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NAVIGATING GLOBAL SOUTH'S AMBIVALENT STANCE ON RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

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Abstract

The study reveals the complexity of the Global South's stance on the Russia-Ukraine war within a broader context of a changing world order. Through the lens of neorealism and constructivism, we explore how the positions of the Global South countries are influenced by their vision of own national interests, divergent perceptions of the causes and possible consequences of the war, and of the roles of the parties involved with regard to the prospects of reshaping the global system of international relations.

We trace the increasing attention to the Global South in the West and the evolution of its perception from the concept of an economically disadvantaged Third World to an important geopolitical player. We discuss why the postcolonial perspective of war that has gained traction in Ukraine is perceived differently in the Global South due to their own historical experience, the role of the West, and Russian propaganda. We also analyse why the Western framing of the Russia-Ukraine war in the context of preserving the existing world order and as a battle between democracy and autocracy has limited appeal for the Global South.

We discuss how pragmatic indifference and strategic opportunism are preventing countries in the Global South from taking a more active stance on the war, and how their governments are seeking to mitigate or compensate for the negative effects of the war. We analyse how China's perception of the war is influenced by competition with the U.S. and aspirations to build a multipolar world devoid of Western hegemony, and how Beijing's pro-Russian neutrality affects the position of the Global South.

The article reveals how Ukraine, faced with the challenge of gaining political support from the Global South, while being critically dependent on military and financial assistance from the Global North, has achieved certain progress in this regard, but still seeks a more active engagement of the Global South as a potential balancing force in world order.

Keywords: Global South, Russia-Ukraine war, Third World, Non-Aligned Movement, postcolonialism, world order.

Introduction

Traditionally, the Global South has been referred to in international relations as a post-Cold War alternative to the term "Third World", economically disadvantaged nation-states, mostly members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Mahler, 2017). But today, the Global South is significantly different from how it was perceived in previous decades. While to a certain extent it is still about the "spaces and peoples

negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization" (Mahler, 2017), it is also about "a multifaceted movement that underscores the need for a postcolonial international community of interest" (Grovogui, 2011), a powerful force "to present and claim future alternatives to neoliberal globalization" (Ballestrin, 2020), countries from across the globe with variegated economic and political systems and asymmetrical power that does not prevent them from "taking common policy positions in international affairs and multilateral settings" (Brosig & Verma, 2024).

The growing influence of the Global South on international relations is increasing the competition for its countries' support between the Global North, primarily the United States and the European Union, and the Global East, particularly Russia and China.

The deficit of comprehending the evolved Global South as a geopolitical actor makes it challenging to understand the motivations and predict the policies of its actors, as illustrated by the difficulties in the U.S. and Europe's attempts to find common ground with the Global South in elaborating a coherent position of the international community on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In this paper, we will aim to consider the complexity of the Global South's views on the Russia-Ukraine war within the context of a broader picture of the changing world order, the main factors and trends in this perspective, and what it means for Ukraine and for the international relations studies on the Global South.

Methodology

This study relies on the rationalist and constructivist approaches to interpreting international relations, as well as the power transition theory. The former approaches help to understand how the egoistic national interests of the Global South countries and their divergent interpretations of the conflict and the roles of the parties involved influence their stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. The power transition theory initiated by Abramo Organski (1958) suggests a useful angle to explain how and why global players compete for the voices of the Global South states to establish favourable global hierarchy with asymmetrically distributed power which can reassure peace (Kugler & Organski, 1989).

We begin with analysing how the perception of the Global South has been reconsidered in international relations (IR) studies, evolving from the concept of an economically disadvantaged Third World to an important geopolitical actor that is gaining increasing influence. In the following sections, we explore the Global South countries' stance on Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting its ambivalence and unwillingness to clearly take sides. We further analyse the complexity of the factors that influence the position of the Global South, including the postcolonial legacy and utilisation of it by Russia in attempts to justify its aggression against Ukraine.

We explore how the perspectives of pragmatic indifference and strategic opportunism are pushing the Global South countries to refrain from taking a more active position in the war, including imposing economic sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, we analyse China's stance and its role in shaping position of the Global South countries, and explore how they perceive the conflict through the prism of their attitude to the existing world order and their aspirations for a more just system of international relations. We conclude with a reflection on Ukraine's attempts to gain support from the Global South and the prospects for further development.

"A Vital New Force in international affairs"

Back in the distant 1964, British sociologist Peter Worsley in his book "The Third World" predicted the emergence of "a vital new force in international affairs" (Worsley, 1964). Today, this is taking place, and the new dynamics in IR are widely recognised by scholars and policymakers. Prof. John Ikenberry from Princeton University names the Global South, along with the Global West, and the Global East, as "Three Worlds" offering their "grand narratives" and "seeking to shape global rules and institutions" (Ikenberry, 2024). Prof. Stephan Klingebiel from the German Institute of Development and Sustainability points out that "actors in the Global South are no longer merely participants on the sidelines, but active co-players which many actors are trying to win over" (Klingebiel, 2023). U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called Africa, the continent with the largest number of the Global South countries, "a major geopolitical force" that "will shape our future" (Blinken, 2022).

It is not surprising that, according to the Google Books Ngram Viewer, the mention of the Global South in books increased 32 times between 2000 and 2019, as shown in Fig. 1 (Google Books Ngram Viewer, 2024).



Fig. 1. The term "Global South" in a corpus of books, indexed by Google Books, 2000-2019. Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer (as of 7 July 2024).

Even more revealing is the data from Scopus and Web of Science Core Collection, where the number of indexed publications with the term "Global South" in the title increased hundreds of times from 2000 to 2023. If in the early 2000s the number of indexed publications with the term "Global South" in the title in Scopus and Web of Science was estimated at a few per year, in 2023, more than 600 such publications were indexed in Scopus and almost 500 in Web of Science, as shown in Fig. 2 (Scopus, 2024a, 2024b; Web of Science, 2024a, 2024b).



Fig. 2. The number of publications with "Global South" and "Third World" in the titles, indexed in Scopus and Web of Science Core Collection, for 2000-2023. Sources: Scopus, Web of Science (as of 7 July 2024).

It is noteworthy that in this case, the term "Global South" has not just replaced the term "Third World," the number of references to which in the titles of publications indexed in Scopus and Web of Science has not changed significantly, with some deviations in different years. Therefore, we can certainly state the growing academic interest in the "Global South" and not just the substitution of one term for another.

It is also worth noting that out of a total of 3,273 publications with the term "Global South" in the titles indexed in Scopus for 2000-2023, most authors are affiliated with the United States (745 publications),

the United Kingdom (608), South Africa (376), Germany (276), and Canada (229). The situation is similar with the publications indexed in Web of Science Core Collection: out of a total of 2,936 publications with the term "Global South" in the titles indexed for 2000-2023, most authors are affiliated with the United States (730 publications), England (503), South Africa (289), Germany (214), and Canada (213).

Thus, out of the top five countries of affiliation for the authorship of publications with the term "Global South" in the titles indexed in 2000-2023, only one is from the Global South itself, namely the Republic of South Africa, while four represent the Global North. On the one hand, this indicates a significant and growing interest of the countries of the Global North in the Global South. On the other hand, it also indicates that the position of the academic community of the Global South itself is underrepresented in the world's leading academic publication databases, which is unlikely to be beneficial to a better understanding of the motivations that influence policy-making in the Global South.

Postcolonial and Non-Aligned Legacy, Pragmatic Indifference and Strategic Opportunism

From a postcolonial perspective, which has recently gained a new impetus in academic research and political rhetoric in Ukraine, the ambiguous position of the Global South on Russia's invasion of Ukraine might seem paradoxical. After the colonial nature of Russia's war against Ukraine was highlighted by a number of reputable scholars on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g., Mälksoo, 2022; Snyder, 2022), and after Russian president Vladimir Putin openly linked his actions to the 18th-century territorial conquest of Russia's first emperor, Peter the Great (OSN, 2022), Kyiv expected more unified support from countries that had themselves suffered from colonialism not long ago.

During the vote on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4 (12 October 2022), condemning the Russian Federation's attempted illegal annexation of four regions of Ukraine and demanding the withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine, 143 countries voted in favour, while 5 voted against, 35 abstained, and 10 did not vote (Mälksoo L., 2023). Of these 50 countries that in one form or another did not support the resolution, almost all of them represent the Global South, plus several post-Soviet states dependent on Russia. Namely, Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, and Syria voted against the resolution. Algeria, Armenia, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Pakistan, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe abstained. Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, São Tomé and Príncipe, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela did not vote (Besheer, 2022).

Notably, most South American, and African countries supported Resolution ES-11/4, which condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine, with no African country voting against it. Another important indicator of the predominantly negative perception of African countries towards Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine was the fact that only 17 heads of state participated in the Second Russia-Africa Summit in 2023, compared to 43 heads of state who attended the First Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 (ISSAfrica, 2023). Below we will consider why, despite the generally negative perception of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the countries of the Global South mostly prefer to refrain from taking an active position in condemning Russia's actions.

When analysing the situation through the prism of postcolonialism, it should be kept in mind that it has a completely different perspective for the countries of the Global South than for Ukraine. And this is not surprising, because even for the countries of the Global North, which overwhelmingly actively support Kyiv in its opposition to Russian aggression, until recently the Ukrainian stance was less welcomed than the Russian one, and Ukrainian studies, including on colonialism, have long remained "subaltern and marginalized" vis-a-vis Russian studies even in the West (Chernetsky, 2003; Kurylo, 2023; O'Sullivan & Krulišová, 2023).

For the countries of the Global South, the perception of the Ukrainian perspective on the colonial nature of Russian aggression is even more challenging due to their own colonial legacy of the 20th century. For "the Western governments now supporting Ukraine's resistance to Russian imperialism were previously the colonial powers ruling the peoples of the Global South, while the USSR often supported anti-colonial struggles" (Karadjis, 2023).

And Russia's official and latent propaganda is making every effort to maintain and strengthen its image as a leader in the fight against neocolonialism (Shekhovtsov, 2022). To this end, "Russian leadership portrays the conflict in Ukraine as a Western attempt to colonise Russia" (Kozyrev, 2023), "cynically attempting

to frame Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine as an anti-colonial response to Western hegemony" (Šćepanović, 2024). Moreover, this position is being promoted not only at the political and media level through the powerful mechanisms of Russian information policy (Bondarenko et al., 2020), but also in the academic sphere. For example, Viatcheslav Morozov, former professor at the University of Tartu, in his book "Russia's Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World" explains Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine as the "defensive moves", provoked by "what it perceives is an expansion of the Western empire, which through a series of 'colour revolutions' is consolidating its hegemonic position in world affairs" (Morozov, 2015, p. 135).

To illustrate the scale of Russian propaganda's influence, it is worth mentioning that the Spanish-language versions of Russia Today TV and Sputnik Radio alone have an audience of more than 30 million regular viewers and listeners (Farah & Ortiz, 2023). At the same time, Ukraine and its Western partners are far behind in terms of information activity in the Global South, where Russian narratives have a broader reach (Klyszcz, 2023). Efforts to challenge Russian postcolonial narratives in the academic community (e.g., Durdiyeva, 2023; Hendl et al., 2023; Mälksoo M., 2023) also still remain rare voices.

