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SOCIAL RATIONALITY AS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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Abstract

The article explores the close interaction between political scientific discourse and society, which lies in the direct determination of political discourse and the subject field of political science by the demands of the social system. As a result, the boundaries of political discourse are delineated by the boundaries of societal problems and phenomena actualized by society on one hand, and by the dominant type of social rationality on the other. Consequently, the limitation of political discourse within the boundaries of social rationality is traced. It is specified that this process involves a clear subordination and mutual determination of scientific discourse and the social system, characterized by the necessary conformity of political science research to societal norms, axiological, and ethical ideals of society. The article considers the key role of society in shaping the scientific discourse of political science. The interdependence between the political situation in the social system and progressive or regressive processes in political discourse is traced.

The article represents the main approaches to understanding the principle of social rationality in the general scientific discourse. The relationship between social rationality, social acceptability, historical situation, and historical context within the framework of general scientific methodology is examined. The key aspects of the operation of this principle within the social and exact sciences are demonstrated. The fundamental role of social rationality for the functioning of social sciences is substantiated. It is proven that the influence of social acceptability not only affects the scientific discourse of social sciences but also exact sciences, considering the decrease in the strength of this factor's influence on the latter. Characteristics and projections are made on the political discourse.

Keywords: social rationality, social acceptability, politics, political discourse, science methodology, public sphere.

Introduction

Science in its path of development has transitioned from a closed system of sacred knowledge to an open accessible system of secular knowledge, acquiring social significance and becoming the subject of open discussions within society. On one hand, this demonstrates the inseparable connection in the mutual development of society and science, their mutual influence and mutual determination, including the mutual determination of possibilities. On the other hand, rises the issue of the relationship between science

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and the role of public opinion in the processes of institutionalizing scientific paradigms, the selection of research topics, the use of a certain type of methodology, delineation of subject fields of scientific theories, determinants of political discourse, etc. Society ceases to be merely a consumer of the results of scientific research due to the increase in the level of education among the average individual and the level of ability to engage in constructive criticism within the aforementioned society. The role of public opinion transitions from that of a passive consumer to that of an active participant in political discourse due to the actualization, acceptance, or non-acceptance of certain methodological postulates, results of political processes, or simply affirmations of certain political programs (Babkina, 2009, p. 3-8). Thus, if previously political discourse existed relatively independently, focusing on the process of verifying the results of its activities solely on the opinions of other members of political communities, contemporary political discourse is saturated with the influence of public opinion, which, regardless of the type of political reality, will retain its significant influence, with the caveat that within different political systems the strength of the influence of public opinion may vary, but despite the change, it will inevitably retain its direct and indisputable influence (Habermas, 2006, p. 217).

Literature review

The theme of social rationality has been one of the key points in the scientific discourse of recent decades, as the growing influence of society in shaping scientific discourse becomes undeniable. The publicity and openness of the scientific process stimulate its development, but on the other hand create a situation of excessive influence from society on the creative processes of science. However, an important observation is that mostly this topic is explored within the framework of general scientific methodological discourse as one of the main principles of overall scientific development. Along with this, it is necessary to note the conceptual difference between the action of this principle in the natural and social sciences, as it receives a completely different degree of influence. This theme has mostly been discussed by Western researchers, and within the Ukrainian political discourse, it has been only superficially illuminated as an attributive rather than a substantive factor.

In the context of this issue, it is worth referring to the works of Karl-Otto Apel's "Towards a Transformation of Philosophy" (1980), Hilary Putnam's "Reason, Truth, and History" (2003), Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1996), Gaston Bachelard's "The new scientific spirit" (1986) and Jürgen Habermas's "The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory" (2006). The aforementioned works have become classics in the methodology of science, but the concepts proposed by them receive a more vivid interpretation through the prism of their application within the framework of political discourse. It is particularly worth emphasizing that Karl-Otto Apel's idea (1980) of the "communicative society" within the development of the political process receives connotations not only of a participant in the external scientific discourse but also of its internal - political, which are combined within political science (Apel, 1980, p. 192). The communicative society emerges not only as an active participant in the political process but also in the scientific discourse due to the publicity of modern science and the increase in the education and awareness of society.

