

## POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

DOI: 10.46340/eppd.2023.10.1.2

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### **IMPACT OF THE 2022 MOSCOVIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION ON CRIME TRENDS IN UKRAINE (ANALYSIS OF CRIME PREVENTION POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF STATISTICS FOR 2013 – 2022)**

The paper focuses on the 2022 crime trends in Ukraine, subjected to deep changes due to the 2022 Moscovian military invasion of Ukraine. The paper stressed that the 2022 invasion is the first full-scale war in the centre of the European continent after World War II with the openly declared participation of the biggest European states, which has become a new and broad field for criminological research concerning the impacts of *contemporary wars* on *contemporary digital and technological societies*.

The author argues that crime trends in wartime Ukraine have become an interesting criminological phenomenon for a researcher due to the *dualistic nature* of such trends. On one hand, the number of crimes committed in Ukraine in 2022, exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021 and 2020. On the other one, the number of criminal proceedings, with concrete suspects (with given notifications of suspicion) dropped almost 1,5 times as compared with 2021, which serves as an indicator of the *decreasing effectiveness* of the national criminal justice system.

The author points out that a traditional view on the wartime society as a *more criminogenic* one is partly refuted by Ukrainian crime statistics. The official crime statistics demonstrate a significant increase only in the numbers of those crimes, which are *directly concerned with the war* (crimes against human life, crimes against national security, war crimes and crimes against mobilisation).

The paper focuses on some *demographic trends*. It is found that the percentage of crimes committed in 2022 by offenders over 60 has increased to a large extent which can be partly explained with the involvement of such persons in collaboration by Moscovian occupiers before and during the 2022 War.

The author explains a rapid increase of crimes of intentional homicide, other crimes against human life and health, as well as crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person and offenses against military service (military crimes), which is explained by the impact of the 2022 Moscovian invasion.

In contrast, it is found that *property crimes* demonstrated a rapid decrease, although one could have expected that many citizens would commit more property crimes in light of the deep ruin of traditional social and economic relations caused by the War. Generally speaking, the statistics of 2022 demonstrate a significant decrease in thefts and other property crimes (excluding crimes of fraud).

As far as *drug-related crimes* are concerned, the analysis of their trends gives more grounds in favour of the previously shaped the author's argument that the 2022 War '*bared*' a *real social and political nature* of drug-related criminality in Ukraine. The author proves that the crime drug market is strictly controlled by the police, where the police use potential drug offenders as a permanent source of illegal (corruptive) income. Being deprived of other traditional corruption incomes during the 2022 War, the police have reacted to the challenges caused by the 2022 War with a '*deeper attention*' to *petty drug offenders*.

The author has found that for the whole period of 2013 – 2021 there had been registered only 854 *war crimes*. In 2022, 62128 *war crimes* were registered, which clearly demonstrate the difference between pre-war Ukraine and wartime Ukraine.

It is also pointed out that the number of *sex crimes* decreased significantly, as could be expected from wartime society.

The author argues that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion had brought a serious increase in the numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization*.

At the same time, *crimes against justice* have mostly gone into the shadows in Ukraine. Official crime statistics demonstrate a rapid decrease of crimes against justice (more than two times as compared with 2021) although we tend to analyse such a decrease in the light of a factual sabotage of the LEA in registering such crimes.

A significant decrease in *crimes against public services* points to the fact that most of such crimes have also gone into the shadows. Crimes of receiving a bribe had also gone to shadow. A crime of bribery reflects a *dualistic trend* – a decrease in registered ‘white-collar’ crimes and an increase in the ratio between registered crimes and the number of notifications of suspicion in related criminal proceedings.

Reduction in *family violence* could be explained by different factors like the mass migration of many potential victims to other European countries and participation (both voluntary and compulsory) of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions. In any case, the traditional social basis for family violence was minimised to a large extent with the 2022 War.

The author analyses the crime of *smuggling* and *smuggling of drugs*, which had occupied a permanent segment in the general structure of the Ukrainian crime statistics until 2022.

It is also stressed that crime trends in Ukraine for the last ten years are a good example to explain a common social nature of *THB crimes* and ‘*satellite* (*‘shadow’*) *crimes*, where indicators of all the mentioned crime trends are changing almost the same way.