Along with the ambiguous interpretations of the postcolonial moment in the Russia-Ukraine war, another factor preventing the Global South countries from taking a more clear position is their non-aligned heritage. Founded to counterbalance the bipolarization and to advance interests of developing countries amid the 20th century Cold War confrontation, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) continues to influence the international stance of its member states. As the Russia-Ukraine war has revitalised the East-West rivalry and the Cold War geopolitics (Dąbrowska, 2023), non-aligned countries are trying to avoid taking sides and direct involvement in the confrontation, as well as minimize the damage caused by the war.

A comprehensive analysis of the reasons influencing the Global South's stance on Russia-Ukraine war also requires not losing sight of the fact that national governments tend to make cost-benefit assessments, prioritising their own national interests. This includes rationalising from perspectives such as pragmatic indifference and strategic opportunism. Countries of the Global South prefer the status quo to policy change, as change requires the expenditure of economic and political resources, and they are not prepared/willing to bear these costs. Global South actors also "try to offset the negative consequences of the war through strategic gains in other areas" (Brosig & Verma, 2024).

Although Russia is not a major trade partner for the Global South, but it is still an important exporter of energy, fertilizer, food, and arms. In some cases, the countries of the Global South have difficulties finding an adequate alternative to Russian supplies, while others decided not to miss the opportunity to negotiate more favourable terms of trade under Western sanctions and disregard the moral aspect of such a decision. Many governments "approach the Russian invasion pragmatically and try to generate economic benefits from a purely interest-driven, transactional perspective" (Öniş, 2022).

For example, after losing a significant part of its European export market, Russia offered China significant price discounts for oil, gas and coal supplies (Düben, 2024). Although Russia is not Indonesia's largest trading partner, but supplies of Russian potassic fertilisers, coal briquettes, asbestos, refined petroleum, and semi-finished iron are important for Indonesia's economic development (Sebastian & Priamarizki, 2024).

Another example is India which strives to become a leading world power and whose government considers Russia as an important partner in strengthening India's military capacities. Russia has long been and remains India's primary arms provider, and even though New Delhi has been trying to diversify its arms supplies in recent years, it still needs a steady flow of Russian weapons and spare parts to ensure the effective operation of its armed forces (Kronstadt, 2022). Another factor that encourages New Delhi to continue military-technical cooperation with Moscow is the transfer of military technology. Unlike Russia, India's other important arm-trade partners, such as the U.S., the UK, France, and Israel, "have not been willing to collaborate and cooperate with India in the joint development and production of state-of-the-art military platforms" (Verma, 2024).

China's Role and Scepticism Towards the Western-led World Order

China's "pro-Russian neutrality position" in the Russia-Ukraine war (Kozyrev, 2023) is an important signal for the Global South countries that influence their stance on this issue. As the most important trade partner and investor in infrastructure development in the Global South, China naturally also aspires to be its informal political leader.

Most countries in the Global South trade more with China than with the U.S., for example, China overtook the U.S. as Brazil's largest trading partner already in 2009. Beijing has increased its investment in Africa from $75 million in 2003 to $5 billion in 2021 (Freitas, 2023). In 2000-2022, Chinese lenders provided 1,243 loans amounting to $170.08 billion to 49 African governments and 7 regional institutions. This is 64% of the World Bank's $264.15 billion in sovereign loans to Africa and almost five times the African Development Bank's $36.85 billion in sovereign loans to Africa in the same time period (Moses et al., 2023).

Moreover, amid the Western-controlled global economic system's failure to provide the resources that would enable the Global South to develop (Krause, 2024), China is proposing "the developmental model that raised its people out of obscurity and poverty to developed global superpower status in a few short decades" (Dreyer, 2023), and this model seems attractive to both ordinary citizens and governments in the Global South. People get hope for rapid poverty alleviation, while ruling elites see an opportunity to achieve economic development without the need for a political transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.

Therefore, when Xi Jinping makes his first foreign visit after being re-elected for a third term to Moscow, he sends an important signal to numerous China's partners in the Global South. Beijing's position on the war is determined not so much by its attitude towards Russia and Ukraine as by the perception of the war in the broader context of the great power competition and possible reshaping of the world order. Debating the difficult political choices facing Beijing in the wake of the war, China's expert and academic community is mostly inclined to conclude that in the context of U.S. global dominance, Russia remains China's key partner to counter-balance American global power and regional influence (Sagild & Hsiung, 2024). This emphasis is reinforced by the Chinese government's tendency to correlate the Russian narrative of NATO's eastward expansion with Beijing's own concerns about the U.S.-led alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the "Quad" with India, Japan, and Australia, and the AUKUS security partnership with Australia and the UK (Düben & Wang-Kaeding, 2023).

There is also a viewpoint in China that this war is a proxy conflict waged by the United States against Russia (Sagild & Hsiung, 2024), or even China itself (Bachulska & Leonard, 2023) in order to contain the latter in light of Beijing's ambitions to become a leading global power (Leoni & Strina, 2024). Some Chinese experts and scholars also argue that through this war, the U.S. seeks to consolidate its transatlantic partnership with the European Union, as well as strengthen its military hegemony and influence on the global energy sector (Zhen, 2023).

According to Vitaly Kozyrev, "China utilises the Russian-Ukrainian war" as an instrument of pressure on the West, demanding that Beijing's proposals for a new world order be heard by the West (Kozyrev, 2023). Therefore, it is not surprising that the 12-point "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" published in February 2023 contained Beijing's vision of a multi-polar world devoid of Western hegemony. For example, it called for the strict observation of the "universally recognized international law" and rejection of the "double standards". It also stressed that security of one country "should not be pursued at the expense of others", and "the legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries" must be seriously taken and properly addressed (MFA of China, 2023).

In May 2024, "Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" was published, calling for deescalation, dialogue and negotiation, international peace conference recognized by both Russia and Ukraine, avoidance of nuclear crisis, and opposing to "dividing the world into isolated political or economic groups" (MFA of China, 2024). Notably, both Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, and Li Haidong, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University, commented this Sino-Brazilian common understandings as a representative viewpoint of the Global South, which advocates for a "more balanced and reasonable structure of world power" and "fairer global order" (Zhang Han, 2024).

While Western leaders frame the Russia-Ukraine war in the context of preserving the existing world order and as a "battle between democracy and autocracy" (Biden, 2022), it is reasonable to question whether the Global South is satisfied with the existing world order enough to defend it, and whether the choice between liberal democracy and autocracy is perceived there in the same way as in the Global North?

The problem is that the answers to both questions are negative rather than positive. From the perspective of the Global South, the existing world order "is a deeply unjust system that primarily protects the interests of the West, and especially those of the USA" (Klingebiel, 2023). Furthermore, the Global South "does not want to support Ukraine when it is seen as a struggle between Western liberal democracy –

let alone American hegemony – and Russia" (Ikenberry, 2024). And it is hard to disagree with scholars who argue that framing confrontation as democracy vs. authoritarianism has limited appeal for the Global South (Tsang, 2023), as the political elites in the Global North and the Global South have different visions of priorities and guiding principles for the world order. The former emphasising democracy, market economy and universal human rights, and the latter prioritising national autonomy, non-intervention in internal affairs and state-permeated economies (Schirm, 2023).

Wars and violations of international law can hardly surprise the Global South countries, many of which have been facing such violations in their neighbourhood for decades, which "tend to remain sidelined in the media and political discussions in most parts of the world" (Forsberg & Patomäki, 2023), despite the fact that examples of massive human suffering in the Global South have become reference cases for investigations of this type of crime (Naumkina et al., 2024). Therefore, while the countries of the Global South are unlikely to believe that Russia is fighting for a more just world order, neither should they be assumed to have a strong interest in defending the current Western-led world order, which they see as unjust and insufficiently responsive to their national interests that "may not always coincide with the interests of the West" (Kipiani, 2023).

The scepticism of the Global South is additionally exacerbated by the negative image created by some recent experiences of the U.S.-led interventions, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. So, the Western-led support for Ukraine is seen by many in the Global South as a manifestation of the U.S. hegemony, and "it is not a cause they want to embrace" (Ikenberry, 2024). This scepticism also extends to the issue of sanctions. Guillaume Long, former foreign minister of Ecuador, argues that many in Latin America consider sanctions to be selective and politicized, with a lot of double standards, and that they are "a tool of the US hegemony rather than a tool of global justice" (Guyer, 2022).

Therefore, not seeing geopolitical advantages in engaging in the struggle to preserve the current world order, especially if it may be associated with certain economic losses due to restrictions on trade with Russia, the Global South countries "do not see much value in strongly aligning with either side, the West or Russia", and prefer to rhetorically condemn the invasion but not to impose sanctions (Brosig & Verma, 2024). Thus, the critical attitude towards the Western-led world order negatively affects the consolidation of the Global South's support for Ukraine, which, on the one hand, is critically dependent on the support of Western partners, and on the other hand, is a kind of "collateral victim" of the South's scepticism towards the West.

Ukraine's Struggle to Win the Support of the Global South

While resisting full-scale Russian aggression, Ukraine faces a difficult challenge in international relations − receiving critical military and financial assistance from its partners in the Global North, Kyiv also needs political support from countries in the Global South, whose role in world affairs continues to grow. As discussed above in the article, most countries of the Global South have taken an ambivalent position, denouncing Russian aggression on the one hand, but avoiding more active actions, including economic sanctions, on the other.

A positive moment for Ukraine is the fact that Russia has not succeeded in gaining clear support even from its partners in BRICS, an organisation created with the participation of important players in the Global South, including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa (Karadjis, 2023). Moreover, during the important voting on the UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4 entitled "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations", Brazil voted for it, while China, India, and South Africa abstained (Besheer, 2022). According to numerous surveys, since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, public opinion support for Russia has dropped globally, including among citizens of the Global South countries, and even in the BRICS member states of Brazil and India, the majority sympathized with Ukraine amid the war unleashed by Russia (Karadjis, 2023).

Analysis of the voting in the UN General Assembly in 2023, indicates that "all things being equal, a country's support for Ukraine is somewhat correlated with its wealth", and Ukraine gains less support from the poorest countries than from the richer ones (Véron, 2023). In this regard, an important step was the launch of the humanitarian food programme "Grain from Ukraine", which supplied Ukrainian grain to a number of countries in Africa and Asia facing malnutrition and hunger (MFA of Ukraine, 2024).

In the context of scepticism in many Global South countries about the current world order, which they consider unjust (Klingebiel, 2023), it is also reasonable that Ukraine emphasises the importance of the UN Charter and includes in its peace plan, as first steps, the provisions beneficial to the common good of the entire international community, such as radiation and nuclear safety, including the ban on nuclear

blackmailing; food security, including safe export of grain to the countries of Global South; and energy security, including the ban on weaponization of energy resources (Zelenskyy, 2022b).