Hilary Putnam's concept of "social acceptability" is crucial for social rationality, as the researcher notes that the role of society in scientific discourse is not just passive consumption of results, but also the correlation of research with criteria of their acceptability for society. This correlation means that society determines scientific discourse to conform to specific ethical, cultural, and humane norms, which also correlates with political and political science discourses. Since politics itself unfolds within the acceptable framework of society. And a scientific fact is not devoid of axiological and ideological load, which is critically manifested within political discourse (Putnam, 2003, p. 134).

The concepts of scientific revolutions by Thomas Kuhn (1996), "worldviews" by Jürgen Habermas, and the transformation of rationality through the prism of the "spirit of the era" by Gaston Bachelard (1986), objectify the ways of functioning of scientific discourse in political science within its constant transformations and adaptations to contemporary conditions. In fact, the synthesis and comparison of these approaches allow us to project this system of coordinates of social rationality in the context of the scientific discourse of political science, where it acquires new manifestations and helps to trace the regularities and complexities of the functioning of political discourse.

The Specifics of the Place of Social Acceptability in the Scientific Discourse of Social Sciences

Public opinion is capable of justifying certain scientific or metaphysical aspects of political existence based on non-rational grounds, thereby determining new boundaries of the political: "Moral truths, which

still enter into religious and metaphysical world pictures, share this strong genuine claim, though the fact of pluralism at the same time reminds us that comprehensive doctrines can no longer be publicly justified” (Habermas, 2006, p. 126). Despite the development of the scientific worldview and its increasing role in social life, science is still influenced by social moral imperatives, which, despite their irrational nature, directly determine the boundaries of social acceptability. Thus, a problem arises that the type of worldview embedded in the core during the construction of the scientific worldview still goes beyond rationality and remains within the boundaries of social norms, which is particularly evident in the scientific discourse of social sciences, especially political science.

The discourse of social sciences requires reasoned justification due to the lack of a clear evidential basis, such as the objective results of repeated experiments in the exact sciences, where repeatability is one of the main arguments for proving the truth of a theory. However, with the transition to the pluralism of the postmodern concept of truth, questions arise about the adequacy of such an approach. If we take the assertion that truth is probable and relative, then anything endowed with cognitive content needs justification: “Whatever one may think about the discussion of being and duty, with the transition to modernity, the ‘objective’ reason, embodied in the nature or history of salvation, has changed to ‘subjective’ reason of the human spirit. At the same time, the question arises whether normative sentences still have any cognitive content at all and how they can be justified as needed” (Habermas, 2006, p. 113). Here, we observe the tendency that society precisely shapes its formation as a participant in constructing scientific discourse, necessarily endowing it with a political context, from which it follows that public opinion becomes a fundamental regulator of proposed scientific theories, which in the process of their formation must necessarily be accepted by society and enter into the structure of the societal worldview, absorbing the irrational component of social existence, during which they will reach the stage of general consensus: “The unifying consensus is reached when all reasonable members of the political society justify the political concept they share by incorporating it into some of their comprehensive reasonable views” (Habermas, 2006, p. 124).

In contrast to its origins in the early modern period, science gradually moves away from the principle of forming scientific theory around the idea of pure consciousness as the verifier of the truth of this scientific theory. On the contrary, the role of public opinion is increasingly affirmed within the framework of general scientific discourse: “Namely, it is now revealed that, on the one hand, the subject of possible consensus on truth in science is not the external ‘consciousness’ vis-à-vis the world in general, but the historically real society; on the other hand, that historically real society can only be adequately understood when it is considered as a possible subject of science, including sociology, and its historical reality will be empirically and at the same time normatively critically reconstructed taking into account the ideal of an unrestricted communicative society realized in society” (Apel, 1980, p. 198).