**Keywords:** crime, crime prevention policy, crime trends, crime statistics, criminology, the 2022 Moscovian aggression against Ukraine, the police, policing, law enforcement agencies, drug-related crimes, crimes committed with the use of firearms, minor crimes against human health.

## Introduction

This paper aims at research of the crime trends in Ukraine in the period of 2013-2022 where the focus is made on the *impact* of the 2022 Moscovian military aggression (*the 2022 War*) on criminality in Ukraine and national crime prevention policy.

In addition to the previously developed and published author’s research and conclusions, this paper is focused on the issues of the *personal characteristics* of offenders where special attention is paid to trends in personal and social characteristics of offenders that occurred during wartime.

This paper is based on the previous author’s papers focused on crime trends in Ukraine in different periods of 2022 (Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). *Crime prevention policy in Ukraine in the light of crime statistics for the period of eight months of 2022. Bulletin of the Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University. Series Political sciences. Volume 4, P.p. 28-45*; Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). *Criminal justice system of Ukraine in the wartime: impacts and challenges. European Political and Law Discourse. Volume 9, Issue 4, P.p. 33-51*; Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). *Impact of the 2022 Russian military aggression on crime trends in Ukraine (analysis of crime prevention policy in the light of crime statistics for ten months of 2022). European Political and Law Discourse. Volume 9, Issue 6., P.p. 35-80*).

## Terminology

According to Article 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, notification of suspicion shall be necessarily issued in the following cases: 1) apprehension of an individual at the scene of a criminal offence or immediately after the commission of a criminal offence; 2) enforcement of a measure of restraint against an individual as prescribed by this Code; 3) availability of sufficient evidence to suspect a person of having committed a criminal offence.

Therefore, in this paper, we describe the current crime trends in Ukraine on the basis of two main indicators of the Ukrainian criminal justice system: 1) the general number of criminal proceedings opened and registered by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies; 2) the number of criminal proceedings where concrete suspects were given the notifications (notes) of suspicion.

In corresponding tables and diagrams, we use the term “*notifications*”, which reflects the number of criminal proceedings where there are concrete suspects (the number of notifications of suspicion).

### Crime Rates

For the period of twelve months of 2022, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (*hereafter – LEA*) registered 362636 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where the above-mentioned numbers reflect both criminal proceedings with concrete suspects and so-called “*factual*” criminal proceedings (without concrete suspects).

It should be noted that the number of registered crimes even for the period of ten months of 2022 almost reached the level of 2021 (a whole year). Consequently, the number of crimes committed in Ukraine for the whole period of 2022 exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021 (321443 crimes) and the number of crimes committed in 2020 (360662 crimes) (*Figure 1*).

The above-mentioned facts seem to be of a great importance due to the general presumption that negative social and economic consequences of the War would lead to increasing crime trends in Ukraine.




Fig. 1. Total number of registered crimes (2013 – 2022)

At the same time, as official crime statistics demonstrate, the number of criminal proceedings *with concrete suspects* dropped almost 1,5 times as compared with 2021 which serves as an indicator of the *decreasing effectiveness* of the national criminal justice system.

It could also be noted that the *ratio* between a general number of criminal proceedings and a number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects has had a stable trend towards decreasing until the 2022 Moscovian military invasion.

As a result, the criminal justice system of Ukraine has demonstrated one of the highest ratios in the last ten years (*Figure 2*).




Fig.2. Ratio between registered crimes and notifications (2013 – 2022)

Official crime statistics also demonstrate that crime rates increased every month after the beginning of the 2022 War, having achieved the highest point in August 2022, with further decreasing to the level of January 2022.

### Geographical Distribution of Crime

One of the main conclusions from research into crime trends in Ukraine for the period of twelve months of 2022 is that the 2022 War made criminality in Ukraine *more rural*, although the difference is *not* so sufficient.

In 2013, the ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas was 4,04.

At the same time, in 2022, the same ratio decreased to the point of 3,45 (Figure 3).




Fig. 3. Geographical distribution of crime (1)

In the period of 2013-2021, urban crimes occupied 77-78% in the general structure of criminality in Ukraine (Figure 4).

2022 has brought the minimum level of urban crime (74,14 %) and maximum level of rural crime (22,97 %) for the last ten years of national history of crime prevention. It seems that such changes have resulted from the 2022 Moscovian military aggression where many crimes were committed by Russian soldiers and officers in *rural* areas (Figure 4).





