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SECURITY DIMENSION OF SPAIN'S EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION: CONCLUSIONS FOR UKRAINE

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Abstract

The present article is concerned with the national security aspects of Spain's accession to European Economic Community (EEC) / European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). One of the goals pursued in this paper is for Ukraine to adopt some particular features and experience of Spain's European and Euro-Atlantic integration practices consistent with the local context. The author analysed the Spanish and Ukrainian historiography on the issues under investigation. This paper analyses geographical range of geostrategic and national security interests of Spain. As the country is situated on the periphery, in the south of the Iberian peninsula, they are concentrated in the Mediterranean region and in Maghreb. The Mediterranean area, which includes the southern and south-eastern coasts of Spain, is the gate of the Atlantic Ocean and the crossroads, both the contact and the conflict zone for a number of European, African as well as Asian states. Ukraine's prospects in this context are also the subject of analysis.

During the years of Francoism, the security interests of Spain in the military sphere were determined by the bilateral common defence treaty with the USA, and the preferential agreement with the EEC on the most favoured nation treatment in the economic sphere.

The security and defence dimensions of Spain did not change in the post-Francoist epoch. The mechanisms of their implementation were supplemented, besides the relations of the USA, by the country's membership of NATO, Western European Union (WEU) and EEC (the EU). As a member of NATO, Spain became ultimately confirmed in its national security interests. NATO membership determined the defence functions of the country concentrated in the Pyrenees, Eastern Atlantic and Western Mediterranean region.

Keywords: Spain, security, NATO, European Economic Community, European Union, the Mediterranean region, referendum.

Introduction

On its way to the democratic transition from the authoritarian system to a full-fledged democracy, post-Francoist Spain had to accomplish one of the essential tasks, i.e. designing and implementation of a new foreign-policy strategy whose main purpose was for the state to become an agent on the international arena, to fully integrate into the European and global structures and processes, thus ensuring the country's national economic, military and political security. Since gaining its independence, Ukraine has declared similar strategic foreign-policy tasks. Their implementation, however, differs fundamentally from the Spanish version (Smoliy, 2001, p. 247-321; 245-306; 624-627, 641-653).

Spanish historiography generally distinguishes two models of foreign policy espoused and adhered to by post-francoist governments, which differ from one another based on their fundamental principles and priorities. The first model, which took atlanticism and unilateralism, i.e. cooperation with the USA

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and NATO, as a priority, was implemented by the governments of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UDC) headed by Adolfo Suarez and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, as well as that of People's Party (PP) led by Jose Maria Aznar Lopez. A different foreign policy model called "Europeanist", with an emphasis on top-priority cooperation with European institutions, European countries and multilateralism, was put into effect by the Socialist governments (the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party – SSWP) headed by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (Carola, 2010; Celestino, 2011; Ivanytska, 2016b).

The experience of Spain with regard to the implementation of Euro-Atlantic trajectory has not only a theoretical, but also, first and foremost, a practical importance for Ukraine on its painful and controversial path to European institutions. The mainstreaming of this agenda in the way of comparison is also enhanced for us in view of a certain similarity of the historical fate of Ukraine and Spain in the 20th century (polarization of the society, a civil war, long-lasting totalitarian-authoritarian regimes, a democratic transition, etc.). We should keep in mind the fact that, having undergone a long-term international isolation during the Francoist period, the Kingdom of Spain became a member of the EU and NATO within a relatively short span of time (from a historical point of view), and ranks high among the leading European countries.

Therefore, it is deemed important to study the historical, national and security context of Spain's accession to NATO and the EU, and within this framework to analyse the effectiveness of the national and international political mechanisms with a view to incorporate Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic security institutions, particularly, into the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The topicality of the subject under consideration is also defined by the fact that national history and political science currently lack complex comparative research in this field.

Literature Review

Spanish historiography is the most well-founded in this respect. Primarily, the Spanish researchers summarized the historiographic studies of the process of Spain's Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, Manuel Corchado Rincon and Carlos Sanz Diaz (2000) published an article on the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary, in which they analyzed the historiography of the Spanish vision of the North-Atlantic Alliance and their country's place and role in it. The researchers emphasize the fact that the historiography of the problem went through certain stages of development. A period in the historiography of research may be defined as a time segment of the historiographic process marked by a unique complex of relevant conceptual peculiarities of the interpretation of the problem. Manuel Corchado Rincon and Carlos Sanz Diaz (2000) singled out 3 periods in the historiography of Spain's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, specifically, into the North-Atlantic Alliance: a) 1949 – 1981; b) 1981 – 1986; c) 1986 – 2000.

It is the authors' opinion that the first period is characterized by the lack of the researchers' attention to the problem of Spain's accession to the Alliance. In our view, the epoch of Francoism within this period should be singled out as a separate space of time, and thus Francoism, which prioritized bilateral cooperation with the USA and the EU in the military and economic security spheres over Spain's membership in the NATO, will not be merged with post-Francoism.

The issues of Spanish Euro-Atlantic integration had been most intensively studied during 1981 – 1986, i.e. since the application for NATO membership by Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo and the eventuation of the national referendum announced by the Socialist government of F. Gonzalez, where the Spanish confirmed the necessity of Spain's membership in the NATO. This period is characterized by the scholarly literature which conceptually dealt with the peculiarities of the break with public consensus with regard to the strategic foreign policy course of the country, the information on party and public controversial debate and the ways of overcoming them. Since the declaration of the referendum results, which marked the 3rd period in Spanish historiography, "the NATO issue" receded into the background. Instead of agitprop cliches, the research demonstrated objectivity, technical and academic approaches, in particular, in axiological and security aspects of Spain's membership in NATO and the EU (Corchado & Sanz, 2000).