Correlation of historical epoch and social rationality of society

The historical context of society’s existence is one of the main principles of forming the political discourse. But despite the correlation between the historical type of reality and the influence of social thought on the development of scientific knowledge, we consciously separate them into two separate determinants of the formation of the subject of political science in its history. Because in today’s scientific discourse, the principle of social rationality and acceptability has acquired a new fundamental significance, especially in the sciences, the object of study of which is society, but at the same time, we in no way diminish the influence of this factor on the methodological discourse of exact sciences. Here, the fundamental point is that in the modern historical context of existence of society, the role of the influence of social thought on science has moved to a qualitatively new level, ceasing to be a certain attribute of historicity, because, on the one hand, we understand that the political process unfolds in time and is endowed with temporal characteristics, however, on the other hand, it is overloaded with the influence of the human factor, which is often unpredictable. From this point of view, we must clearly distinguish the ways of extracting a specific type of political discourse from various factors: “First of all, already for the identification of the subjects of science at the level of so-called description, there is a fundamental difference, depending on whether the data are ‘supplied’ and then classified as instances of possible explanation according to the laws by means of reproducible experiments, or whether the data should be thematized as individualized in temporal-spatial relation moments of the continuous mediated unchangeable historical process” (Apel, 1980, p. 199). Thus, the historical process is fundamental to the development of scientific discourse, and the influence of social thought can be considered its direct consequence, but this in no way indicates its attributiveness in relation

to the historical one. Science, emerging into the public sphere, asserting itself as a source of true knowledge or a system of ways to verify its reliability, becomes a fundamental element in shaping public opinion, which testifies to the direct influence of the scientific knowledge system on the formation of social rationality.

But this influence is not as one-sided as it may seem, considering the tendencies of development even in exact and natural sciences. Science initially forms the worldview of society, basing it on logical cause-and-effect relationships in attempts to explain the world of physical and social phenomena. And then it itself is subject to strict influence from society, incorporating politicization of science based on the value orientations proposed by it: "In this second sense of the term 'political' refers not to a specific matter, but to a special epistemic status sought by conceptions of political justice: they should be involved in various worldviews, becoming their coherent parts" (Habermas, 2006, p. 114). The public recognition and acceptance of scientific theory by society are equally important in the modern scientific discourse as recognition by the scientific community, which is directly proportional to the popularity of this theory in society. Society is the main consumer of the results of scientific development, which with the increase in the level of education and expertise has led to the fact that society has transformed from a consumer into one of the main verifiers of the truth of scientific theory. Of course, this is a general trend in science that is inherent in both exact and humanitarian sciences, but in the context of humanitarian sciences, especially in the discourse of political science, this trend takes on a completely different level of fundamental importance.

Specifics of the principle of social rationality within the framework of the general scientific discourse

One of the main aspects of the scientific discourse, which led to the increased influence of the social factor on science, as well as the demonstration of a constant reference to the scientific process, was the abandonment of the concept of "truth" in favor of the concept of "probable truth" or "plausibility". Such a transition marked a departure from understanding scientific development as a clear movement towards achieving true knowledge or the process of dogmatizing science with a single theory claiming comprehensive explanation. Thus, science was recognized as a synergistic system that develops self-organizing and self-correcting, interacting with society, as a result of which this system provides itself with both empirical material and constant critical potential, which is particularly vivid in the field of social sciences. The concept of "probable truth" emphasizes the historical context of the scientific process, which historically corresponds to a specific period of time and a specific historical situation in society: "Science is a product of the human mind, created according to the laws of our thinking and adapted to the external world" (Bachelard, 1986, p. 28). Therefore, the phenomenal importance of science for society lies in the fact that society needs a certain system of paradigms and principles, which, in their plurality, form an intermediary between humans and the world, serving as instruments for explaining the world around them, including social phenomena: "Ordinary people rely on scientists to provide expert (and socially acceptable) evaluations of theories of this kind. But due to the instability of scientific theories, it is unlikely that there will be a scientist who will respond even to such a successful theory as special relativity, as 'true', tout court, quite briefly" (Putnam, 2003, p. 118).