Numerous visits of Ukrainian officials to the capitals of the Global South countries and bilateral top-level meetings, as well as media interviews and video addresses by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the political, expert and academic communities in the Global South (e.g., Zelenskyy, 2022a, 2022c, 2023) demonstrate the seriousness with which Kyiv perceives the need to enlist the support of the Global South. It is also indicative that half of the top-level bilateral meetings held by the Ukrainian president during the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on 15-16 June 2024, were with leaders of the Global South countries, namely: Argentina, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, and Palau. In his speech at the Global Peace Summit, Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasised that a just end to Russia's war against Ukraine should mean a transition to the fair application of the UN Charter and international law for every nation in the world (Zelenskyy, 2024).

Evidently, Ukraine has learnt the lessons of previous years, when it relied mainly on the assistance of its Western partners from NATO, the EU and the OSCE to counter Russian aggression (Tytarchuk & Khylko, 2016), and since the full-scale invasion, Kyiv has been actively working to gain truly global support. Ukraine's certain progress in engaging support from the Global South is indicated by the fact that as of 11 July 2024, out of 87 states that signed the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework following the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland, 36 signatures represent Global South countries. Despite lacking China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, the list of signatories includes such important regional players as Argentina, Kenya, Philippines, and Türkiye (FDFA, 2024). It should also be taken into account that China and Brazil are promoting their own vision of the war settlement, mentioned earlier in the article, that reflects Beijing's ambitions for leadership within the Global South and beyond.

Conclusions

It was not the Russian-Ukrainian war that gave rise to the Global South as an important geopolitical player, but the competition for support from the Global South between Ukraine and its Western partners, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other, that forced the world community to acknowledge the increased role of the Global South.

While not supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and simultaneously having a historically motivated lack of trust in Kyiv's partners from the Global North, the countries of the Global South are seeking to avoid direct involvement in confrontation and at the same time not to miss the opportunity to take advantage of the growing need for their voice to demand a more just world order with due respect to their national interests.

For international relations studies, the growing geopolitical influence of the Global South means that there is a need to engage more with scholars and analysts from these countries to better comprehend perspectives and positions from the ground, not only through the lens of Western IR paradigms.

It is in the world community's common interest that the Global South acts as one of the independent balancing pillars of the world order, in cooperation and competition with the Global West and Global East. It is important that, while legitimately defending its subjectivity from the West, the Global South does not fall into a new dependence, this time on the East. The growing weight on the international stage also places greater responsibility on the Global South itself, as its role and position significantly influence what the world of tomorrow will look like, including whether it will be a safer place than it is today.

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UN PRACTICE IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DURING ARMED CONFLICTS

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Abstract

This article examines the critical role of the United Nations (UN) in shaping the mechanisms for protecting human rights during armed conflicts, focusing on three interconnected aspects. First, it explores the UN's influence on the evolution of international legal frameworks, particularly the development of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). These frameworks have been crucial in addressing the complexities of human rights protection amidst the chaos of warfare. The UN's involvement has not only helped establish these norms but also promoted their implementation in various conflict scenarios, thereby contributing to a more humane conduct of hostilities. On the other hand, the UN's approach to this issue has given rise to a number of problems and raised questions that have not been resolved to date.

The article also pays considerable attention to examining UN practice on the issue of the interrelation between IHL and IHRL. It analyzes the ongoing debate regarding the applicability and precedence of these legal frameworks in UN practice. The article as well discusses the differing views on whether IHL, as the lex specialis, should override IHRL during armed conflicts, or whether both should be applied complementarily. This discussion highlights the challenges in ensuring that human rights are upheld even in the dire circumstances of war, where the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations is constantly tested.

In addition, the article addresses the responsibility of armed groups that commit massive human rights violations during armed conflicts, particularly when these groups are under the control of a state. It examines the legal implications of state responsibility for the actions of such groups, as outlined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other bodies of UN. The article also considers the challenges in holding states accountable, given the complex nature of modern armed conflicts where non-state actors play a significant role.

Focusing on these three aspects, the authors argue that in recent decades there has been a clear trend of convergence between IHL and IHRL in the field of human rights protection during armed conflicts, and this has been largely facilitated by the practice of the UN and especially the International Court of Justice.

Keywords: International Human Rights Law, IHRL, International Humanitarian Law, IHL, human rights, armed conflict, International Court of Justice, strict control, effective control.

Introduction

The twentieth century was marked not only by the rapid growth of international legal and national human rights protection systems, but also by unprecedented international crimes that affected millions of people around the world. As history shows, massive human rights violations are most often accompanied by armed conflicts that occur even in contravention of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force

or threat of force, which in the post-war period became the cornerstone on which the entire existing system of international relations is built. The inability of mankind to abandon armed conflicts has necessitated making them more humane. As a result, this led to the active development of IHL. The ancient Roman rule that "when weapons speak, laws are silent" no longer applied. An additional factor that led to the active development of IHL is the fact that a significant number of states that actively participated in the process of developing such norms did not expect to be forced to apply them at some point. However, after that, there were quite serious changes in the "paradigm of international relations" and the most democratic states with fairly effective national mechanisms for the protection of human rights were forced to use IHL, including on their own territory.

At the same time, in the second half of the twentieth century, quite a few acts were adopted to regulate the protection of human rights in peacetime, and a number of both universal and regional institutions were created to monitor the implementation of such international legal documents, which generally led to the emergence of IHRL. With that, the developers of such acts, taking into account the existing principle of "prohibition of force and threat of force", did not always foresee the specifics of their application during armed conflicts.

Equally important is the fact that the very nature of armed conflicts has changed significantly in the post-war period. Previously, wars between states prevailed. However, in the post-war world, most armed conflicts are non-international. At the same time, the legal regulation of such conflicts is complicated by, for example, foreign military intervention by another state. The participation of private military companies, non-state armed groups, terrorist organizations, etc. in the conflict has become a significant problem. All of the above once again emphasizes the importance of studying the issue of human rights protection during armed conflicts.

The institutional basis of the modern legal order is the UN, so it is not surprising that it is the practice of this organization in a particular area that is crucial for determining the main approaches to solving most of the current problems of international law. This article is devoted to the analysis of the UN approaches to the problem of human rights protection during armed conflicts.

It is clear that it is impossible to cover all aspects of this problem in this article. Therefore, we will try to focus on its three main aspects: 1) to analyse the history of the development of legal regulation in this area; 2) to characterize the main approaches of UN bodies to the problem of correlation between IHL and IHRL; 3) to reveal the practice of the International Court of Justice regarding the responsibility of states for actions committed by groups under state control.

Materials and Methods

The issue of human rights protection during armed conflicts is widely covered in modern studies. Most authors focus on the correlation between IHL and IHL (Droege, 2008; Todeschini, 2018; Schäfer, 2006). Another group of sources includes studies aimed at studying the history of the formation and development of IHL (Islam, 2018; Pictet, 1984), as well as the impact of international institutions, such as the ICRC (Lysyk, 2012), the ECHR (Reidy, 1998) and some others on the development of IHL. However, the role of the UN in the process of implementation of international law regulating the protection of human rights during armed conflicts is often overlooked by researchers. This makes us pose the question of how the UN practice influenced the formation and development of international legal regulation on human rights protection during armed conflicts, and the role of each branch in this process.

The subject of the analysis was primarily the international treaties that are the sources of IHL and IHRL, as well as the practice of their application by UN bodies, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, as well as decisions of other UN bodies. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of Judgments and Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice and some other judicial and quasi-judicial institutions.

The History of the Formation and Development of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law

Questions about war and peace have followed the development of humanity since ancient times. Undoubtedly, the norms on this issue were among the priorities for regulation at that time. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first references to the protection of human rights during armed conflicts date back more than three thousand years BC (Miche, 1956, p. 313-348) in fact, to the emergence of the first “proto-states” (Yasuaki, 2000, p. 2) or even in the pre-state period (Parry, 1975, p. 8-17). Subsequently, these

norms evolved along with the development of human society, reaching a peculiar milestone in the late Middle Ages, when they were embodied in the laws of chivalry and military morality. Modern scholars attribute the emergence of more modern rules of warfare to these phenomena. However, when it comes to treaty regulation, the Geneva Convention of 1864 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1864) should undoubtedly be considered the first universal treaty in this area. Although the scope of this document was quite narrow, it is from this document that the whole branch of International law – "International humanitarian law" emerged, which until recently was called "Laws of War", "Laws and Customs of War" or "Law of Armed Conflicts".

Since the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1864, the development of international legal regulation of human rights protection during armed conflicts has significantly accelerated. By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of documents were adopted, including the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, as well as a number of Hague Declarations and Conventions of 1899.

Of particular note is the Hague Convention (II) relative to the laws and customs of war on land (International Peace Conference, 1899). It is also important that the preamble to this Convention contained the "Martens' Clause". It stated: "Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience." This provision had a significant impact on the development of legal culture, as it promoted humanism in the most "inhumane situation - during war."

On the eve of the First World War, in 1907, the Second Hague Peace Conference was held, which approved more than a dozen treaties, among which the IV Convention and its annex, the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, should be particularly noted. This document became the basis for the protection of human rights during armed conflicts for the next half century.

The First World War gave a significant impetus to the development of human rights norms. In fact, it was the first conflict where most of the belligerents were bound by humanitarian law. After the war, several important events took place. First, the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 provided for the establishment of a court for Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was accused of violating the laws and customs of war, among other things. Secondly, the use of certain types of weapons, including chemical weapons, was prohibited, which in turn significantly contributed to the protection of human rights during armed conflicts. At the same time, the Geneva Convention relative to the Rights of Prisoners of War of 1929 was adopted.

At the same time, norms intended to protect individual human rights began to develop, such as the Slavery Convention 1926, the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy of 1932, etc.

In 1939, the Second World War began, with more than 100 million victims, according to various estimates. During this conflict, human rights violations of unprecedented scale and brutality were committed. At the same time, unlike in previous conflicts, most of the victims are civilians, i.e. those who did not take direct part in the armed conflict. The scale of these violations was such that it was necessary to immediately revise the existing rules governing the behaviour of the belligerents, especially with regard to the protection of civilians during armed conflicts. As a result, four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949. The IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons should be particularly noted. For the first time in history, this document extended the protection provided during an armed conflict to all categories of civilians (in fact, to all those who were not protected by the I-III Conventions of 1949), which was a rather revolutionary decision at the time. Moreover, all Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not apply the rule of reciprocity. That is, a contracting party is obliged to apply these documents regardless of whether the other parties to the armed conflict are parties to them.

It is noteworthy that a year earlier, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, and this marked the beginning of a new branch of international law - International Human Rights Law. The Universal Declaration was the first universal document to provide a minimum list of human and civil rights, freedoms and obligations (although it was not legally binding).

Subsequently, in 1966, two extremely important documents were adopted: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The first is particularly important because it guarantees the rights of the first generation, which are undoubtedly part of the so-called "minimum humanitarian standard". It should be noted that this document does not mention war or armed conflict, only the state of emergency. It is the absence of such a reference that is often used as an argument in favour of the fact that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights continues to apply during all types of armed

conflicts. However, if we analyse the history of the creation of this document, a completely different explanation for this fact becomes apparent. The fact is that the UN bodies initially decided not to take into account the ideas related to the law of war in their activities. They proceeded from the fact that by dealing with this branch of law, they would jeopardize the authority of the jus contra bellum proclaimed in the UN Charter, which could call into question the Organization's ability to maintain peace. Although, in fairness, it should be mentioned that in the process of discussing the draft of this document, the issue of armed conflicts was raised several times.