Fig. 4. Geographical distribution of crime (2)

### Nationality


As previously, the statistics of crimes committed by foreign nationals in Ukraine occupy an *insignificant* segment in the general structure of criminality.

It can be concluded that crimes of foreigners occupy only 0,3-0,4% (Figure 5).



**Fig. 5. Crimes committed by foreigners**

At the same time, the 2022 War has led to a significant reduction in crimes committed by foreign nationals (*Figure 6*). Probably, official crime statistics for 2022 do *not* cover crimes committed by Moscovian military agents during the 2022 War. Nevertheless, there is *no* reference in the official crime statistics of the Office of the General Prosecutor that the mentioned indicator does *not* cover crimes committed by Moscovian occupiers.




**Fig. 6. Percentage of crimes committed by foreigners**

### Age

One of the surprising conclusions drawn from official crime statistics is that the percentage of crimes committed by persons at the age of 18-59 years has *not* changed significantly since 2021.

In other words, the 2022 War has *not* led to significant changes in the percentage of crimes committed by adults under 60 years (*Figure 7*).



**Fig. 7. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 60**

At the same time, the percentage of crimes committed by offenders over 60 has *increased* to a large extent which can be partly explained by involvement of such persons in collaboration with Moscovian occupiers before and during the 2022 War (*Figure 8*).




Fig. 8. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 18 and over 60

For example, official crime statistics demonstrate a serious *decrease* in involvement of persons over 60 in crimes against life and health, against property, against public security (including illegal keeping of firearms) or drug-related crimes (*Table 1*).

Table 1

Offenders at the age over 60 (2016 – 2022)

<i>Persons over 60 committed crimes</i>	Against national security	Against life and health	Property crimes	Against public security	Drug-related crimes	Against justice	War crimes
<b>2016</b>	8	846	723	173	535	22	0
<b>2017</b>	13	858	924	338	610	17	1
<b>2018</b>	7	935	1120	313	380	14	0
<b>2019</b>	16	997	1129	295	409	25	0
<b>2020</b>	8	1098	1124	271	487	32	5
<b>2021</b>	13	1125	1160	239	388	33	3
<b>2022</b>	188	1083	753	197	353	24	201


At the same time, for the period of twelve months of 2022, offenders over 60 committed many more *crimes against national security* as compared with the whole period of 2016-2021 (the ratio is 2,89).

Likewise, for the period of ten months of 2022, persons over 60 committed many more *war crimes* as compared with the whole period of 2016-2021 (the ratio is 22,33) (*Table 2, Figure 9*).

Table 2


Offenders at the age over 60: general numbers

<i>Persons committed crimes</i>	Against national security (all offenders)	Against national security (offenders over 60)	War crimes (all offenders)	War crimes (offenders over 60)
<b>2016</b>	95	8	2	0
<b>2017</b>	107	13	20	1
<b>2018</b>	113	7	4	0
<b>2019</b>	117	16	6	0
<b>2020</b>	101	8	21	5
<b>2021</b>	111	13	35	3
<b>2022</b>	1455	188	679	201



**Fig. 9. Number of offenders over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security**

Figure 10 demonstrates statistical data concerning the percentage of persons over 60 who committed crimes against national security and war crimes.



**Fig. 10. Percentage of offenders at the age over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security**

Crime statistics demonstrate that in relative numbers, persons under 60 committed many more crimes against national security and war crimes as compared with other types of crimes (Table 3, Figure 11).

Table 3

**Percentage of offenders in the over 60**

	2021	2022
<i>Crimes against human life and health</i>	5,39	7,13
<i>Crimes against property</i>	2,38	3,01
<i>Crimes against public order</i>	2,44	6,17
<i>Drug-related crimes</i>	3,35	2,79
<i>Crimes against public services</i>	8,40	8,96
<i>Crimes against justice</i>	1,59	2,16
<b>Crimes against national security</b>	<b>11,71</b>	<b>12,92</b>
<b>War crimes</b>	<b>8,57</b>	<b>29,60</b>




Fig. 11. Percentage of offenders in the over 60

### Offenders under 18

Official crime statistics show that the number of offenders under 18 having committed property crimes had reduced until 2022. Moreover, the number of such crimes *dropped* significantly in 2022 as compared with 2021.

The number of offenders under 18 who committed crimes against human life and human health has also reduced (*Figure 12*).