People need mechanisms to explain the world, such as religion, metaphysics, or science. But unlike the previous ones, science is a universal and synergistic system that develops along with society, as well as constantly being within its bounds: "Subtle normative decisions are needed to sort reasonable worldviews, which must be justified independently of the 'dense' background metaphysical assumptions" (Habermas, 2006, p. 132). Looking at the phenomenon of social science, the relationship between science and society takes on a new status. First of all, it should be noted that social science cannot abandon evaluative judgments, which, on the one hand, are unscientific from the point of view of the positivist paradigm, but the application of which, on the other hand, gives social theories a new meaning, the subject of which is often the results of human actions: "Human actions are what they are, they cannot be described without understanding the norms of their success and recognizing these norms as evaluative criteria" (Apel, 1980, p. 201). It is precisely based on understanding the causes and motives of human actions that social science must proceed, which must be "understanding". In the context of the general scientific discourse, social acceptability becomes a certain fundamental principle of the existence of scientific theory, thereby verifying it as one that corresponds to the value worldview of society.

The scientific process is endowed with non-scientific contexts, acquiring social attributes. It is also worth noting that science, having become a universally recognized authority and gaining universal recognition as a source of truth, has undergone revolutionary processes within itself, as a result of which it

has become enriched with new characteristics and attributes. The aforementioned properties have a constructive character in the course of the development and dissemination of scientific knowledge, but at the same time, the concept of “science” has become more complex and has lost many of its original fundamental features. Scientific research, with its acquired results, has allowed society to use their important achievements, creating an unprecedented illusion of knowledge hidden in the use by society of the results of scientific development without understanding all the methodological and interdisciplinary processes, requiring scientists to provide simple and schematic explanations: “Any scientific theory is actually just an ‘economic’ way of asserting many facts according to the formula: when you perform such and such actions, you will have such and such experience. Therefore, those who hold this view do not have to defend the illogical assertion that scientists are interested only in applying their discoveries or only in practical purposes, but they are supposedly not interested in knowledge for its own sake” (Putnam, 2003, p. 190). Therefore, we cannot reduce the scientific process only to the instrumental application of the results of scientific research without introducing into its structure the methodology and thematic of these researches themselves.

The scientific discourse is a more complex phenomenon than society perceives it to be, but the subject matter of scientific research depends directly on its actualization in society and should not contradict the dominant social values. Science moves away from its understanding as merely a system of knowledge and becomes a project: “Beyond the subject, on this side of the immediate object, modern science is based on a project. In scientific thinking, the subject about the object always takes the form of a project” (Bachelard, 1986, p. 108). And based on the idea of science as a project, we logically proceed to evaluative judgments about it in terms of its success or failure, which already have a social nature. Public opinion perceives scientific theories in terms of their success rather than understanding their methodology or potential novelty. Here we can observe the negative impact of the principle of social acceptability on scientific theories, during which the previously described process of reduction of science takes place. Success is manifested in the general recognition of a scientific concept as capable of predicting the greatest sum of potential development outcomes of the object, explaining them, and proposing the most understandable way to explain anomalies that arise in the process of manipulating the chosen object of study. Therefore, we can also note that when talking about the success of a particular theory, it is not always necessary to have in mind a social theory. On the contrary, social success of a theory is entirely possible even in the exact sciences, particularly when considering theories in physics: “Judgments that the special theory of relativity and quantum electrodynamics are the ‘most successful’ physical theories we have are claims made by the established society itself, the authority of which is recognized by the strong force of customs and ceremonies, instituting them in this sense” (Putnam, 2003, p. 119).

In general, we should note the interdisciplinary nature of this phenomenon in contemporary scientific discourse, even in the field of exact sciences, whose research is under greater influence of the principle of objectivity. However, the principle of rational acceptability as the basis of individual’s worldview orientations is based on the success of the theory, as a result of which it will be perceived by public opinion with necessity and unanimity, bearing fundamental importance for constructing the worldview, on the one hand, and for shaping the subject field of research in all fields without exception, on the other hand. Rational acceptability is a social construct that is a product of the scientific discourse of previous stages of its development, but at the same time it determines the scientific discourse of the future: “We must have criteria of rational acceptability even to have any empirical world, so that they, those criteria, reveal part of our conception of optimal speculative rationality. In a word, I say that the ‘real world’ is grounded in our values (and vice versa)” (Putnam, 2003, p. 145).