In 1977, two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were adopted at a diplomatic conference in Geneva. Additional Protocol II was an attempt to regulate non-international armed conflicts, which until then had been essentially regulated exclusively by Article 3 (common to all) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. However, the parties were so careful in defining the scope of application of this document that most modern non-international armed conflicts are still exclusively regulated by the mentioned above Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 1949.

In addition, in the post-war period, in parallel with the development of the universal human rights protection mechanism, identical phenomena occurred at the regional level. As a result, three regional human rights instruments were adopted: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981.

After that, several more documents related to the protection of human rights in peacetime were adopted (e.g., the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, and a number of others). However, at that time, the system of documents in the field of human rights protection was already formed and it still exists today. And as can be seen from the previous analysis, the international community has actually formed two parallel systems: one designed to protect human rights in peacetime, the other - during armed conflicts.

This division was formed historically and largely depended on the position of the UN, which took a twofold position when drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. On the one hand, the Universal Declaration, as well as the 1966 Covenants, did not include a provision on the possibility of derogation from the provisions of these acts in the event of armed conflicts, which from a formal point of view can be perceived as a confirmation of the possibility of their application in such a situation (Fortin, 2012, p. 1440-1444). An additional argument in favor of this position is that during the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration, there were proposals to include such provisions (Pilloud, 1949, p. 254). Also, the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly appealed to parties to armed conflicts to respect both IHL and IHRL. Such statements were made in relation to the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau (United Nations Security Council, 1998), Sudan (United Nations General Assembly,1999), Côte d'Ivoire (United Nations Security Council, 2003), Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations Security Council, 2000a) and others, and called on the parties to stop violating the norms of these fields (United Nations Security Council, 2004, Para. 8; United Nations Security Council, 2008, Para. 11; United Nations Security Council, 2011, Para.14). On the other hand, as mentioned above, the UN did not want to call into question the principle of jus contra bellum, which is the cornerstone on which all the organization's activities are based, by mentioning IHL.

This dual approach applied by the UN has given rise to several theories of interrelation between IHL and IHRL. Although there are dozens of theories in the literature, an in-depth analysis of their provisions suggests that there are only two main approaches to the problem of the interrelation between IHL and IHRL. The supporters of the first one argue that IHL is lex specialis in relation to IHRL. The other approach, often called complementary, argues that the norms of each branch organically complement each other. The most interesting thing is that the authors use the same facts and decisions to substantiate their truth. Let us try to analyse each approach in more detail.

The Concept of Lex Specialis

Proponents of this theory, while recognizing the possibility of applying IHL in armed conflicts, proceed from the impossibility of simultaneous application of both branches of international law, pointing to the character of IHL as a whole as lex specialis as the central argument (Draper, 1971, p. 191-192; Kolb, 1998, p. 409-420; Suter, 1976, p. 406-410).

The main arguments put forward in support of this position are usually that these two branches have completely different origins, different principles, objectives, essence, content, use their own implementation mechanisms, etc. (Meyrowitz, 1972, p. 1059-1104). Among these differences, two aspects

are particularly noteworthy. First, there is a fundamental difference in the content of the rights protected by each branch. A detailed analysis allows us to conclude that the list of such rights and their scope is significantly different. At the same time, in the case of the IHRL, it will be larger in both cases. Although, in fairness, it should be noted that IHL does not allow for cases of restriction of rights, as is often done in IHRL. On the other hand, this is logical, since IHL norms should protect the most basic rights to the extent necessary for survival in emergency conditions - a situation of armed conflict. That is, in essence, the task of IHL is to find a balance between humanism and military necessity. In this regard, a logical question may arise as to whether the parallel use of the norms of both branches will not expand the list and scope of these rights too widely, making it impossible for the parties to the conflict to comply with them. Second, each of the branches has its own implementation mechanism. While for the IHRL it is a series of judicial and "quasi-judicial" committees, the effectiveness of which primarily depends on the actions of the person whose rights have been violated, the situation in IHL is completely opposite. The main role is assigned to special monitoring bodies – the Protecting States and their substitutes, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Fact-Finding Commission, etc. Furthermore, the primary objective of IHRL is to protect individuals from abuses, primarily by the state itself, whereas IHL aims to protect individuals from the enemy. There is also a certain peculiarity in the formulation of the norms of each branch, which sometimes complicates their simultaneous application. For instance, IHRL establishes a list of individual rights that a state is obliged to guarantee to every person under its jurisdiction, while IHL establishes the obligations of belligerent parties. From the point of view of legal theory, this approach to the formulation of rights means that the rights provided for in IHL cannot be subject to disputes, for the same reasons that impede the exercise of economic and social rights. Consequently, the balance between military necessity and humanitarian requirements remains the basis of humanitarian law, and states are well aware of this when concluding treaties that are acceptable to their military.

In addition, there is a phenomenon in IHRL that is not typical of IHL, namely the simultaneous and parallel existence of universal and regional treaties, and the fact that most of these treaties distinguish between "civil and political rights" on the one hand and "economic, social and cultural rights" on the other. The difference between them in the legal context is that the first group of treaties requires immediate respect for the rights listed in their provisions, while treaties relating to economic, social and cultural rights require the state to take appropriate measures to ensure the consistent realization of these rights. In other words, this group of rights is conditioned by the appropriate economic development of the state. There is no such division in IHL. In fact, the state under whose authority the person is located is obliged to provide the person with the full range of rights provided for by the relevant norms IHL in a given situation.

In criticizing this theory, one should first of all argue that the use of the lex specialis principle at the level of entire branches of international law is incorrect and contradictory to legal logic. It is generally accepted to use this principle primarily when it is necessary to resolve legal conflicts. In addition, it can be used in the interpretation of norms, to determine the meaning. In general, this theory is usually supported by states that are often at war. The position of these states can generally be summarized in two arguments: 1) simultaneous application of IHRL and IHL is impossible, i.e., the norms of the first branch are valid in peacetime, the second - during armed conflicts; 2) universal and regional human rights bodies do not have jurisdiction to apply IHL. An example is the situation with detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Thus, after the events of September 11, 2001, the United States launched the "war on terrorism", within the framework of which quite a few people were detained, some of whom were placed at the Guantanamo Bay military base. At the same time, the United States has consistently defended the position that this is a war, and therefore IHL, not IHRL, should be applied. This automatically means that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has no jurisdiction in this matter. However, the Commission disagreed with the US arguments (United States, 2002, p. 1015; United States, 2006, par. IV-VI). In general, this situation is similar to the one that previously arose in the case of Coard v. the United States, in which the United States denied the applicability of the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties to the situation that arose in connection with the military operation in Grenada (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1999, par. 35), The UK (United Kingdom House of Lords, 2007), Israel (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2010) and Russia (European Court of Human Rights, 2011) also took a similar position. The latter, in particular, has consistently denied the jurisdiction of the ECHR to consider the case of Georgia v. Russia, arguing that since this armed conflict was international, the norms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be applied, not the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (European Court of Human Rights, 2011).

As we can see, although this theory was the first and for a long time the only one to emerge, it has a number of significant drawbacks, which eventually led to the search for other alternative solutions to the problem of the correlation between IHL and IHRL.

The Theory of Complementarity

It should be noted that the concept underlying the theory of complementarity was established in the mid-1970s, and this is usually associated with the Tehran Conference of 1968, during which the UN member states discussed issues related to the protection of human rights in armed conflicts. As a result, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution entitled "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts", which contained references to both IHRL and IHL. At the same time, the decisive role in this document was assigned to IHL, in particular, it emphasized the need "to follow principles for observance by all governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: (a)That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; (b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; (c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible» (United Nations General Assembly, 1968). However, in the very next Resolution on this issue, the UN General Assembly included a revolutionary wording for this period: "Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict"(United Nations General Assembly, 1970). It was after this document that UN bodies, when analysing the human rights situation in a particular state, referred not only to the norms of the IHRL, but also to the norms of IHL. Among the first such documents are the Report of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation in Afghanistan (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1987) and the UN General Assembly Resolution on the situation of human rights in occupied Kuwait (United Nations General Assembly, 1990). Subsequently, this practice was extended to other UN bodies, including the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 1995).

In general, most branches of international law, including IHL and IHRL, recognize the fact that they should not operate in a legal "vacuum" but in parallel with other norms. This conclusion is confirmed by the main treaties in this area. For example, Article 4 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that in times of public emergency, states may derogate from their obligations "provided that such measures are not incompatible with their other obligations under international law". The identical provision is contained in Article 15 of the ECHR, which states that "such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law". Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 also contains a similar wording. It follows that the main IHRL treaties explicitly provide for the possibility that states have obligations arising from other rules of international law, and non-compliance with these obligations (including those arising from IHL) should be considered a violation of the relevant human rights obligations (Henckaerts, 2005, p. 37). An additional argument in favour of the fact that IHRL applies during armed conflicts is the direct mention in the last two documents of "war" as a ground on which a party to the Convention may derogate from certain obligations. It is clearly emphasized that the war itself is not a sufficient ground for "derogation". The state must make a corresponding declaration. If it does not make such a declaration, the provisions of the relevant documents should in fact be applied in full.

As for the basic IHL treaties, none of them states that only the rules of this field apply during armed conflicts. A detailed study of IHL rules allows us to conclude that their application does not in any way affect the validity of other obligations for the parties arising from international law, in particular in the area regulated by IHRL. Thus, in particular, the preamble of the 1977 Protocol II provides: "Recalling that the international instruments relating to human rights provide fundamental protection to the human person". That is, there is a direct reference to the provisions of the IHRL. In addition, part 8 of Article 75 of Protocol I of 1977 states: "No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other more favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1". In other words, this means that IHL not only does not limit the possibility of applying the rules of other branches of international law, but also directly indicates the need to guarantee the rights provided for in such documents if they provide for greater protection "under any applicable rules of international law". Thus, if before the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols there could still be doubts about the admissibility of parallel operation of IHL and IHRL, after that there is a clear reference to the need to use all the norms governing the protection of human rights.

In general, the position on the complementarity of IHRL and IHL is supported by most bodies within the human rights protection system. Thus, back in 2001, in its General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2001) the Committee noted that during «…international or non-international, rules of international humanitarian law become applicable and help, in addition to the provisions in article 4 and article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, to prevent the abuse of a State's emergency powers. The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation». And later, in 2004, in General Comment No. 31, (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2004) the Committee added that while more specific IHL rules may be appropriate in relation to certain rights enshrined in the Covenant, both areas of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

Thus, as can be seen from the above, in the second half of the twentieth century most treaties and enforcement bodies moved away from the lex specialis principle and gradually began to apply a complementary approach to the question of the interrelation between IHL and IHRL.