Fig. 12. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

In contrast, the number of offenders having committed drug-related crimes does not show such rapid trends to the decrease, which can prove a hypothesis that the 2022 War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market, which is mostly controlled by the police (*Figure 13*).




**Fig. 13. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice**

#### Offenders at the age 18-28

Crime statistics show that the number of offenders at the age of 18-28 years having committed property crimes has also had a trend to reduce until 2022. Moreover, the number of offenders dropped significantly in the twelve months of 2022 as compared with 2021.

The number of offenders having committed crimes against human life and human health has also reduced (*Figure 14*).



**Fig. 14. Number of offenders at the age 18-28 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes**

As in previous example with drug-related crimes committed by persons under 18, the number of offenders at the age of 18-28 who committed drug-related crimes does *not* demonstrate such rapid trends towards the decrease, which can also prove the hypothesis that the 2022 War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market, which is mostly controlled by the police (*Figure 14*).




Fig. 15. Number of offenders at the age 18-28 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

#### Offenders at the age 29 – 39

As far as offenders at the age of 29-39 are concerned, the corresponding crime rates reflect the general crime trends typical for Ukraine.

We can also point to reduction in persons at the age of 29-39 who committed crimes against human life and human health (*Figure 16*).

At the same time, numbers of drug offenders seem to be *not* influenced by the 2022 War, which gives us additional grounds to argue about the illegal control of the police over the illegal drug market and its 'customers' (*Figure 16*).





Fig. 16. Number of offenders at the age 29-39 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes


As far as crimes against public security, against public service and against justice are concerned, the number of offenders at the age of 29-39 having committed the above-mentioned crimes dropped significantly, which can also be explained with the impact of the 2022 War on normal life of Ukrainian society (*Figure 17*).



**Fig. 17. Number of offenders at the age 29-39 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice**

#### Offenders at the age 40-54


The conclusions presented above could also be used in relation to offenders at the age of 40-54: rapid reduction in crimes against human life and human health, as well as serious reduction in property crimes (*Figure 18*).



**Fig. 18. Number of offenders at the age 40-54 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes**

In line with previous conclusions, it is not surprising that the number of persons at the age of 40-54 committed drug-related crimes had *increased* (*Figure 18*).


In contrast, the number of persons committed crimes against public security, public service and justice had decreased (*Figure 19*).



**Fig. 19. Number of offenders at the age 40-54 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice**

#### Offenders at the age 55-59


The same conclusions could be drawn from the crime statistics in relation to offenders at the age of 55-59 (*Figure 20*).



**Fig. 20. Number of persons at the age 55-59 committed crimes against life and health, property crimes and drug-related crimes**

At the same time, as was argued before, the crime trends of drug offenders seem to be *not* influenced by the 2022 War, which gives us additional grounds to argue about the control of the police over the illegal drug market (*Figure 20*).


In contrast, the number of persons having committed crimes against public security, public service and justice has decreased (*Figure 21*).



**Fig. 21. Number of offenders at the age 55-59 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice**


#### Offenders over 60

Finally, the number of offenders at the age over 60 years who committed crimes against human health and human life decreased significantly after the 2022 War started (*Figure 22*).



**Fig. 22. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes**

The number of persons who committed drug-related crimes, as could be predicted in the light of previously drawn conclusions, has *not* changed significantly (*Figure 23*).



**Fig. 23. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice**


As far as we have paid special attention to offenders having committed drug-related crimes, we have decided to present the numbers of the above-mentioned offenders graphically in a separate Figure (Figure 24).

Here, we can observe the numbers of offenders of the mentioned category for the period of 2016-2022.

If we exclude the pick of such persons at the age of 29-39 registered in 2017, we can conclude that there had been no rapid changes in this number.

In other words, the 2022 War has *not* significantly impacted the number of such persons.

As far as offenders at the age of 18-28 and offenders at the age of 40-54 are concerned, there is an obvious conclusion that the 2022 War has *not* impacted the numbers of detected drug offenders.



**Fig. 24. Persons committed drug-related crimes (1)**

The same generally could be said in relation to drug offenders under 18 years and drug offenders over 55 years. It is obvious that the 2022 War has impacted to a *little extent* the numbers of drug offenders but such an impact was *not* sufficient (Figure 25, Table 4).