The security aspects of Euro-Atlantic course of Spain, its prerequisites, causes, the political parties' attitude to it and debates between them, security factors of the country's accession to NATO and the EU were most consistently and tersely analyzed in fundamental academic publications (Marin et al., 2001; Arostegui et al., 2003).

Spain's path to integration into the European Economic Community, its governing motives and approaches, their evolution and economic results ranging from the Francoist epoch to late 20th century were investigated and evaluated by Julio Crespo MacLellan (2004) in his well-grounded monograph «España en Europa, 1945-2000. Del ostracismo a la modernidad» (Crespo, 2004).

The problem of Madrid's accession to NATO in terms of debate in Spanish-British relations over the sovereignty of Gibraltar was analyzed by Jose Miguel Bueno Vicente in a periodical edition (Bueno, 1981). At the same time, Angel Linares suggested a stocktaking of different theoretical and practical approaches concerning Spain's accession to the Alliance.

The national literature on history and political science has not yet fully covered the issue of Spain's Euro-Atlantic integration, specifically, its security dimension. However, it is gratifying to note that there appeared first research of young Hispanists, namely Fedorova (2014), who did an in-depth study of security-related advantages and disadvantages of Spain's membership in NATO (Fedorova, 2014). A Ukrainian scholar, Koshchiiy (2003) defended her thesis on the issue of Gibraltar in international and Spanish-British relations (Koshchiiy, 2003), while a newspaper columnist Zagoruyko (2013) published a series of articles on the particulars of the conflict over "The Rock" between Madrid and London in "Dzerkalo Tyzhnia", usually referred to in English as The Mirror Weekly (Zagoruyko, 2013). The issues related to Spanish accession to the EEC and Spain's experience of rapprochement with NATO in the context of practical experience for Ukraine was studied by Kyivan scholars Kopyyka (2001) and Pokrovska (1988). The problems of conditions, circumstances, and certain security consequences of the accession of the Spanish state to the EU and NATO were touched upon in a number of textbooks written by Ivanytska (2016b).

Spanish studies in Russia, drawing on the long-standing and serious traditions of their development, are represented by a number of collaborative and monographic studies, academic papers on current history of Spain, in which foreign policy of Spanish governments with regard to the country's accession to EEC and NATO is analyzed to a greater or lesser degree. Collaborative research works, complex and unparalleled in their chronological and geographical scope, the corpus of the sources used and historiographic basis, rank high among academic credentials of Spanish studies in Russia, to name a few "History of Spain. Volume 2. From the War of the Spanish Succession to the early XXI century (Sagomonyan & Yurchik, 2014) and "History of Foreign Policy in Spain" (Anikeeva et al., 2014).

A prominent hispanist, Cherkasova (2009; 2015; 2017) came closest to the thorough study of the specifics of the subject under consideration, in particular, Spain's security in Euro-Atlantic format (Cherkasova, 2009; Cherkasova, 2015; Cherkasova, 2017). The constructive aspects of military-political and military-technical cooperation of Madrid with the EU and NATO were studied by Mazin (1999), Spain's role and place in the system of Western political and military organisations and alliances were investigated by Orlov (2000), and a scholar from Belarus, Naumov (2002) analyzed the problems of Spain's integration into NATO.

Therefore, our brief historiographic analysis of the security dimension of Spain's accession to the EEC and NATO indicates that this problem elicits academic interest both in the world and national Spanish studies. However, the absence of comprehensive research in this context and the need for extrapolation of the Spanish experience of Euro-Atlantic integration to the Ukrainian version determines the topicality of our research.

Spain's Geopolitical Security Space and Mechanisms of National Security Priorities' Defence During Franco Era

Due to its unique peripheral geographic state, the geostrategic, security and defence interests of the thalassocratic Spain in the 2nd half of the 20th century were focused on the Southern flank of continental Europe, i.e. on the south of the Iberian Peninsula, in the Mediterranean and Maghreb in the area of which, there were a number of problematic, in terms of security, points – the Gibraltar Peninsula, the Strait of Gibraltar, which links the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea, Spanish enclaves and city-ports of Ceuta and Melilla located on the territory of Morocco that requires their return thus preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Moroccan state, Western Sahara, the Canary Islands in the context of Algeria's territorial claims regarding these territories, conflicting Maghreb as a zone of Spain's national interest and security control over this region. Due to its favourable economic and geopolitical location, the Mediterranean area, which includes the southern and south-eastern coasts of Spain, is a gate to the Atlantic Ocean as well as the crossroads, a contact and conflict zone of a number of European, African and Asian countries. At the same time, it plays a role of a specific bridge between the East and the West and Spain is a main link between Europe and North Africa (Cherkasova, 2009; Cherkasova, 2015; Cherkasova, 2017).

The Francoist Spain, which after the end of World War II found itself in international isolation and not being a member of UNO or other world and European organization or unions, was looking for security guarantees in bilateral relations with the countries that recognized it.

A decisive role in breaking the international isolation was played by the Spanish-American rapprochement that started in 1947. The USA ignored the nondemocratic nature of the Spanish regime; geo-strategic, geo-political and ideological interests prevailed. This year may be considered to be the year of concretization of the “Cold War” state. The leader of Spain placed his stake on anti-communism, Catholicism and, most importantly, on the favourable strategic and geographical location of the peninsula (Bennassar, 1996, p. 174).