It should be noted that our analysis of practice would not be complete without an analysis of the practice of the Court of Justice, which has also had a significant impact on the resolution of this issue.

The Problem of Interaction in the Practice of the International Court of Justice

In fact, since the late 90s of the twentieth century, there have been precedents for the parallel application of IHRL and IHL in the practice of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.

Two cases of the Court of Justice had a particular impact on this issue, namely the 1996 Advisory Opinions on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and the 2004 Advisory Opinions on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

In the first case - the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons - the Court stated: "...the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself" (International Court of Justice, 1996, par. 25).

A similar opinion was expressed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of 2004. Israel objected to the application of international human rights treaties, including the 1966 Covenant, arguing that humanitarian law provides protection in situations of conflict, which is the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while international treaties within the scope of IHRL were created to protect citizens from their own government. In particular, the Court stated: "…generally... ...the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". Moreover, the court directly indicated the relationship between the IHRL and IHL: "As regards: the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question, put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law." (International Court of Justice, 2004, par. 106).

In addition to the aforementioned advisory opinions of the Court of Justice, these issues were considered in the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, in which the Court stated that "Uganda violated ... provisions of the international humanitarian law and international human rights law instruments, to which both Uganda and the DRC are parties..." (International Court of Justice, 2005, par. 219). In other words, the Court not only confirmed the applicability of IHL and IHRL to this situation, but also stressed the need for their parallel application. In another case, Georgia v. Russia, the Court ruled

that the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (which is one of the core treaties in the field of IHRL) should be applied during armed conflict (International Court of Justice, 2011).

Thus, the practice of the Court of Justice has evolved from the use of the lex specialis principle to confirmation of the parallel use of the rules of both branches of international law, i.e. to the theory of complementarity.

State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Committed during Armed Conflicts

Another equally important aspect related to the protection of human rights during armed conflict is the issue of state responsibility for actions that violate its obligations in this area. Of course, the state is responsible for the actions of its bodies and officials, including the armed forces. However, very often, in order to avoid accusations of violating the principle of prohibition of force or threat of force, as well as massive human rights violations during armed conflicts, states do not use their armed forces directly, but often use so-called "proxies" - national liberation movements and other paramilitary organizations. It is the use of such actors that is associated with the majority of massive human rights violations in the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, it is not surprising that the UN, as the main institution called upon to ensure international peace and security, as well as to counter gross violations of international law, including the prevention of mass human rights violations both in peacetime and during armed conflicts, was forced to respond to this situation. Within the framework of the International Law Commission, the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts was developed and approved by the General Assembly in 2001 (United Nations General Assembly, 2001). This document, namely Article 8, provides that "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct".

However, prior to the adoption of this document, the UN practice repeatedly raised the question of whether a state was responsible for massive human rights violations committed by anti-government groups or other non-state groups. This issue has become particularly acute in connection with the activities of the Contras in Nicaragua. This situation was the subject of consideration by the International Court of Justice in 1986 in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (International Court of Justice, 1986). In this case, the court identified two possible concepts of control, namely strict and effective.

Strict control. This concept implies that the state fully controls a certain organisation (in this case, a separatist entity), which is completely dependent on it. In this case, the object of control is all aspects of the organisation's activities, i.e. the organisation itself. In fact, in this case, for legal purposes, such an organisation can be considered a de facto body of the state and the state is responsible for all its actions. We should agree with the opinion of S. Talmon, who argued that in fact this "means de facto annexation of the group, which will only deepen the state of complete dependence" (Talmon, 2009).

In order to establish the existence of strict control, three facts must be proved:

1) A certain organisation (entity) must be completely dependent on the state, and such dependence is absolute and does not provide for any actual autonomy. Ideally, it should be proved that a certain state initiated the creation of such a group, and without it, it would not exist.

2) The organisation's dependence on the state applies to all areas and is absolute and permanent.

3) The state must use this dependence to the fullest extent. This criterion usually implies that the state not only has the ability but actually uses such dependence (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1999).

However, it is virtually impossible to prove the existence of these criteria, and the Court was therefore forced to turn to a different concept.

Effective control. Unlike the previous case, this concept implies that there is a certain dependence of the organisation on the state, but such dependence does not mean full integration of this entity into the state mechanism, but only provides for financial support, payment for the work of its members, military assistance, exchange of intelligence information, assistance in logistics and a number of other issues. In addition, the state may sometimes appoint the leadership of separatist groups. However, in this case, the Organization retains its autonomy, and the object of control is not the entire operational activity of such an entity, but only certain military operations. At the same time, it is important that the state has a sufficient level of influence on such an organisation to control the preparation, execution and completion of the operation (Yong, 2013).

In general, the concept of effective control largely reflects customary international law and coincides with the standards developed by the International Law Commission in Article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. As is well known, this article explains the conduct of a state by persons or groups of persons acting "at the direction of" or "under the direction of" or "under the control of" the state. These three features are not cumulative, but disjunctive, i.e. it is enough to prove the presence of one of them.

Thus, the main difference between strict and effective control is that the former gives grounds to consider the organization a de facto body of the state due to its partial or complete integration into the state apparatus, while in the latter case, we are dealing with cooperation between two subjects in order to achieve a certain goal. That is why, in the case of effective control, the state is responsible not for all, but only for certain actions of such an entity.

It should be noted that although these approaches are somewhat outdated, as they are not used in their pure form in the practice of other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, they have become the foundation on which all other more modern approaches are built.

Conclusions

Thus, it can be stated that the UN plays a key role in the development and implementation of international law governing the protection of human rights during armed conflicts. However, the short-sighted policy of the UN in the first decades of its existence, in particular, the unwillingness to recognise the fact that armed conflicts continue to exist despite the prohibition of force and the threat of force, has largely contributed to the fragmentation of human rights protection during armed conflicts. It was only in the 1970s that there was a gradual change in the organisation's approaches, which is primarily reflected in the activities of the International Court of Justice, which in the process of resolving cases expressed its opinion on important aspects of this issue.

First of all, it is worth noting the Court's practice regarding the interrelation between IHL and IHRL, in which the Court initially rejected the idea of parallel application of the rules of both branches (referring to the concept of lex specialis), but later moved away from it in favour of a more progressive concept of complementarity. This allowed for more comprehensive protection of victims of armed conflict. Another important development was the Court's practice of determining responsibility for massive human rights violations committed by groups under state control. It is the UN practice that has become the foundation on which the entire system of human rights protection in armed conflict is built today.

In general, judging by the UN practice, the process of convergence of IHL and IHRL has been taking place for 50 years, which can be considered a positive trend that will help to create a more effective mechanism for the protection of human rights in peacetime and during armed conflicts in the future.

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SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: AN INSEPARABLE CONNECTION USING THE EXAMPLE OF THE METHODOLOGY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Abstract
The article examines the interaction between ideology and political science through the lens of their interaction in the process of constructing scientific knowledge about politics. It substantiates the direct influence of political ideology on the actualization of social demands, which directly determine the formation of the subject and object of political science, as well as its methodology in general, establishing a clear connection between the ideological situation in society and the development of social sciences. It is proposed to consider political ideology not only as an object of political science research but also as a direct participant in the process of forming its methodology and scientific discourse. The extreme manifestations of the ideologization of political science within the framework of the Marxist paradigm of social sciences are outlined through the prism of the scientific discourse of the USSR, which had a significant impact on the formation of the tradition of political science in Ukraine and the former Soviet countries. Scientific communism is considered an extreme manifestation of the ideologization of political science, and the main dangers of this phenomenon in scientific discourse are outlined. The irreversibility of the process of ideologization of scientific discourse is argued within the scientific article, and it is also proven that the situation of dogmatization of scientific theories is a general scientific phenomenon that has a regular character.
The difference between internal scientific dogmatization of the scientific environment and external political ideologization, which is characteristic of political science in both cases, is outlined. The specificity of political science as a system of scientific knowledge within which ideologization is the strongest and most noticeable is characterized. The process of ideologization and dogmatization of scientific theory, as well as the political establishment of scientific theory as a metatheory of scientific discourse, are demonstrated using the example of the Marxist paradigm within the discourse of the social sciences of the USSR. The main challenges facing political science in its close interaction with political ideology are characterized.
Keywords: political science, methodology, political ideology, scientific discourse, Marxism, subject of political science.

Introduction

Social and behavioral sciences can be regarded as a product of the interaction between society as a whole and the scientific community, the mutual influence of which cannot be stopped or divided into main active and secondary passive elements. This is a complex and intricate interaction that inseparably shapes and refines the subject of political science while simultaneously being a direct consumer of the results of scientific research on phenomena that are actualized by society itself (Kovalchuk, 2024, p. 21). Society requires the existence of social sciences because its needs extend beyond the methodological boundaries of exact disciplines, as it cannot be subjected to clear axiomatic explanations through the prism of necessary and objective laws: “With the emergence of science came the understanding that there are many questions that cannot be clarified by the methods of exact sciences, and the most obvious examples here are ideological and ethical questions” (Putnam, 2003, p. 160). Political science is the discipline tasked with resolving these overarching questions and problems. The ideological determinant of the scientific process is a certain type of subjectivity in the scientific process, which we will focus on further, emphasizing the clear division of this principle into two separate components: external political ideologization of scientific discourse and internal paradigmatic ideologization of the scientific community.

Literature Review

In the context of our topic, it is necessary to refer to the ideologization of scientific discourse in Thomas Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1996), which, despite becoming classic within the methodological discourse of science, has been quite controversial in terms of evaluations and criticisms from other science methodologists. In the context of his theory, the researcher suggests considering the irrational components of the scientific process, such as belief in theory and conviction, which are crucial for our research, as the positive application of scientific theory is inseparably linked to the belief of the scientific community and society in this theory: “If faith is restored, we return to positive predictions; we declare what the implementation will be; we convince those who are ready to recognize everything at once. But to recognize does not mean to know. We easily recognize what we do not know” (Bachelard, 1986, p. 106). Political science as a system of scientific knowledge is directly related to the political sphere, which serves as the object of study, and the phenomena of its manifestation directly shape the boundaries of its research subject (Shypunov, 2021, p. 89). Therefore, it is logical to argue that political science as a system of scientific knowledge is fundamentally closely linked to the political sphere of society's existence and often finds itself under the strict censorship of the dominant type of political ideology. In this interpretation, it is worth referring to the Marxist paradigm of knowledge about society, which was initially conceptualized as a scientific theory of economic development, then evolved into an ideology of social development, and later emerged as a widely accepted political ideology, particularly in the territory of the USSR and its spheres of political influence (Mykhalchenko, 2016, p. 210).

The ideologization of the scientific process has been considered in various methodological works, but in the context of our research, we will focus on Thomas Kuhn's classic work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1996), as well as on the work of another researcher of the methodology of science, Paul Feyerabend, "Science in a Free Society" (1978), in which science is considered as a separate and independent ideology. It is worth noting that the position regarding this issue within the community of science methodologists and philosophers varied; for instance, the American researcher Hilary Putnam criticized these two concepts: "In short, if Feyerabend and Kuhn in his greatest incomparability were correct, then we could conceptualize members of other cultures, including scientists of the 17th century, only as animals responding to stimuli (including noises amusingly resembling English or Italian sounds)" (Putnam, 2003, p. 125).