Science always offers scientific theories as attempts to explain the world around us, and our worldview, which must be historically dynamic and hypothetical, directly consists of these attempts at explanation. The specificity lies in the fact that a scientific theory, becoming part of an individual’s worldview, acquires a subjective character, is subject to ethical implications and evaluative judgments, and must directly be in agreement with the ethical and social norms of the individual. In particular, we can observe the prohibition of certain scientific research due to their violation of established moral norms of modern society or the presence of an ethical code in science, the breach of which is unacceptable, thus directly demonstrating the limitation of scientific discourse by social norms. For example, research on human cloning is prohibited due to ethical norms. We by no means question the need for ethical boundaries in scientific research; on the contrary, we consider them a thoughtful step in scientific discourse, but nevertheless, they are limitations. On the other hand, hypothetically, these limitations are subject to clarification and review, as moral or ethical

norms are not absolute and therefore undergo transformation according to historical conditions and situations. In reality, it is entirely conceivable that those studies which currently lie beyond the bounds of rational acceptability today will be within those bounds tomorrow. The dynamic nature of these boundaries reflects the dynamism of the scientific process and the constant movement towards refining and expanding the constructed scientific worldview, which also includes evaluative judgments: "We use our criteria of rational acceptability to construct some theoretical picture of the 'empirical world', and then, as that picture develops, we review our own criteria of rational acceptability in the light of that picture, and so on indefinitely" (Putnam, 2003, p. 145). From the perspective of the philosophy and methodology of science, moving away from the concept of absolute universal truth towards multiple hypothetical probabilities, the constant refinement and dynamism of the scientific process have become axiomatic.

As a result of the above, there arises a methodological contradiction, which lies in the fact that the scientific process is unlimited in its development, but at the same time it is limited by a specific type of rational acceptability at a certain point in time. This contradiction is not as problematic as it may seem at first glance, because we should realize the fact that due to the change in the scientific worldview, there will also be a change in scientific acceptability and vice versa, due to their interdependence. If we historically consider the stages of formation of a certain scientific knowledge system, for example, political science, we will notice that at each stage of its development, we can identify the main research problems that directly determine the boundaries of the subject field of political science, which are determined by a specific type of rational acceptability. Thus, rational acceptability changes with the development of society, which changes along with the development of science. For example, gender issues in political science research were considered non-scientific or quasi-scientific until quite recently, but now it is one of the leading directions in political science research. The concept of a fact, namely its interpretation, is directly dependent on the type of rational acceptability, because we can interpret the same fact differently, but the concept of a fact is fundamental to any scientific theory. Therefore, we should consider the concept of a fact not separately, but in the context of social rationality, which determines its interpretation: "A fact is something believed to be rational, or, more precisely, the concept of a fact (or true statement) is a certain ideological interpretation of a statement believed to be rational. 'Rationally acceptable' and 'true' are intertwined concepts" (Putnam, 2003, p. 210).

The role of scientific theory in constructing social rationality and political discourse

Social sciences, including political science, build the logic of their research according to the interpretation of concepts that, firstly, are overloaded with historical content and, secondly, are interpreted depending on the current type of rationality and communicative rationality of society. As a result, a researcher cannot simply conduct research and present its results to the public if the topic of their research contradicts the prevailing type of social rationality, thus raising questions about the objectivity of scientific research in political science. However, it should be noted that the concept of a social fact still has a certain universality, which allows us to interpret social phenomena, even if they go beyond the accepted type of social rationality. This allows scholars to analyze and explain the variety of social phenomena, which can be perceived in different ways depending on the context and historical conditions. Thus, scientific theory not only influences the formation of social rationality but also determines the direction of political discourse. However, it is important to remember the universality of the concept of a social fact, which allows for the interpretation of social phenomena in different ways, reflecting their complexity and multiple aspects.