Fig. 25. Persons committed drug-related crimes (2)

Table 4

Age of persons committed drug crimes

Age of persons committed drug crimes	Over 60	55-59	40-54	29-39	18-28	Under 18
2016	535	364	2638	4715	2814	118
2017	610	455	3767	6970	3722	147
2018	380	365	3290	6016	3140	104
2019	409	352	3437	5777	3145	111
2020	487	354	3 019	5018	3193	100
2021	388	270	2886	4935	2993	107
2022	353	368	3074	5434	3422	82

With an aim to compare trends in numbers of offenders having committed *drug-related crimes* (Figure 24, Figure 25), we can demonstrate the same figures but with offenders having committed *property crimes* (Figure 26, Figure 27).




Fig. 26. Number of offenders committed property crimes (1)

Here, we can note how the 2022 War significantly impacted the numbers of *property offenders* where the number of such persons dropped to a large extent (Figure 26, Figure 27, Table 5).




Fig. 27. Number of offenders committed property crimes (2)

Table 5

## Offenders in different age groups

<i>Offenders committed property crimes</i>	<b>Under 18</b>	<b>18-28</b>	<b>29-39</b>	<b>40-54</b>	<b>55-59</b>	<b>Over 60</b>
<b>2016</b>	3224	18858	18623	9409	1194	723
<b>2017</b>	3400	20098	23358	11447	1398	924
<b>2018</b>	3050	19035	24576	12687	1657	1120
<b>2019</b>	2570	15861	22703	12063	1437	1129
<b>2020</b>	2080	13209	19329	10963	1363	1124
<b>2021</b>	1793	11808	17994	10524	1273	1060
<b>2022</b>	820	6037	10130	6424	807	753

## Educational Background

The wartime period has put on the agenda an interesting aspect concerned with *educational background* of offenders (Figure 28, Table 6).

The percentage of offenders with *professional (technical) education* for the period of twelve months of 2022 was the same as compared with 2021 while the percentage of offenders with a *university degree* increased to the level of 13,73 % (Figure 28, Figure 29, Table 6).

Moreover, for the period of 2016-2022 there was a trend of increase in the proportion of offenders with a *university degree*.

In contrast, for the period of 2016-2022 there was a trend of decrease in the proportion of offenders with *no education*.

Table 6

## Educational level of offenders

	<b>University degree</b>	<b>Technical education</b>	<b>Secondary school</b>	<b>No education</b>
<b>2016</b>	9,21	24,39	63,33	3,06
<b>2017</b>	9,74	24,09	63,18	2,98
<b>2018</b>	9,33	24,32	63,72	2,63
<b>2019</b>	9,71	24,45	63,39	2,45
<b>2020</b>	9,99	22,45	65,24	2,32
<b>2021</b>	10,67	18,71	68,63	1,98
<b>2022</b>	13,78	18,05	66,69	1,48




Fig. 28. Percentage of offenders with university degrees and with no education

As far as offenders with technical education are concerned, the 2022 War has not impacted insignificantly on their percentage in the general number of offenders (18,71 % in 2021, 18,05 % in 2022) (Figure 29, Table 6).




Fig. 29. Percentage of offenders with technical education

As far as offenders with secondary school education are concerned, the 2022 War has decreased their percentage in the general number of offenders (68,63 % in 2021, 66,69 % in 2022) (Figure 30, Table 6).




Fig. 30. Percentage of offenders with secondary school education

### Crimes against Human Life and Health

For the period of twelve months of 2022, more than 43,2 thousand *crimes against human life and public health* were committed.

At the same time, notes of suspicion were given only 16,5 thousand criminal proceedings.

We can observe how the 2022 War “cut” the number of *detected* crimes against human life and health in March 2022 because of the reasons mentioned above.

As a result, in July 2022, the number of crimes against human life and health, previously dropped seriously in March 2022, has reached the level of January 2022 in July 2022 and in almost in November 2022 (Figure 31).




Fig. 31. Crimes against life and health (by month)

### Intentional Homicide

A special attention should be paid to the statistics on *intentional homicides* where, as it was stressed earlier, numbers of intentional homicides committed by Russian soldiers and officers were incorporated into the general numbers of all crimes of the same type.

Figure 32 presents the number of registered intentional homicides registered in 2021 and 2022.

At the same time, having approximately the same number of suspects each year, we can point to the fact that in 2021 38,3% of perpetrators were detected having committed these gravity crimes (Figure 32).