Scientific development, according to Thomas Kuhn, is viewed as an endless change of paradigms that requires constant crises and complete disillusionment in the outdated theory in favor of the new one, which initially is not recognized by the scientific community due to the conviction and loyalty to the old paradigm, but later becomes accepted and becomes the central paradigm. In particular, as another science methodologist, Gaston Bachelard, wrote: "No matter how persistent realism is, it is amazing that all productive revolutions in scientific thinking begin with a crisis that leads to its deep layering. Realistic thought itself never generates its own crisis" (Bachelard, 1986, p. 123). This process is prolonged and always requires crisis situations in the scientific process, and the main reason for this is the ideological belief in the correctness and possibility of transforming the old paradigm, which serves as a metatheory. The fundamental importance of this provision for our research lies in the fact that the choice of a metatheory for interdisciplinary research, which will be considered a model for all scientific systems and according to which the main subjects of scientific

research will be chosen, is based on an irrational belief in scientific theory that has already exhausted itself, which we will call the internal ideologization of scientific discourse.

In this context, it is worth turning to the principle of the pluralism of scientific methods and programs proposed by Paul Feyerabend. The researcher argued that scientific knowledge is necessarily ideologically loaded due to its belonging to a certain tradition, a certain specific type of scientific rationality within science. This is a completely constructive phenomenon within the existence of science as a knowledge system since we cannot claim its monolithic nature in terms of the existence of a single tradition. The science methodologist wrote: "They deny this, saying that equal rights can only be guaranteed if the basic structure of society is 'objective,' not subject to the influence of any one tradition" (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 48). Even the problem of the existence of a clear and unambiguous definition of the subject or object of political science due to the constant variability of the subject field of this science and the absence of a single definition of its object, namely politics, is a consequence of the presence and encounter of different traditions of political thought. And the researcher's affiliation with a particular tradition may already indicate a clear tendency to conceptualize the object of study and further define the subject fields of political science (Harbadyn, 2015, p. 45). Thus, we directly correlate the interpretation of political discourse with the researcher's affiliation with a specific tradition within political science, which we consider a clear illustration of the ideological component in shaping the concept of the subject of political science, as well as its influence on the formation of the entire methodology of political science.

Scientific and Political Ideology: the Problem of Differentiation

Political science is an interdisciplinary field that incorporates general scientific principles and is influenced by social and political spheres (Fedorchuk, 2017, p. 85). The methodology of political science always revolves around a metatheory, leading to a general scientific methodological risk that this metatheory will transform from a dynamic paradigm of scientific knowledge development into a static dogma. Scientists may adhere to this metatheory not because of its positive results but due to their belief in its truth, thereby turning it into an ideology that shapes the worldview of researchers and the construction of the subject fields of scientific research: “Moreover, one could go further, saying: the most brilliant method ends up losing its fertility if its application’s object is not renewed” (Bachelard, 1986, p. 34). Therefore, scientific discourse, including that of political science, should be characterized by dynamism and openness, while the ideologization of the scientific process necessarily leads to stagnation and inertia in scientific systems. The ideologization of political science discourse is a dangerous factor for the growth of scientific knowledge but allows for a clear definition of the boundaries of its subject field due to its strict doctrinal nature. In the above interpretation, we should divide the ideology of the scientific process into two components: internal ideology within the scientific community, which manifests itself in the faith of community members in a paradigm that is ineffective and unable to handle the constant emergence of anomalies; and external ideologicalization of science, originating from the political subsystem of the social system, strictly determining the development of science and its research areas within the boundaries of rational acceptability criteria, clearly declaring a specific scientific paradigm as the only true and comprehensive one, thereby closing the scientific discourse within the strict confines of the postulates of the universally accepted paradigm, which must simultaneously serve as a political and scientific ideology.

The first example can be found in faith in scientific theory regardless of political doctrine and represents a stage in scientific development, as the static nature of science indicates the need for modernization or changes in scientific theory. In other cases: “If this does not happen, it means that the scientific spirit is stuck in dogmatism and axioms accepted on faith” (Bachelard, 1986, p. 105). The second type of ideologization of scientific discourse finds its realization in the context of the relationship and direct influence of the political regime on the political science discourse, creating a situation of direct ideological censorship of scientific discourse (Rotar, 2016, p. 101). It is noteworthy that such censorship is most vividly manifested in social sciences or behavioral sciences, the paradigm of which depends directly on social and political processes.

The Subject Field of Political Science and Ideological Delimitation of its Boundaries

The fundamental complexity in forming the methodological principles and main factors of conceptualizing the scientific discourse of political science lies in the fact that this field is directly linked to the power structures of the state, whose authority is one of the phenomena within its subject field, and state resources often serve as the basis for conducting research. Naturally, political science, in its consideration

and exploration of the boundaries of its subject, extends far beyond the confines of the state, but we can also argue that state support for a particular tradition of political science poses a threat of creating a situation of external ideologicalization of scientific discourse (Rudych, 2003, p. 9).

In the context of the ideologization of political science discourse, it is worth noting that Marxism is entrenched by political bodies as a type of universally accepted criteria of rational acceptability with the right to truth firmly attached to it: "…there can be an understanding of 'rational' according to which any view that can be reasonably and convincingly defended against the assumptions of any culture is a 'rational' point of view, but that understanding cannot be the only or normatively important one" (Putnam, 2003, p. 167). This quote from an American science methodologist draws a clear line between scientific rationality, which is open and necessarily incorporates the principle of pluralism into its structure, which is completely eliminated in the case of Marxism in the USSR, which is recognized as the metatheory of any science of society, including political science, which finds its realization in the concept of scientific communism. Marxism was initially proposed as an economic theory of social development that gained widespread fame and popularity (Shypunov, 2018, p. 368). Political science, as a system of scientific knowledge about society that constantly incorporates interdisciplinary methodology, was directly influenced by it. Arising from the positivist paradigm of universal knowledge, political science was predetermined to constantly straddle the boundary between exact sciences and social sciences, leading to constant critical attitudes within the scientific community, which under the influence of the success of instrumentalism in the natural sciences, formed criteria for scientificity in the methodology of exact disciplines: "In this situation, someone caught up in the cultural influx began to argue that there really was no knowledge outside the exact sciences, and if there was in the social sciences, it was only to the extent that they tried to imitate the exact sciences, and only to that extent" (Putnam, 2003, p. 160). And it is precisely in the concept of the existence of political science within the framework of scientific communism that we find such imitation, hence political science issues are clearly determined by the economic approach of Marxism. The specificity of Marxism and similar theories lies in the fact that due to the success of scientific instrumentalism, any other form of scientific knowledge, to meet the criteria of scientificity, must be endowed with instrumental characteristics and criteria (Shypunov, 2018, p. 197).

Ideologization of Political Science through the Prism of Marxist Interpretation of Social Sciences in the USSR

It is important for us to note that Marxism, having evolved first into Marxism-Leninism and later into Marxism-Stalinism, became the dominant methodological tradition of scientific discourse in the USSR, as well as the officially sanctioned state ideology by political decision (Mykhalchenko, 2016, p. 205). This, on one hand, signified the "death" of Marxism as a dynamic scientific theory due to its crystallization into a universally accepted ideology, and on the other hand, allowed for the extreme ideologization of scientific discourse. The aforementioned ideologization is not a positive historical, political, or scientific phenomenon, but it is a unique experience that holds potential for further methodological research, especially for the topic of our study in the context of examining the Ukrainian school of political science, which in its history has experienced all the described processes and their derivative structural paradigmatic changes: "Feyerabend, like Kuhn, emphasized the way different cultures and historical epochs produce different paradigms of rationality" (Putnam, 2003, p. 124).

In the scientific discourse of the USSR, the science of politics existed exclusively within its tradition as scientific communism, which is not devoid of meaning and possessed epistemic potential. However, the problem lies in reducing the entire scope of political science to this one aforementioned tradition, which is considered entirely reliable without any right to alternative interpretations. In particular, political science was regarded as a science that should study society and social relations from the perspective of their formation in the process of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of the material results of labor. Most importantly, all these processes were considered to unfold exclusively within the framework of the operation and strict determination of economic laws in specific economic formations of society, which were expected to replace each other in the course of the unfolding economic development of history (Mykhalchenko, 2016, p. 203).

It is important to note that Marxism borrowed many methodological principles from the social and dialectical views of G.W.F. Hegel, giving them a materialistic projection, according to which we will also relate this concept to historical ones in their extreme manifestations: "The historical essence relies on the past, which expands the scope of the given, and overcomes the present with its help" (Patochka, 2001, p. 23).

However, the decisive factor remains the strict ideologization of political knowledge and the subject of political economy, which will be strictly determined by the universally accepted tradition of Marxism: "The modern variety of organic reason has grown out of dissatisfaction with the skeptical and negative position of finiteness; it grew out of the inadequacy of empiricism, primarily from its excessively passive character; it grew where the tradition of positively metaphysical thought remained most alive" (Patochka, 2001, p. 22).

Scientific communism within the scientific discourse of the USSR is considered exclusively as one of the components of the general Marxist doctrine, aptly called Marxism-Leninism, forming a triad with philosophy and scientific communism, and shaping Marxism-Leninism in its entirety. It is important to note here that scientific communism and political economy as its component are not considered as scientific theories that can exist beyond ideology. Instead, they are seen solely as components of ideological tradition. The subject of study of Marxist political economy is the production relations inherent in various historically conditioned modes of production. Therefore, one of the main dogmas of political economy, and at the same time the reason for its name, is that the economy is considered the main basis of the social and political life of formations, where politics is only a superstructure inseparably linked to the economic situation and the dominant type of economic relations.

The theoretical form of objectively existing production relations is economic categories, which must enter the subject fields of research of scientific communism or the dominant tradition of knowledge about politics in the USSR. The most general and repeated causal relationships within the structure of economic phenomena and processes are conceptualized in economic laws. It is worth noting that in this case, scientific communism arms itself with the methodology of exact applied sciences, which is why one of the central components of the subject of its research is economic laws that underlie political shifts and phenomena. Such a focus on objectifying political reality reflects a tendency towards emulating the principle of instrumentalism, the success of which is one of the main factors in popularizing science in society and the main reason for the increase in the authority of science, the truth of whose propositions can be proven through the repetition of the corresponding experiment: "According to the weak version of operationalism, which has become a kind of working philosophy for most scientists, the content of scientific theory consists of results that are available for verification, and these can be expressed in statements by the formula: when we perform such and such an action, then we will get such and such results available for inspection. If the statements made according to this formula are true, then their truth can often be proved by repeating the corresponding experiment" (Putnam, 2003, p. 187). On the other hand, we must recognize that such a tendency of social sciences to turn to the objectivity of natural science systems of knowledge was proposed by positivist theorists but only in the context of conducting political science in such a narrow version as scientific communism. This idea became the real principle at the basis of knowledge about politics. Of course, the excessive level of ideologization within the aforementioned approach stimulated the consideration of such a tradition of political science with critical attitudes. Alongside the above, such an approach is important for our research since it is an extreme manifestation of implementing the principle of ideologization of science in shaping the subject of political science research.