Therefore, we can still argue that there is a certain level of universality in social phenomena that allows us to understand them, even if they do not conform to our type of social acceptability: "This is a defining fact about human experience in the world's various interacting cultures, though individually undergoing changes, slower or faster, and we are able to make this fact into a matter of universal human experience; capable of interpreting each other's beliefs, desires, and expressions in such a way that it all makes some sense" (Putnam, 2003, p. 128).

The social rationality is a fundamental principle that delineates the subject field of any scientific discourse, but we must clearly understand the connection of this principle with the historical context, as well as the presence of other principles, which, being in mutual influence and determination, allow us to direct the development of the scientific process, which, regardless of various factors and characteristics, possesses universal components that are necessary for humans, regardless of external factors and influences. Based on the above, we affirm the possibility for today's researchers to understand works of the Antiquity, the Middle Ages, or the Modern Era. Of course, we do not possess all the information and

a complete picture of the contexts of these works, which limits our understanding, making it incomplete and partial. However, we are still able to read and interpret these works: “Our fundamental concepts require us to interpret not only our current temporal fringes, but also our complex ‘I’, our ancestors, along with members of other cultures, past and present, as persons, which means (I continually argue) endowing them with common references and common concepts, no matter how different these concepts may be that we attribute to them” (Putnam, 2003, p. 131). Therefore, we can argue that there are still basic universal principles that enable any operations of our thinking, during which humans comprehend the world and, with the help of acquired experience, form their individual and societal worldview, which then shapes the main vectors of the direction of social rationality. For example, we can recall Newton’s experience with the falling apple, the falling of which is an undeniable fact for centuries, or even millennia, but the principles of social rationality give the falling apple a completely different context, drawing their conclusions from the commonly accepted most prevalent theory, which in the specified period of time is the most influential and productive. Thus, we must note that the very fact of the falling apple is overlaid with a way of thinking inherent in society, within which there will be an attempt to explain the nature of the causes of the fall of the aforementioned apple.

Therefore, in the process of explanation, society will draw its conclusions from the basic criteria of rational acceptability, which by their principles will already delineate the boundaries and prerequisites for proving certain knowledge as something that corresponds to reality: “...truth itself takes its life from our criteria of rational acceptability, and they are what we must look to if we want to unlock the values that are truly implicit in science” (Putnam, 2003, p. 141). Thus, we acquire the ability to be critical of the scientific theories proposed to us due to the presence of criteria of rational acceptability, which may change in the process of developing social rationality, but their existence will always be a necessary condition for society’s ability to critically assess a particular type of political scientific theory proposed as the initial postulate for constructing the worldview. As a result, the subject matter of research, conceptualization, and actualization of objects of scientific research will directly be determined by the aforementioned general scientific theory, which will permeate into various fields of scientific knowledge, as has been the case in the history of science with positivist theory, which gained the status of general scientific theory after undergoing several transformations. Hence, there arises the necessity for the existence of a metatheory that would serve as a general scientific methodological guideline for the development of scientific knowledge as a whole: “In short, this is an important and extremely useful limitation for our theory itself – that our theory of the world, which is constantly evolving, must contain an explanation of the very activity, the very processes, by means of which we can know that our theory is correct” (Putnam, 2003, p.143).

The aforementioned metatheory should indeed be the foundation of social rationality, correspond to it, and most importantly, formulate the criteria of rational acceptability with its fundamental principles, which will already serve as the main determinants of the development of scientific discourse. On the other hand, through the components described above, the subject area of social sciences and the main themes of their research are directly formed within the societal scientific discourse. A researcher cannot propose a methodology in their research that contradicts the fundamental metatheory, formulate a research subject that is not relevant in society, or offer conclusions that go beyond the boundaries of moral values, thus restricting scientific research within the framework of contemporary criteria of scientific acceptability, which is particularly evident in political scientific discourse. The latter is inevitably within the framework of societal moral discourse and must be aligned with it: “Our concepts of sequence, simplicity, and rightness are as historically conditioned as our concepts of goodness, beauty, and value; these epistemological terms figure in the same eternal philosophical controversies as terms of ethical and aesthetic value” (Putnam, 2003, p. 146).