Already in 1947, a number of well-known American Congressmen visited Madrid and next year, the Commander of the US Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sherman. He had a concrete goal – to find out about the possibility of signing a bilateral agreement that would allow the US to place military bases on the territory of Spain in exchange for American military and economic assistance. In his talk with the American Ambassador S. Griffis in 1950 F. Franco confirmed that Spain was ready to sign an agreement with the USA, which would outline the obligations similar to those included into the North Atlantic Treaty, but only on condition that the United States provide sufficient support to Spain (Sabin, 1997, p. 209; Fusi, 2001, p. 108, 112).

After the election of President D. Eisenhower in 1952 in the USA, the security role of the Pyrenean Peninsula – and, particularly, of Spain – increased as the new master of the White House, being a military man in the past, truly appreciated the favourable geostrategic location of the peninsula. The negotiations speeded up. On September 26, 1953 a broad Spanish-American Pact of Madrid, the legal weight of which was decreased to “an executive agreement” that did not require ratification by the Senate and approval of the Congress. Under the terms of the treaty that was signed for a period of ten years with two automatic prolongations for five years each as well as under the terms of secret supplements, the USA received the rights to construct and utilize eight air and two naval bases on the territory of Spain. The construction of military depots and an oil pipeline was also authorized. Under the terms of the agreement, the USA rented three air force bases (Torrejón, Zaragoza, Morón) as well as the Naval Station Rota. Also, in case of a “possible communist aggression, which threatened the security of the West” Washington received the right to use Spanish bases as they saw fit, which for Spain meant its automatic involvement in the military conflict. At the same time, the agreement did not regulate the actions of the USA in a situation when Spain could become the victim of aggression. The agreement on economic support was similar to the agreements and treaties, which Washington signed with other countries. The total sum of the support was 465 million dollars, but by the end of the first decade it increased to 1 billion dollars, and according to some data – to 1 billion 183 million. In general, the US cooperation with Spain in 1954-1975 cost the former 7 billion dollars spent on economic and military aid to the Francoist regime as well as on maintaining and expanding American objects.

Thus, in 1953 Spain got the status of a strategic ally of the USA and, without being a NATO member, it was included into the security and defense structure. Even though it officially was not a member of the military-political block, Spain became an important joining link between the USA and its NATO partners in Western Europe. It was through Spain, as well as through its Canary Islands, passed the main air military cargo traffic from America to the Old World. Strategically significant bomber aircrafts with nuclear weapons were located at the air force bases and Rota served as the forward operation location of the 16th squadron of nuclear-armed submarines of the “Polaris” type. With the US assistance, Spanish enterprises producing weapons and military machinery were considerably modernized. Some of them traditionally received regular orders from American Armed Forces. During 1954-1972 alone, the aircraft enterprises of the country repaired and provided technical service for 5,300 airplanes and helicopters of the American Air Forces (Sabin, 1997, p. 201-214; Bennassar, 1996, p. 175; Fusi, 2001, p. 118; Krasikov, 1989, p. 88-91).

The Spanish-American relations were developed successfully. The US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles visited Spain in 1956 and 1957, and the US President D. Eisenhower in 1959. However, the incident, which took place on January 17, 1966 somewhat clouded these relations as the territory of Spain faced a radioactive threat. On that day, near the village of Palomares, a B-52G bomber collided with a KC-135 tanker, which had taken off from a base in Morón. The B-52 carried four hydrogen bombs with the destruction force of 1.5 megatons each. Three bombs fell on land, two of them detonated and radioactive plutonium spread around; the fourth one fell into the sea and the search for it lasted almost 3 months. It was impossible to hide the accident and it provoked a negative attitude of the Spanish and of the world community.

As a result, the Francoist government prohibited the flights over the territory of their country of the American Strategic Air Command with nuclear weapons on board as well as the mid-air refueling of American planes. Madrid took advantage of the anti-military and anti-American moods, pressing the USA to agree to joint use of the bases (Pozharskaya, 1982, 255-258; Krasikov, 1989, p. 134-136). To a certain extent, the Francoist Spain also used these moods during the Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973. Referring

to the fact that the escalation of the situation in the Mediterranean seriously reflects on the security of the state, the Spanish authorities announced that they prohibit the use of the “dual use” bases for the needs of a third country. This meant prohibition for the aircrafts which transported weapons to Israel to land on the military bases in Spain. Moreover, after France left the military structures of NATO, the Spanish caudillo started talking in 1968 about neutrality as an alternative to the foreign policy vector of Spain (Pozharskaya, 1982, 258-260).

The Spanish-American military-defense and security cooperation was expanding: various memorandums were signed, a new agreement, which diversified and improved this cooperation and substituted the 1953 agreement, which had expired, was signed in 1963 for a period of five years. Under the terms of this agreement, the Americans kept their bases on the Spanish territory. At the same time, a new structure was established – an American-Spanish Consultative Committee on Defense Matters. The USA assumed an obligation to modernize Spanish Armed Forces. The “Joint Declaration” published on the occasion of signing the 1963 agreement states that it is “a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas” (Marin et al., 2001, p. 181-182; Krasikov, 1989, p. 122-123; Pozharskaya, 1982, 250-252).

In August 1970 a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed between Spain and the USA, which was viewed as a qualitatively new stage in the development of partnership relations between the two countries in the field of security. However, while signing the Treaty in 1970, Madrid took advantage of a number of circumstances demanding some preferences from Washington. These circumstances included: the Palomares incident, which caused a wave of anti-Americanism among the Spanish community, the appearance of American ships in Gibraltar during a conflict between Madrid and London, the turn up of the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea etc. The Spanish demanded that the previous agreements should be substituted by a “treaty”, which would have equal force for both states, obliged the USA to defend the Spanish territory in case of external aggression, widened American military and economic assistance (Pozharskaya, 1982, p. 270-280; Krasikov, 1989, p. 149-142).