Scientific Communism as an Extreme Form of Ideologization of Political Knowledge

Within the principle of ideology influencing the formation of knowledge about politics as scientific communism, it is worth noting that despite observations and critical attitudes towards the objective foundations of forming scientific discourse among methodologists, we can clearly define the boundaries of its subject. In the system of production relations, ownership relations over the means of production are highlighted as the basis of all production relations. Production relations are subject to study by political economy, and thus by scientific communism, in unity with the productive forces that determine them and the superstructure of the corresponding type of society. With the development of social production and the complication of economic relations, there is a necessary expansion of the subject field of scientific communism. Here the dynamism of the subject of scientific communism is present even despite its strict ideological nature, which proves the potential scientific nature of such an approach to studying politics. The dynamism of science is always evidence of scientific development: "If this does not happen, it means that the scientific spirit is stuck in dogmatism and axioms accepted on faith" (Bachelard, 1986, p. 105).

Scientific communism cannot be limited to studying production relations only within the framework of production, as the complication of the international division of labor, the improvement of economic and political relations between countries with different socio-economic systems, economic competition between socialism and capitalism, and the development of international economic cooperation emphasizes

the importance of considering the economic basis on a global scale. The above includes ways and forms of influence of economic systems on each other through political means, economic relations between states of different systems and their development prospects, characteristics of the structure and social nature of economic relations operating within the global economic system, and economic laws. The separation of production relations as the subject of scientific communism is a characteristic feature of the Marxist paradigm of political science (Fedorchuk, 2017, p. 85).

Additionally, within the framework of Marxist theory, the adaptation of the dialectical method, namely dialectical materialism, was carried out with its subsequent application to the study of production relations in society. Dialectical materialism considers one of the main criteria for the truth of results and conclusions obtained by science to be their correspondence with objective reality. Therefore, we can note that the principle of cognition of objective reality is a fundamental postulate of the epistemology of Marxism, which necessarily indicates the presence of general scientific principles of the positivist conception of science within the structure of the Marxist methodology of scientific knowledge. This is manifested in the identification by Marxists of the concept of rationality with scientific rationality, which consists of constantly referring to the facts of objective reality: "But, of course, this sociological fact has something in common with the increasingly elevated elevation of the concept as if rationality equals scientific rationality, as well as the concept of scientific rationality based, as such, on proving instrumental connections to (potentially) satisfy the vast majority" (Putnam, 2003, p. 189). In this context, it is worth noting that the excessive presence of the ideological component within Marxist theory leads to the situation of using manipulative means in constructing scientific rationality, which is manifested in recognizing as scientific only those concepts and approaches that are built on the principles of using dialectical materialism.

Scientific communism, studying reality, takes the economic situation as its starting point, rejecting all other components as derivative and methodologically unimportant, leading to the reductionism of this approach since only the essential characteristics of economic relations lead to political changes and development. Accordingly, in the process of the movement of scientific consciousness, there is a descent from the abstract to the concrete, from the simple to the complex, the system of economic categories and laws is outlined and analyzed. The method of dialectical materialism requires the unity of quantitative and qualitative analysis of economic processes, but it is worth noting that qualitative characteristics of political or economic changes manifested in the change of formations are favored.

Conclusions

Ideology is a direct participant in the construction of political science discourse, including the determination of its boundaries. It also serves as a methodological principle for conceptualizing the subject fields of specific studies, which becomes relevant at the level of ideologizing scientific paradigms and theories. This approach allows us to view political science as being within the influence zone of the ideology of society, a particular political system, or the scientific discourse itself. As a result, social rationality can be seen as a product of ideological influence. One example of such ideologization is the concept of social science within the scientific discourse of the USSR, where social development is not considered outside the concept of "economic determinism," and all knowledge about society and politics is interpreted through the economic base, with politics being merely a superstructure. Thus, the concept of "political economy" is a product of the Marxist paradigm of political science, which establishes itself not just by spreading this theory among the scientific community, but as an exclusively political ideology that has crystallized as a scientific paradigm under the influence of political processes. The establishment of scientific communism as the main concept of social knowledge within the discourse of social sciences in the USSR directly demonstrates the political ideologization of scientific discourse, clearly showing the interrelation between ideological and scientific environments, which has left a strong imprint on the Ukrainian political science discourse.

An important aspect of this phenomenon is the existence of the unquestionable hegemony of a single approach to studying social reality, leading to the convergence of political and scientific boundaries of the authority of this theory, supported by the state. This implies that an important aspect is the possibility of the state becoming one of the key authorities in the process of forming scientific discourse, signaling the construction of the concept of scientific rationality, where the main criterion of truth is conformity to generally accepted ideological dogmas. Thus, it is logical to conclude that in the extreme manifestations of the ideologization of political science discourse, the ideal of "scientific objectivity" is devalued, and political influence on the formation of scientific discourse in the social sciences becomes apparent.

This devalues the existence of such theories within the framework of scientificity, but at the same time, they have functioned in the past and continue to influence the study of the political system of society even today. This process is an integral part of the functioning of the scientific system, making it impossible for the researcher to step outside the ideological environment in their studies. However, it is important to note the specificity of this phenomenon within political science, where, on the one hand, ideology is a direct object of study and, at the same time, a key component in the formation of the methodological principles of the scientific system itself – political science.

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NARRATIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: FROM MILITARY STRATEGY TO WAR CRIMES (BASED ON STATEMENTS AT THE OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL MEETINGS)

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Abstract

The article examines the role of strategic narratives that the Russian Federation uses to legitimize its aggression against Ukraine, particularly through statements at the OSCE Permanent Council meetings in February-March 2022 and 2024. Strategic narratives play an important role in shaping the international image of the state and justifying its actions, especially in the conditions of information warfare. The research uses the method of qualitative content analysis, in particular the analysis of the texts of the statements of the Russian Federation at the meetings of the Permanent Council of the OSCE. Attention is focused on identifying and analyzing the main strategic narratives used to justify military actions and war crimes, as well as how these narratives change in response to the development of the international political situation. The results of the analysis showed that the Russian Federation systematically uses several key narratives to justify its aggression against Ukraine. Chief among them is the justification of military actions by the need to protect the Russian-speaking population from "genocide" and fight against "neo-Nazism". In addition, Russia actively discredits international organizations such as the OSCE, accusing them of being biased and unable to resolve conflicts effectively. The analysis of the statements of 2024 shows an increase in the aggressiveness of the rhetoric, especially in the accusations against Western countries, which, according to Russia, allegedly contribute to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. These changes in rhetoric reflect the evolution of narratives aimed at adapting to new international challenges and increasing pressure on the international community. The revealed narratives confirm that the Russian Federation continues to actively use information warfare to justify its aggression against Ukraine and undermine the international consensus to condemn its actions. The evolution of these narratives reflects the adaptation of Russia's strategy to new political realities and growing international pressure. Further monitoring and detailed analysis of these narratives is critical for developing effective strategies to counter Russian propaganda at the international level, which, in turn, will contribute to strengthening the international legal order and ensuring global security.

Keywords: narratives, Russian aggression against Ukraine, war crimes, OSCE, rhetoric, military strategy, information war.

Introduction

Strategic narrative is a specially prepared text intended for verbal expression in the process of strategic communications through the flow of information to the target audience (Mandziuk, 2017). Strategic initiatives in the minds of the military are characterized by various elements of propaganda, media content, political promotions and social media. The stinks can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes: in the first phase, the stink is aimed at demoralizing the enemy forces and the civilian population, in the other – at increasing the motivation and unity of the powerful military population. Strategic narratives are a key element of information warfare involving social media users, mass media, communications analysts, and other influential groups. They are formed by the process of collecting and selecting relevant facts, statements, and heroic stories to create a transformative story, directed to the public audience and the audience of the enemy. Over the past decade, Russia has been developing strategic narratives to build on its international image, and developing specific arguments to justify its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Oates, 2023). The analysis of Sarah Oates (2023) shows how "Putin, through his promotions and public appearances, developed a special rhetoric for Ukraine, declaring the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and the need for the "unification" of Ukraine and so-called neo-Nazis who are never encouraged by the Sunset" (Oates, 2023). It is significant that they often indulge in well-worn Russian narratives, which may have an anti-foreign directness and glorify Russian nationalism, but the discourse about Ukraine includes unique aspects.

In the context of the current Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and will rise to a new scale in 2022, an important element is the analysis of the Russian Federation's We are active in the international arena. One of the key Maidans, where these initiatives are actively expanding, is the meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. The investigation of these initiatives is extremely important for understanding the strategic goals of the Russian Federation and contributing to international cooperation. This article is based on an analysis of the main initiatives that the Russian Federation uses to justify its actions, starting with the military strategy and ending with military misdeeds, in its statements at meetings. ï For the sake of the OSCE.

Methodology

This research uses qualitative content analysis to study the strategic narratives expressed by representatives of the Russian Federation at the plenary sessions of the OSCE Permanent Council. The analysis covers statements made by Russian officials during two key periods: February-March 2022 and February-March 2024. The primary sources for this study are the official transcripts and minutes of the OSCE Permanent Council meetings available through the OSCE Online Archives.

Data collection was carried out by systematically selecting and reviewing all relevant statements made by Russian officials during the specified meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council. Statements were carefully extracted from minutes of meetings and official documents, which made it possible to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the analysis. The selection of the time frames of February-March 2022 and February-March 2024 made it possible to record the initial arguments to justify the invasion of Ukraine and to assess the changes in the rhetoric two years later.

The analysis was conducted through a coding process that revealed recurring themes, arguments, and rhetorical strategies. Coding categories were determined based on a preliminary review of the statements and included key aspects such as justifying military action, discrediting international institutions, blaming Western countries, and using humanitarian narratives. Coded data were analyzed to identify patterns and changes in narratives over time. Particular attention was paid to the evolution of narratives between the two periods and their adaptation to changes in the international political context and the growing global pressure on Russia. In addition, the comparative analysis made it possible to understand how Russian narratives relate to other information strategies used in the international arena.

The research methodology is aimed at providing a comprehensive understanding of the strategic narratives used by the Russian Federation and their impact on international relations and global security. The results of the study allow a better understanding of how these narratives are used to legitimize aggression and create a favorable informational context in conditions of geopolitical conflict.

Narratives of "protection" Donbass (February-March 2022)

Examining the minutes of the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council from February 24 and 27, 2022 (OSCE, 2022a; OSCE, 2022b), we can see how Russia is systematically building its own information

policy aimed at legitimizing its aggression against Ukraine. Using various arguments, such as the protection of the Russian-speaking population, opposition to "Nazi" governments, as well as manipulation of the role of the OSCE, Russia seeks to convince the international community of the legitimacy of its actions.