We must note that social rationality often constitutes a primary component of the notion of objectivity in political science research, considering society’s and the scientific community’s perception of the results of specific research, its methodology, and delineated subject. Society determines the subject field of political science research through its demands, whereby researchers in their scientific inquiries strive to address society’s current problems, find ways to resolve or optimize the main algorithms of their resolution: “We accept the theory of natural selection not because it has passed a Popperian test, but because it provides plausible explanations for an enormous amount of data; because it prompts fruitful new theories and interfaces with discoveries in genetics, molecular biology, and so on; and also because alternative theories that have been proposed either collapse or appear entirely implausible in the light of background knowledge” (Putnam, 2003, p. 206-207).

The theory employed by the researcher must be characterized by universality and success, which undoubtedly will be the main reasons in favor of its selection. From the standpoint of social rationality, a scientific theory that proposes the boundaries of the subject field of any science must be successful in terms of its application. Success here is understood solely as the theory's ability to explain phenomena, predict their occurrence, and be understandable to society, and thus be within the framework and in accordance with the prevailing type of social rationality, which is a necessary component of any scientific research: "One has to have norms of rational acceptability in order to have anything at all: either a world of 'empirical facts', or a world of 'facts of value' (a world where there is beauty and tragedy)" (Putnam, 2003, p.157).

Conclusions

Therefore, we can assert that scientific rationality is directly interconnected with social rationality and is also determined by the criteria of social acceptability. Of course, it would be erroneous to equate social and scientific rationality, but we cannot clearly separate them as independent and completely distinct since this does not correspond to reality. The subject fields of scientific theories are actualized within the framework of social rationality, particularly in the system of political knowledge, after which they gain comprehensive consideration within the bounds of scientific rationality and return to the structure of social rationality, having passed the stage of verifying the results of researching the aforementioned subject of political activity with the criteria of social acceptability. Therefore, we can note the inseparable methodological connections between society and the scientific community, which are manifested in their mutual influence.

In the process of open political discourse, the political system is open and public, being accessible for investigation by scholars in the field of political science. Thus, political science has access to include the entirety of manifestations of the process of exercising political power in the structure of its subject. An important aspect here is the demands of society, its needs, and actual problems, which necessarily determine the boundaries of the subject field of political science. The political discourse is socially oriented, shaping its thematic issues based on specific practical demands from society. A significant aspect of the manifestation of this principle is that the scientific discourse of political science is directly determined by the prevailing type of social rationality.

Consequently, researchers, in conducting their studies and delineating their subjects, cannot exceed the bounds of social rationality, which is one aspect of the manifestation of the principle of social acceptability. Therefore, the political discourse is a socially constructed concept, which is derived from societal demands on the political sphere. Derived from this is the thematic scope of political science research, the methodology applied, as well as the thematic areas of phenomena allowed by social acceptability. This is also demonstrated in the example of research results, which must be socially positively received and correspond to the generally accepted concept of rationality.

In particular, within the framework of political science, there is a constant correction of the methodological concept of "subject" not through its absence, but through the constant change in the type of social rationality, as well as the criteria of rational acceptability, the form of which directly depends on the type of political interaction within society. Consequently, the subject of political science research and the political discourse are directly determined by the type of prevailing social rationality, which, on the one hand, exists at the level of metatheory, within which the entire general scientific discourse unfolds, and, on the other hand, this principle is reflected in the direct connection of political discourse with the most pressing problems of society within its political subsystem. Therefore, political discourse is directly determined by societal needs, problems actualized by society, the solution of which is directly determined by the specific type of prevailing social rationality, in accordance with which a specific methodology for interpreting political phenomena is formed, as well as the search for the most optimal and acceptable ways to solve the problems actualized by society.

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