In order to reach economic security, Madrid in the years of Francoism was able to find an acceptable modus vivendi in relations with the West through the agreements with the US. In addition, the program of socioeconomic stabilization, developed in 1959 with the help of IMF, determined the political choice of the Francoist regime in the field of economic security – integration to the Common European Market. Despite the anti-African prejudices of the Europeans, Madrid purposefully and gradually adapted to the standards set in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. Minister for Foreign Affairs Castiella, the “designer” of Spain’s foreign policy for 13 years, determined adjoining of the state to the integration processes in Europe to be the priority goal. His line of politics aimed at “Spain’s gaining the status of an absolutely European state with a medium potential...” (Crespo, 2004, p. 115).

In 1962 Spain sent a request to the Headquarters of the EEC to start official negotiations on accession to this organization. Madrid’s request was supported by the Federative Republic of Germany and France, which still had certain concerns due to Spanish competition on the agrarian market, as well as Italy whereas other Western European countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg) avoided giving an unambiguous assessment of this step of the Francoist government. Still, on July 29, 1970, in Luxemburg, after many years of negotiations, only a protocol about granting Spain most favourable conditions for trading with the EEC countries was signed; the protocol decreased the customs tax for Spanish industrial goods exported into the EEC by 65%. Spain was refused membership in the “Common market” (Crespo, 2004, p. 111-125; Krasikov, 1989, p. 145-146).

At the same time, Francoist Spain was not able to solve a number of security-related issues, in which it did not get the support of the USA. First of all, we speak about Gibraltar. The Gibraltar problem (territory on the south of the Pyrenean Peninsula, total area – 5.9 square km, population – 27,000 – the English and the Spanish (the 1990-s); border with Spain – 1km 240m; distance between Europe and Africa in the narrowest point of the strait – 14 km) has a long history in the Spanish-British relations. Just a reminder that Gibraltar was recaptured from the Moors by the Spanish Queen Isabella I of Castile in 1462.

Under the terms of the Peace of Utrecht of July 13, 1713, which ended the war for Spanish heritage, Spain ceded the Port of Gibraltar and the Menorca island to Great Britain; London did not have the right to pass or sell Gibraltar to another country; in case Great Britain disclaims Gibraltar, it automatically returns to Spain. During the World War II A. Hitler, wishing to engage Spain into the war on its side, encouraged F. Franco to start a joint operation on recapturing Gibraltar. Most probably, Churchill’s threat to take over the Canary Islands in case of joint Spanish-German operation “The Rock”, put these plans on break. In 1964

the negotiations between the official representatives of Francoist Spain and Great Britain on Gibraltar decolonization started, however, they were not successful. Then Great Britain granted Gibraltar the status of a dominion and initiated a referendum among the population in 1967: of 19,000 citizens of Gibraltar, who took part in the referendum, only 44 people expressed a desire to join Spain. By the results of the referendum, Gibraltar ceased to Gibraltar border, which led to food deficiency on Gibraltar as it came from Spain. The blockade lasted for 15 years (Sboyko, 2008).

The Ancient Greek name of the Mediterranean Sea be a part of Spain. In 1969 a Constitution was adopted in Gibraltar, according to which, a governor, who is responsible for foreign policy, defense and domestic security, represents Great Britain on the Peninsula. In addition, a local parliament and the Council of Ministers were established. Reaction of Madrid was acute. In 1969 F. Franco declared a blockade of the Rock, forbade the flights of British planes over the Spanish territory as well as the use of the Algeciras Port, closed the Spanish – “Mare Nostrum” quite accurately describes one of the traditional security vectors of Spanish diplomacy, which can be clearly traced through the events of the Francoist epoch. Especially taking into consideration the complexity of relations with Morocco, the regime was objectively interested in security stability as well as trade and economic cooperation in these neighbouring countries, namely, in the Maghreb sector. In 1968 Spain recognized the independence of its African colony (Equatorial Guinea) and also agreed to return its colony, the Ifni Province, to Morocco.

The problem of Western Sahara – the Spanish “African Province”, which countries of Northern Africa set claims for, became an acute problem at the end of 1974. The “Province” was a narrow strip of the desert on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean with the population of 150 thousand people, mainly nomadic cattle herders. Western Sahara raised an interest of Spain as well as of its African neighbours mostly of the fact that it has huge phosphate deposits. Morocco and Mauritania both wanted to establish a protectorate over Western Sahara, Algeria claimed that it should be entitled to self-determination. The UN Special Committee on Decolonization supported the idea of holding a referendum on this territory so that people could choose their fate. Soon afterwards, by the Cortes’ decision of 1975, Spain passed Western Sahara to Morocco, hoping to decrease the claims over its African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. At the same time, Madrid received a number of preferences, particularly, for phosphate mining (Oneto, 1975, p. 35; Krasikov, 1989, p. 157-158).

Thus, despite the almost 40-year existence of an authoritarian Francoist regime in Spain, there were no radical changes in the foreign policy regarding national security priorities, hereditary and traditional character of the past was preserved.

Special Aspects of Spain’s Accession to NATO and EU Membership and Guarantees of its Security Interests

With the death of F. Franco in November 1975 Spain entered a new historic stage: peaceful dismantlement of the authoritarian regime as well as a transition towards a fully-fledged democracy. This transition was completed in October 1982 when a socialist government headed by F. Gonzalez came to power as a result of a free democratic election. Within the period of the Spanish transition to democracy governmental policy was implemented by two democratic governments headed successively by A. Suárez (1976-1981) and L. Calvo Sotelo (from November 1981 to July 1982).