Russia constantly uses the argument about the need to protect the Russian-speaking population in Donbas. The February 24, 2022 statement stated that the "special military operation" aims to "protect the civilian population from genocide and eight years of abuse by the Kyiv regime" (OSCE, 2022a). Such rhetoric tries to justify aggression as a form of humanitarian intervention. The Russian Federation draws parallels between NATO's actions in 1999 in the former Yugoslavia and its own actions in Ukraine. In its February 24, 2022 statement, Russia asks a rhetorical question: "Where was the response of the OSCE and the international community to this largest military operation in Europe since World War II?" (OSCE, 2022a). This is an attempt to create an image of Russia as a state that acts by analogy with the actions of other great powers in the past.

Russia criticizes the OSCE for not fulfilling its functions in relation to the settlement of conflicts, in particular in Ukraine. In materials dated February 24, 2022, Russia notes that "not a single conflict in the area of responsibility of our Organization has been settled by the forces of the OSCE itself. The crisis in Ukraine is a clear confirmation of this unsatisfactory situation" (OSCE, 2022a). This narrative underscores distrust of international institutions, which, in Russia's opinion, have failed to adequately respond to challenges. Russia is trying to portray the Ukrainian government as a "Nazi regime", which justifies the need to "denazify" Ukraine. In a statement dated February 24, 2022, it is noted that "neo-Nazi paramilitary formations have become a pillar of the current regime in Kyiv" (OSCE, 2022a). This is the basis for justifying military aggression, since "denazification" becomes a necessary step for the "protection" of the population.

Russia uses its claims to spread false information, claiming that no attacks on civilian infrastructure are taking place in Ukraine, and that "a special operation is underway, during which high-precision means disable military infrastructure" (OSCE, 2022a). This is part of a wider information war aimed at creating an alternative reality of events. Considering the narratives described above, it can be concluded that Russia systematically uses them to form a certain military strategy. This strategy is based on several key aspects. Using rhetoric about protecting the civilian population and fighting "Nazis", Russia is trying to create the impression that its actions are not only justified, but also necessary from the point of view of international law. This makes it possible to create a basis for further aggression, which is perceived as "protection" of the civilian population.

In addition, the Russian Federation uses a strategy of undermining international norms, accusing the OSCE of bias and inefficiency. For example, the statements emphasize that the OSCE is allegedly unable to objectively assess the situation and does not condemn Ukraine's actions in Donbas. Such accusations serve as a basis for justifying one's own actions and for creating an image of the Russian Federation as a "victim" of an international conspiracy (OSCE, 2022b).

Constant accusations against the OSCE for its inability to resolve conflicts undermine trust in this organization and allow Russia to justify its actions by presenting them as the only possible ones. It also helps Russia avoid responsibility for violations of international law, as it refuses to recognize the authority of international institutions. By making unsubstantiated accusations against the Ukrainian government and spreading misinformation about its actions, Russia is trying to create an alternative version of events that is beneficial to its interests. This strategy allows maintaining internal and external support, despite obvious violations of international law.

In March 2022, at the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council, the Russian Federation continued to form and spread narratives aimed at justifying its aggression against Ukraine, as well as at discrediting international institutions and other states, in particular Western countries. An analysis of the Russian Federation's statements at these meetings allows us to identify key topics that Russia uses to justify its actions and conceal war crimes.

One of the central narratives promoted by Russia is the claim that military actions on the territory of Ukraine are aimed at "protecting" the population of Donbas and the Russian Federation itself from threats from NATO and "neo-Nazi" groups. In a statement at the March 3, 2022 meeting, Russia claims that the situation in Ukraine is the result of the "unconstitutional coup d'état of February 2014" and that the Russian Federation was forced to resort to a special military operation due to threats to national security (OSCE, 2024c). This narrative is supported by accusations against the West, which Russia says supports "neo-Nazi" forces in Ukraine.

Using Humanitarian Narratives to Justify Aggression

Russia also actively uses humanitarian narratives to justify its actions in Ukraine. In statements at various meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council, she emphasizes her alleged concern for the civilian population, while accusing the Ukrainian authorities and nationalist battalions of using civilians as "human shields" and creating humanitarian disasters. For example, at the meeting on March 7, 2022, Russia accused Ukraine of sabotaging humanitarian corridors and that the Ukrainian side allegedly deliberately creates obstacles for the evacuation of civilians from the war zones (OSCE, 2024d). At the same time, Russia is trying to shift responsibility for the humanitarian disaster in Mariupol and other cities to the Ukrainian side.

Russia also uses OSCE meetings to discredit international organizations, including the OSCE itself, accusing it of "illegal" actions. For example, in a statement dated March 3, 2022, Russia criticized the OSCE for allegedly turning it into a "political show" used to attack the Russian Federation (OSCE, 2024c). This narrative is supported by accusations against the West of double standards and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, which, according to Russia, undermines the foundations of international law.

In its statements, Russia also accuses Western countries of allegedly pushing Ukraine to escalate the conflict by supplying it with weapons and military support. According to the statement at the meeting on March 7, 2022, Russia believes that the West is unleashing a large-scale information war against the Russian Federation and promotes the proliferation of dangerous weapons, which can lead to catastrophic consequences not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe in general (OSCE, 2024d).

Narratives of "protect" Russia's Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty

The analysis of the narratives of the Russian Federation in the context of its actions in the international arena, in particular at the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council, allows us to trace the evolution of the rhetoric used to justify aggression against Ukraine. This article will compare the content of the narratives presented in previous analyzes and in the latest statements at the OSCE meetings in 2024 to discover whether there have been changes in rhetoric and how they correlate with developments in the political and military arena.

Previously, the main narrative of the Russian Federation on international platforms, including the OSCE, was the justification of its actions as "protection of the Russian-speaking population" from "genocide" carried out by the Ukrainian authorities in Donbas. This justification was used to legitimize the "special operation", which the Russian Federation presents as a forced action aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of "Russian-speaking citizens". An important element of this narrative was the assertion that the Russian Federation is not waging a war against the Ukrainian people, but is only protecting its national security from "threats" that, according to Russian representatives, emanate from the territory of Ukraine.

An analysis of the latest statements of the Russian Federation, presented at the OSCE meetings in February-March 2024, shows the evolution of this narrative. In their speeches, representatives of the Russian Federation continue to insist on the need to "demilitarize and de-Nazify" Ukraine, but the rhetoric is becoming more aggressive. In particular, the statement dated February 23, 2024 emphasizes the growing involvement of NATO countries in the conflict, which is presented as a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation (OSCE, 2024a). It is noted that the Russian Federation is forced to continue its actions, as Western countries leave it no other choice but to "protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty" (OSCE, 2024b).

Justifying War Crimes: From Denial to Accusation

Previously, the narratives of the Russian Federation in the context of war crimes focused on denying any accusations of war crimes, accusing the Ukrainian side of provocations and using the civilian population as "human shields". The Russian Federation also constantly criticized the OSCE for bias and inefficiency, stressing that the international community ignores the "crimes of the Kyiv regime."

The 2024 statements maintain this rhetorical approach, but with some new emphases. In a statement dated March 14, 2024, representatives of the Russian Federation not only repeat their accusations towards Ukraine, but also attack the OSCE, accusing it of carrying out the order of "Western powers" and deliberately distorting the facts (OSCE, 2024c). In addition, the Russian Federation continues to assert that all its actions are carried out in accordance with

At the same time, a new element of the narrative is an emphasis on the responsibility of Western countries for the continuation of the conflict. In a statement dated March 14, 2024, Russia accused the West of "direct complicity" in the organization of hostilities against Russian military personnel and civilian objects on the territory of the Russian Federation (OSCE, 2024c). Thus, the rhetoric of the Russian Federation evolves from a simple denial strategy to a more aggressive one, where the emphasis is on accusations towards the West that it is the real initiator and culprit of the escalation of the conflict.

Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the materials of the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council held in February 2022, it is possible to clearly trace certain narratives used by the Russian Federation in its military strategy and in justifying military actions, in particular on the territory of Ukraine. These narratives are important for understanding how the Russian Federation tries to legitimize its actions in the international arena and create its own informational context that justifies war crimes.

An analysis of the statements of the Russian Federation at the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council in March 2022 shows the consistent use of narratives aimed at justifying aggression against Ukraine, discrediting international organizations and Western countries, as well as concealing war crimes. These narratives are part of a broader strategy of information warfare that Russia uses to shape its own view of events.

An analysis of the statements of the Russian Federation at the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council in 2024 shows the preservation of the main narratives used to justify military actions and deny war crimes. At the same time, there are noticeable changes in the rhetoric, consisting in the strengthening of accusations against the West, as well as in a more aggressive justification of its actions. This shows the evolution of the narratives of the Russian Federation in response to the change in the foreign policy situation and increased international pressure on Russia.

Thus, Russian rhetoric continues to adapt to new challenges, but remains within the framework of the main strategy aimed at justifying aggression against Ukraine and undermining the international consensus on condemning the actions of the Russian Federation. Further monitoring and analysis of these narratives is important for the development of effective information strategies that can counter Russian propaganda on the international stage. The results show that Russia is designing in statements at the Plenary Sessions of the OSCE Permanent Council several strategic narratives to gain support for their invasion policy. Important conclusions show that strategic narratives about the war in Ukraine are aimed not only at discrediting the Ukrainian government and challenging the current world order.

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Tato sekce zdůrazňuje aktuální stav studovaného problému na globální úrovni, analyzuje nejnovější výzkumy a publikace s odkazy na vědecké publikace za poslední 3-5 let. Relevance, cíl, úkoly a novost studie jsou odůvodněny. Odkazy na literaturu musí být uvedeny v kulatých závorkách. Tato sekce je nepovinná a měla by obsahovat výsledky výzkumu vědců, kteří analyzovali určité aspekty tématu. Každé jméno výzkumníka musí být doprovázeno příslušným odkazem ze seznamu referencí.

Materiály a metody

Tato sekce popisuje hlavní etapy studie a odůvodňuje výběr metod, technik, přístupů nebo akcí použitých k získání nových vědeckých výsledků. Jsou vysvětleny strategie a kritéria pro výběr vzorků (pokud článek obsahuje empirickou část), je poznamenán experimentální základ studie. Uvedená metodologie by měla poskytnout úplný obraz o průběhu výzkumu tak, aby jej mohli opakovat i další vědci s použitím stejných materiálů a metod. Tato sekce je vyžadována ve struktuře vědeckého článku.

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Tato sekce prezentuje hlavní materiál studie s plným odůvodněním získaných vědeckých výsledků. Tabulkové nebo grafické materiály jsou nezbytně doprovázeny výsledky zpracování statistických dat. Zdroje jsou umístěny pod tabulkami a obrázky. Měly by se vyhnout hodnotícím soudům, stejně jako prvkům popisu metodologie a přímému opakování dat prezentovaných v tabulkách a grafickém materiálu v textu článku. Numerické výsledky by měly být zaokrouhleny v souladu s ustálenými pravidly, s ohledem na průměrnou chybu výzkumu, interval spolehlivosti nebo rozložení hodnot. Výsledky výzkumu musí být dostatečně podloženy, metodologicky správné, mít novost a praktickou hodnotu.

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Acknowledgements

The section is for expression of gratitude to individuals or organisations for all possible technical assistance, ideas, financial (material) aid, which made the research possible, etc.

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