attempts to reverse it – all while retaining the relevance of external military danger and the potential for large-scale battles involving mass armies and extensive military equipment (Prymush, 2006).

Second, it remains difficult to create a unified global security field. A potential system may consist of regional security structures of varying weights, involving states with different statuses and levels of power. In recent decades, although the world has retained its main centers of power (the United States, European Union, China, Russia), not only has the balance of power and influence between them changed significantly, but so has the distribution of resources and military-political potential within these centers. A crucial difference in today's agenda is that the center of the global system of international security is starting to shift. The core of the new architecture will likely no longer be limited to the European and Euro-Atlantic regions. Increasing attention is being drawn to the growing military-political potential of Asian countries, which are seeking to expand their influence by securing the support of other states and regional leaders who, in turn, aim to participate in and strengthen their positions in the future world order. Consequently, while previous security systems were typically built around the most powerful states across all spheres, today the formation of rules for establishing and functioning of the new security architecture should involve all states that possess significant international influence.



Third, the modern international security system is characterized by anthropocentrism. Amid the revision of the existing security system and the development of a new architecture, it seems necessary to preserve this trend. The human need for security is reaffirmed through a focus on achieving global and universal public goods such as physical and political safety, political freedoms, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Lavrynenko & Donaj, 2023).

Fourth, today's international security is ensured by means and methods fundamentally new in content. In particular, this concerns the nature of state governance. In the context of security protection, emphasis is placed on upholding the principle of effective state governance within the framework of democratic principles. The promotion of good governance practices, the fight against corruption and abuse of power, the strengthening of the rule of law and protection of human rights, and the support of political and social reforms are considered the most effective tools for reinforcing international order. Most EU countries adhere to these principles consistently. However, questions have recently arisen regarding their key security partner – the United States – especially after the election of a new president. Fukuyama, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, has openly criticized the policies of Trump. According to Fukuyama, “America is experiencing a process of repatrimonialization, as have many other societies before it”, since, in the researcher's view, the new president and his entourage “deliberately dismantle existing constitutional checks on executive power in the U.S. system. He never attempted to pass policies through the Republican-controlled Congress, preferring instead to rule by executive order” (Fukuyama, 2025). Additionally, recent statements by the current president regarding the potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO or the reduction of American financial contributions to the organization further prompt a reassessment of the United States' global role as the guardian of the international order. This is primarily a signal to EU countries to revise their own defense capabilities and reconsider their place in the emerging world order. Through consolidation, they can preserve their influence on the international stage and remain full-fledged actors in the future global system.

### Conclusions

The modern world order is experiencing a phase of transformation, generating discussions and presenting several challenges to the global community. Firstly, in the past, after a change of epochs, it was possible to clearly identify the victors on the world stage, who then set the rules of international relations. Today's situation shows the absence of clearly defined global centers of influence in the form of superpowers, whose dominance would be indisputable. This uncertainty is associated with two factors: intense competition between states claiming world leadership, and the incomplete nature of the current transition to a new historical period.

Secondly, the nature of the activity of existing security alliances and institutions is also either in need of change or is already undergoing transformation. For example, in the cases of the UN and the OSCE, researchers emphasize the outdated mechanisms, forms, and methods of their functioning, as well as their inability to effectively resolve modern conflicts. Events of recent years have revealed the paralysis of the UN, especially when two permanent members – who possess veto power – find themselves in open confrontation. The vulnerability of the OSCE is mainly caused by internal factors, as member states often use the organization as a tool to achieve their own goals, which does not help reduce tension in international conflicts. In the context of the new U.S. policy, NATO also faces new challenges, and for the Alliance to remain effective, it will be necessary to implement a number of reforms. The most problematic situation appears to be within the CSTO, which currently cannot compete with NATO and, if it fails to overcome internal contradictions, may risk ceasing to exist.

Uncertainty about the character of the existing world order provokes ongoing debates about the future. At present, there is no consensus among researchers about whether the modern world is uni-, bi-, multi-, or non-polar. Supporters of each position present their arguments, but the central issue remains the question of which states should be considered superpowers and which do not meet that status. Some believe that the current world order is unipolar with the dominant role of the United States, a position it is likely to maintain. Others argue that the U.S. already faces a strong rival in China, which is capable of setting its own rules and influencing the global agenda. A third group views the world as a system where power is concentrated in more than two states, though not necessarily with equal capacities. In this context, France, Germany, Russia, India, Japan, and Brazil are also seen as important international actors with ambitions to participate in shaping a new security architecture. Meanwhile, some researchers point to an unprecedented level of interdependence caused by globalization processes, making state relations more interconnected than

ever and preventing the formation of clear global leaders. Lastly, a number of experts argue that today's club of major powers has significantly less influence than similar alliances in the past, due to their inability to independently resolve global problems. Therefore, the modern world is increasingly showing signs of a tendency toward nonpolarity.

The quantitative indicators of military expenditures by G7 and BRICS member states presented in this study demonstrate a significant lead by the United States. However, the active increase in military power and modernization in China enhances its ability to compete with the United States. Russia also stands out as a nuclear state, currently considered a regional power with considerable national potential and aspirations for global leadership. India's influence is still mainly projected for the future, while the European Union states can claim the status of a "pole of influence" only collectively. Thus, according to this indicator, only three states can to some extent compete with one another, claim a worthy place in the new world order, and offer a certain guarantee of global security.

Considering the ongoing debate on the issue of building a new world order and security architecture, this study emphasizes the importance of taking several factors into account while searching for a new balance of power: when constructing a new security system, it is necessary to consider not only traditional but also new threats generated by the information age, globalization, and attempts to reverse it, while maintaining the relevance of external military dangers and large-scale conflicts involving mass armies. A potential future security system may consist of regional security structures of unequal weight, including states with different status positions and military capabilities. Given the ongoing revision of the existing security system and the development of a new one, it is essential to preserve the principle of anthropocentrism. Additionally, ensuring international security today requires placing special emphasis on effective state governance in accordance with democratic principles.

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