Considering the concept of foreign policy implementation, the governments of A. Suárez and L. Calvo Sotelo pursued the assumption that Spain, officially rating “average in significance” as a state, was nevertheless able to play a considerable part in the global as well as European security policy. With this background the future of Spain was interpreted in its indispensable association with European countries. Similarly, in the context of Spain belonging to the Western civilization, claims for accession to NATO were becoming increasingly persistent. Membership in NATO conferred a range of benefits to the state, such as speeding negotiations concerning membership in the EU, solution of the problem of Gibraltar, modernization of the Armed Forces in the context of ensuring national security and protection from potential conflicts (Fedorova, 2014, p. 35-37).

Not long thereafter, this route was hampered by quite a number of “submerged reefs”. The USA, in particular, while endorsing the candidacy of Spain in its obtaining membership in the organization, simultaneously took advantage of the occasion to let the government of L. Calvo Sotelo take note of their concerns as for the retention of American military bases on the territory of this country and the necessity to update the bilateral agreement. At the same time, the candidacy of Spain did not enjoy unconditional support among the other Alliance participants. Certain objections were expressed

by Holland, Greece and France. Apart from that, the government of L. Calvo Sotelo did not have a clear understanding of the forms of Spain's participation NATO structures, considering them to be the subject of further negotiation.

In a similar way, the very issue of Spain's accession to NATO provoked domestic political debates as well as interparty controversies. The leaders of Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) accused the Democratic Centre Union (UCD) of refusing to seek consensus on the issue so significant for Spain. No due attention, as seen by the experts, was drawn to Gibraltar and the expansion of the "covering force" geographic area of Spanish enclaves in North Africa – the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Despite the opposition of the factions of the PSOE and PCE in the parliament, the government of L. Calvo Sotelo submitted an official application for the Accession of Spain to NATO on May 30, 1975 in Washington. The historic paradox lied in the fact that it was the Cabinet of L. Calvo Sotelo, the weakest of all the post-Franco governments since as early as 1975, that made a decisive step towards the Accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Alliance. On December 10, 1981 the ministers of NATO ratified the Accession of Spain to the Alliance. On being ratified by the parliaments of 15 member countries of NATO Spain became the 16th participating member of this military political organization from the year of 1982 (Davydov, 2006, p. 368).

On July 2, 1982 Spain renewed the Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation with the USA, but again in the form of an "agreement". It somewhat lowered the status of the new document. The Preamble to the Treaty alone clearly linked the bilateral Spanish-American relationship to the obligations ensuing from the affiliation of both of the countries to NATO. The agreement between Spain and the USA which was an essential tool in the bilateral political and military interaction continued to be enforced. The USA was confirmedly granted the use of the bases and the objects on Spanish territory. The supplementary agreement stipulated that "the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons or non-conventional weapons and their components on Spanish territory will rely on the approval of Spanish government". A concrete implementation mechanism of this statement, however, was not elaborated, and this devalued the principle as such. Spanish government did not obtain a real possibility to inspect American objects and constructions on its own territory.

Annex 2 of the Agreement contained a list of all the bases and objects which were "property of the Spanish state" and where the "support installations" to be used by the United States Armed Forces were deployed. These were the air bases in Morón, Torrejón de Ardoz and Zaragoza, the naval base in Rota; the ammunition and fuel storages in Cartagena, the communication stations in Umos, Hinojes, Soler, Menorca, Estacada Bares, and the meteorological station in Sonseca etc.

The USA, in their turn, pledged to facilitate the "strengthening of Spanish armed forces by shipping... defense equipment, services and training to Spain". By signing a new set of military and political documents with the USA, the centrist government, "without prior permission", sought to silence the debates on whether any separate agreements with Washington in the military sphere were needed in the event of Spain's accession to NATO (Marin et al., 2001, p. 376-377; Linares, 2013).

During the parliamentary election campaign, Spanish socialists promised to resolve the issue of the country's membership in NATO through holding a referendum. This problem was the subject of contentious debate within the country. Alongside this, the USA continued their efforts for Spain to attain full member status in NATO. Nevertheless, neither the visit of the US President USA R. Reagan to Madrid in May 1985 nor conversations held with F. Gonzalez during his September visit to the USA changed the position of Madrid as for a special status in the Alliance.

It brought Spanish socialists to hold a national referendum on March 12, 1986, which was unprecedented in the history of the Alliance. The question was whether Spain should remain in the Atlantic Alliance on the following terms and conditions: non-incorporation into NATO's military structure, prohibition on the installation, storage or entry of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, non-membership of Spanish Armed Forces in the NATO Military Command Structure (military decisions of NATO should not concern Spanish armed forces), gradual reduction of the United States' military presence in Spain.

It should be reminded that at the time of Spain joining NATO, i.e. in 1982, there were 12000 American troops deployed on the four American bases (Marin et al., 2001, p. 373-374).

The referendum of 1986 confirmed the terms of membership and a "special status" of Spain in the Alliance (52,5% of Spanish people voted in favour of the permanence with NATO, 39,8% voted against). The "special status" of Spain in NATO enabled Madrid to actively participate in the work of the governing bodies of the Alliance and concurrently preserve discretion in decision-making on issues that concerned ensuring national and international security.

Gaining the support of its citizens concerning special status of the country as a member of NATO, the government of F. Gonzalez reduced the duration of military service in the armed forces from 15 to 12 months, reallocating the defense expenditures so that 40% of the funds was directed to Air Force, 32% to Army Field Forces, 28% to the Navy (previously 60% of the military funds had been allocated to Army Field Forces, 19% to the Navy, 21% to Aviation (Marin et al., 2001, 385-388).

As early as October 1985, Spain and the USA had started negotiations on the study of their joint contribution to the defense of Europe and of the West in general. The position of Spain in these negotiations considerably differed from that held previously. The key issue for Madrid was to obtain guarantees regarding the assistance of the USA in the event of a military attack against Spain as well as an increase in economic and military assistance. The USA refused to grant guarantees in the sphere of security claiming that American Congress raised objections about their country making such commitments to the European countries which were not members of NATO.

In the second half of the 1980s, the situation changed dramatically: Spain became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance which solved the problem of guaranteed safety of the country, and Spain was ready to refuse from economic and military assistance of the USA within the agreement discussed. Thus the issue that came to the foreground was a reduction of American military presence in the country.

In 1987 the number of US staff employed at military objects in Spain, i.e. at the four bases mentioned above, made up slightly more than 10 000. At these negotiations with Washington, Madrid was to solve a still more challenging task – to ensure the highest possible level of “compatibility” of the military presence of the USA on Spanish territory with the nuclear-weapon-free status of the country and a special form of its membership in NATO. The USA resisted the claims of Spain. As a result, in November 1987 Madrid officially notified Washington that they refused from automatic extension of the bilateral Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation which was to expire on May 14, 1988. In these circumstances, at the beginning of 1988, America gave their consent to withdraw 72 fighter-bombers (F-16) of the 401 Tactical Air Command of American Air Forces from Spanish territory within 3 years. Also, the parties agreed that the USA should decrease the number of tanker aircraft (from 20 to 15), and the American military staff strength should be reduced by 35,9%. Washington took on an obligation to respect the status of Spain as a nuclear-weapon-free state. Nevertheless, this obligation was devalued by an additional agreement that stated that Madrid should not insist on the Spanish government being provided with information about the presence of nuclear weapon on board US Navy ships that entered the ports of the country. As a new development, the annual American military aid to Madrid was terminated, i.e. the USA ceased crediting Spanish military equipment purchases, which caused the appearance of additional expenditures in the Spanish budget. Eventually, on December 1, 1988 the Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the USA and the Kingdom of Spain was signed. However, the issues of economic, technical and cultural cooperation were to be regulated by separate documents.

This Spanish-American defense cooperation agreement was generally a fairly objective reflection of the level of bilateral cooperation reached in the late 1980s, when the “senior-junior” relations formula was replaced by the principle of equal partnership which was being actively held.

In February 1988 the enactment of a set of documents identifying the place and the level of Spanish involvement in NATO was completed. Spain entered the Defence Planning Committee of NATO, became a member of the Nuclear Planning Group, took part in the organization of the Air Defense System of NATO and in the formation of NATO Navy Force in East Atlantic, took on obligations concerning the logistical support of NATO military units and defense of the Strait of Gibraltar.

Spain and Portugal signed the Protocols of Accession to the Western European Union in London on November 14, 1988. Spain became a full member of WEU on March 27, 1990. On the whole, this step was commensurate with SSWP commitment to strengthening the role of the European countries in the common security system of the West. In the spring of 1990, Spain participated in WEU Ministerial counsel as a full member for the first time and declared that WEU had a “transient nature” and would exist “until the EU undertook the functions of agreeing on a united approach in the sphere of European security.” At the same time, F. Fernandez Ordóñez, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, emphasized that the new security system calls for strengthening of NATO’s political role (Mazin, 1999, p. 89).

The flexible approach to the theme of “Europeanism-Atlanticism” became one of the fundamental elements of Spanish foreign policy at the new stage of international development, i.e. it was the beginning of the national security concept transformation in the new Directive of 1992 which declared that “various crises outside Europe showed that the security of Spain depends not only on the security of its territories,

but also on what is going on in other parts of the world.” “Security should be understood at the collective level; no country can face the new risks and threats alone in such an interconnected world”, said J.Piqué, Spain’s foreign minister, and one might say that these words became one of the mottos of Spain’s foreign policy in the 1990s. The implementation of this motto was reflected in the revision of Spain’s attitude to participation in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Thus, since the Kingdom of Spain joined NATO, it has participated in numerous operations, commencing with missions in Africa and Central America, Kosovo, Iraq, Active Endeavour operation aimed at maintenance of peace and security in the Mediterranean region. Currently, Spanish expeditionary force takes part in a number of operations essential for NATO: Baltic Air Policing Mission (an Alliance’s air defence Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) in order to guard the airspace over the three Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia); Enhanced forward presence (NATO’s programme of strengthening its presence in Eastern Europe within the framework of their allies’ support after the annexation of the Crimea and occupation of a part of Donbas by the RF; Support of Turkey as part of the Active Endeavour operation to defend the population from ballistic missile threats originating from the Syrian conflict, etc. Altogether, 671 Spanish military men take part in different operations under the auspices of NATO, 736 in the EU and 612 in the UN (Rostov, 2019, 21-22).

One of the top foreign policy priorities of the of new J.M.Aznar (1996-2004) government in the context of Spanish-American relations was the problem of reforming the “Spanish model” of NATO membership, that is joining the Alliance’s military structures. Spain aspired to take Command of the Allied forces in the Strait of Gibraltar and the whole territory of the country. Besides, it counted on receiving important positions in other Commands of the Alliance in Europe and the Atlantic region. At the same time, Spain confirmed its non-nuclear status for the future. The facts that J.Solana became Secretary General of NATO in 1995, and the summit of the North Atlantic Council held in Madrid in July 1997, among other issues, decided on NATO’s enlargement by joining Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, were additional reasons for including Spain into the integrated military structure.

However, the UK’s reaction to the situation over Gibraltar was adverse and it claimed that it would block Spain’s joining NATO military structure, if the latter did not lift the restrictions imposed on the British aircrafts landing on “The Rock” territory. True is that a formal decision as to Spain joining a NATO military structure was not taken at the summit because there was no agreement on the issue of the Canary Islands. Spain insisted on the inclusion of the islands in its zone of responsibility and the so-called maritime corridor going through the Canary Islands, Lisbon and the Spanish port of Cadiz. Defending its interests, Portugal raised objections to Spain’s demands. In retort, J.M.Aznar threatened to put on hold the process of integration into NATO if Spain did not gain control over the Canaries.

The last obstacles on Spain’s path to full-fledged NATO membership disappeared in December 1997: the UK unexpectedly lifted its veto to the new command structure and agreed to further discuss the problem of Gibraltar in a bilateral format (experts claim that Washington had something to do with it). It gave the possibility to NATO defence ministers to establish a new command structure of the Alliance, reducing the number of subregional command posts from 65 to 20. A new southwestern combined subregional command post was established especially for Spain on its territory. It covered the whole territory of the country (continental Spain, the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands, as well as the Strait of Gibraltar zone), except Ceuta and Melilla which were outside the purview of NATO. Spain’s headquarters were located in the suburb of Madrid. The water zone between the Canary Islands and continental Spain had remained under the supervision of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Cherkasova, 2015, p. 42; Naumov, 2002, p. 70-71).

Thus, Spain definitively gave up its “special status” in the North-Atlantic Alliance and became its full-fledged member. It was formalized on January 1, 1999 (Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982, an agreement was signed in 1988 concerning the conditions of Spain’s participation in NATO without accession into military structures). Spain accepted The US proposal on the expansion of the American Naval Station Rota which allowed for control over all the Mediterranean area. The air base of the US strategic bomber aircraft located outside Madrid greatly contributed to nuclear parity with the USSR, currently with RF. The Joint Subregional Command Southwest Headquarters headed by the Spanish Major General J.Narro was opened on September 30, 1999 in the town of Retamares outside Madrid.

The Socialist government of post-Francoist Spain took a tough stance toward the problem of Gibraltar, insisting that the British government should seek ways to bring the enclave back under Spanish sovereignty. As it did in the previous decades, Madrid announced various initiatives. However, the British side declined all these proposals alluding to the negative attitude to it on the part of the enclave’s residents. In the meantime, the so-called Brussels Agreement was concluded in 1984. Under the agreement, it was decided to hold

negotiations over the sovereignty of Gibraltar, and Spain was obliged to open the frontier with this territory. The talks with the UK over Gibraltar ended in 1985. The parties agreed to provide equality of rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain; the free movement of persons, vehicles and goods between Gibraltar and Spain. Under the Agreement, Spain provided flight operating safety over the Rock. The UK and Spain agreed to continue negotiations. Nevertheless, the countries were divided over the approaches to the solution of the problem. The United Kingdom regarded the Rock exclusively from the military and strategic point of view, while Spain was more concerned with political, economic and security issues.

The Spanish of the post-Francoist era had no hesitations and considered the accession to the Community to be the catalyst of domestic economic and political reforms. On the eve of joining the EEC, half of the Spanish export (60% in agriculture) and a third of import (30% – agriculture) was accounted for by the EEC. The controversies of the process of negotiations over the EU enlargement on account of Spain consisted of the following:

1) The agriculture of the country caused a number of problems in the EU. The first and the most important was how many EU funds should be allocated to transform its agrarian sector. The matter is that as of 1980, livestock production made 60% of the EU agricultural produce, while in Spain the figure was only 42%. Meanwhile, production of fruit and vegetables in Spain was 58%, and that of the EU was 40%. Besides, Spain's export of fruit and vegetables was highly competitive due to natural climatic conditions, and its produce got to European markets 2-3 weeks earlier than that of France. It caused the French and Italian farmers' discontent.

2) The prospect of the Spanish workforce emigration to the EU countries and its free movement after the restrictions were lifted, was also causing concerns;

3) On the other hand, the question arose of how many votes Portugal and Spain would have in the EU Commission in order to preserve the existing balance between the large and small countries. It was decided to give Portugal 5 votes and 8 votes to Spain, thus preserving the previous balance of power.

An active supporter of the EEC expansion towards the south, France considered it to be an opportunity to reestablish its positions in the Community worsened as a result of the UK accession. At the same time, Paris insisted that all the problems of the countries-applicants should be solved prior to their definitive accession.

The situation in Spain was aggravated by a failed coup d'état on February 23, 1981. However, with the ascent to power of the socialists led by F.Gonzalez in Spain in 1982, diplomatic activity as to the process of negotiations became more intense. The fact that socialists came to power in France that same year considerably facilitated the negotiations. As a result, the Council of Europe passed a resolution in October 1983 about access of Spanish and Portuguese goods to the Common Market. EEC suggested establishing a 10-year transition period intended to have 2 stages. However, the Spanish government declined this proposal and offered a 7-year maximum term of transition period. During the second half of 1984, a consensus on one of the key issues of the negotiations in the agrarian sphere – control over national agricultural production – was achieved at the EEC Summit in Dublin. The Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal into the EC was signed in June 1985. Spain and Portugal became full-fledged members of EU-12. Spain became a member of all political institutions of the Community with 11% of votes allocated to it (Marin et al., 2001; Vernikov, 2007, p. 29-30; Crespo, 2004; Anikeeva et al., 2014, p. 251-252; Kopyka, 2001).

Madrid benefited from the European integration (among many other aspects) financially and economically, specifically, in the form of high payouts from so-called Community funding whose aim was to contribute to Spain's economic growth and enable it to reach the level of more developed countries of the continent. Beginning with 1987, Spain annually received finances which considerably exceeded its contribution to the Community budget (the overall difference for the period 1987-2005 was over € 78,000 million). These additional financial injections enabled Spain to create 300,000 new jobs annually and finance a number of large-scale economic projects, primarily in the sphere of infrastructure. Suffice it to say that the building of 4 out of 10 km of modern high-quality motorways on Spanish territory was funded by the EEC. There are other, no less eloquent indices: the EU countries provided for about 90% of all foreign investments into Spain's economy, and, as of the beginning of the current century, they account for 66% of the Spanish import and 75% of its exports. One of the most important results of the country's accession to the EU is a considerable growth of per capita income in Spain – from 68% average in EEC member-states in 1986 to 90% in 2005 (Vernikov, 2007, p. 29-30, 55-62).

Spain's membership in the Community, and later in European Union, had a great impact on the orientation of Madrid's policy in global affairs, making the European orientation the main trajectory of

trade, economic and political relations of the Spanish state. What is more, it was broad-ranging cooperation with the EU partners that to a large extent determined the formation of all the main directions of Spain's international activity. Furthermore, the interaction of Spanish diplomats with their European colleagues was extended not only to the EU institutions, but also other international organizations, like NATO or CSCE (later, OSCE). The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in February 1992 became a crucial event for Spain. It came into effect on November 1, 1993 and, on the one hand, formalized plans for Economic and Monetary Union – the so-called first pillar of the European Union; on the other hand, it included “The common foreign and security policy” (CFSP), which became the second pillar of the EU into the architecture of integration processes. Since that moment, the vector of further development of the Spanish foreign policy towards new, closer forms of cooperation with European countries was determined (Crespo, 2004).

Conclusions

A brief analysis of the security dimension of the prerequisites, development and results of the Spanish Euro-Atlantic integration process makes it possible to make adequate conclusions, define its peculiar features and extrapolate certain differences and co-relations to the analogous path of Ukraine.

Spain determined its national economic and security priorities which were associated with cooperation and membership in the EU and NATO clearly and definitively, both during the Francoist and post-Francoist periods. Since the country's accession to the Alliance, all Spanish governments, the right or the left, have decisively and consistently pursued the Euro-Atlantic agenda in their foreign policy. Conversely, since it gained its independence, Ukraine has not been able to clearly define its security aspects or determine the main trends of its foreign policy, alternating between West and East. Only in 2018, having wasted more than a decade, did Ukraine stipulate its commitment to joining the EU and NATO in the Constitution.

Having joined NATO, Spain became fully confirmed in its national security interests: its functions in the Alliance were limited to the defence of its own territory and airspace; participation in the sea and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic and Western Mediterranean areas; to control over Strait of Gibraltar; the use of Spanish territory as a transit depot for the Allied Forces. Madrid is keen for the NATO Guideline Area (NGA) to be extended not to the East, but to the whole Mediterranean Area and North Africa, as there exist a number of outstanding issues with regard to Spain's national interests. NATO, in turn, is building outposts of influence on the African continent with the help of Spain, which is in charge of the Alliance's southwestern flank. At the same time, Spain's relations with the UK concerning Gibraltar sovereignty and the inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in NGA have remained in abeyance.

The analysis of the participation rates of Spanish Armed Forces in different security and peacekeeping operations of the NATO, EU and UNO shows that Spain considers its own security to be inseparably connected with that of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. This experience of Spain is useful for Ukraine as well.

There remains an open issue of the benefit Spain gained from its membership in NATO, since the threat of an open attack on the Pyrenees is currently minimal. Nevertheless, there exist new threats and challenges – terrorism, cyberattacks, information warfare, etc. In this context, NATO provides considerable guarantees of security for its member countries. In particular, Spain and the USA agreed upon joint anti-terrorism efforts, allowing the US police services to carry out counterterrorist activity on Spanish territory in conjunction with their Spanish colleagues.

Present-day Ukraine, fighting a hybrid warfare, is losing on these directions of its security policy.

Spain does not call into question the necessity of maintaining NATO as a factor of stability, or the need for American Armed Forces presence in Europe as a crucial condition of maintaining security on the European continent. NATO membership contributed to the modernization of Spanish Armed Forces according to NATO standards. Currently, Spain aims for NATO's transformation into an effective instrument of regional conflict prevention. Ukraine faces a similar pressing challenge on its way to membership in this political-military defence block.

From the military point of view, Ukraine is unable to fully provide its security on its own (taking into account military imbalance with neighbouring countries, nuclear disarmament, etc.). Therefore, Ukraine's participation in the system of collective security, which has a much higher deterrent potential as compared to the national military resources, would be an optimal solution for the Ukrainian government.

NATO membership will make it possible for Ukraine to conduct domestic political, social and economic reforms, bring the national legislation in sync with the legal rules and democratic principles

of NATO member countries, accelerate the national Armed Forces transformation, be included in the decision-making process as regards Euro-Atlantic security, as well as its own; receive additional guarantees of the national sovereignty, inviolability of territory and state borders.

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