In contrast, only 5% of perpetrators were identified in 2022 that indicates an obvious operational weakness of the national criminal justice system in wartime (Figure 32).




Fig. 32. Intentional homicide: crimes and notifications (2021, 2022)

One most important conclusion from the above-mentioned comparison is a big difference in numbers of intentional homicides, which is obviously concerned with the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, it is difficult to separate the number of murders committed by Moscovian *military* agents from those which were committed by Ukrainian '*civilian*' criminals.


### Minor Crimes against Human Health

As far as interaction between victims and the LEA is concerned, after the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, Ukrainians applied much less to the LEA with claims of minor injuries (Figure 33).

These trends can also be explained by that people generally understood the priorities of the law-enforcement system in the wartime period, where the police officers would probably be expected to *sabotage* registering minor crimes and minor offences.

Here, we present crime statistics of all minor crimes against human health committed in 2013-2022 (statistics of 2020-2022 include data on minor crimes and minor offences against health, according to Article 12 of the Criminal Code (“*Classification of criminal offences*”)).

Another important conclusion from the above crime statistics is that the Ukrainian criminal justice system has adapted to the wartime conditions and challenges and “*swum out*” from the deep crisis. At least, the fact that the police have turned back again to registering minor crimes and minor offences against human health can be considered as a normalization of the police routine (*Figure 33*).



**Fig. 33. Minor crimes and minor offences against health (Jan 2013-Dec 2022)**

The number of registered minor crimes and minor offences against human health in 2022 reached the minimum level for the period of 2013-2022 (*Figure 33*).

Zero registered minor crimes and minor offences against health in March 2022 proves more than persuasively the priorities of the Ukrainian criminal justice system in the first weeks of the 2022 Moscovian invasion (*Figure 34, Table 7*).

Table 7

**Minor crimes and minor offences against human health (2022, by month)**

	Minor crimes and minor offences against human health – Crimes (2022)	Minor crimes and minor offences against human health – Suspects (2022)
<b>January</b>	3774	1109
<b>February</b>	2848	860
<b>March</b>	0	204
<b>April</b>	509	601
<b>May</b>	1383	986
<b>June</b>	1834	1423
<b>July</b>	2539	1367
<b>August</b>	2623	1550
<b>September</b>	1159	1563
<b>October</b>	1977	1557
<b>November</b>	1308	1456
<b>December</b>	0	1367

According to official crime statistics, in October 2022 the police registered 18648 minor crimes and offences against health, 19954 minor crimes and offences in November 2022, and 19498 minor crimes and offences in December 2022.




Fig. 34. Minor crimes and minor offences against health (by month)

It is obvious that official crime statistics did *not* even reflect the number of minor crimes and minor offences committed in March 2022 for the above-mentioned reasons.

The fact that the number of minor crimes and offences against health in December 2022 appeared less than the number of minor crimes and offences against health in November 2022 allows us to point at the zero number of minor crimes and offences against health registered in the last month of 2022 (Figure 34, Table 7).

### Crimes against Will, Honour and Dignity of a Person

At the same time, the number of *crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person* has increased significantly – from 782 crimes in 2021 to 1535 crimes in 2022.

At the same time, the number of criminal proceedings where offenders were informed on suspicion dropped significantly – from 412 criminal proceedings (2021) to 207 criminal proceedings (2022) (Figure 35).




Fig. 35. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (2021, 2022)

The highest indicator of crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person was registered in 2014 which could be explained with the political and social consequences of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity when people were regularly arbitrary deprived of their freedom (Figure 36).

What is more important is the fact that after the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, the average level of such crimes has doubled as compared with any year for the period of 2016 – 2021 (1535 crimes in 2022, 782 crimes in 2021, 712 crimes in 2020, 981 crimes in 2019, 939 crimes in 2018, 918 crimes in 2017, 734 crimes in 2016) (Figure 36).




Fig. 36. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (2013-2022)

It should also be stressed on the detection level of such crimes.

Even though the general number of such crimes in 2022 was less than in 2014, the ratio between the number of registered crimes and the number of notifications of suspicion in 2022 is even bigger as compared with 2014, not talking about other periods (7,31 in 2014 and 7,41 in 2022)

### Drug-Related Crimes

The situation with *drug-related crimes* partly refutes the thesis that the 2022 War ‘cut’ all indicators of crime statistics. The number of many crimes stated in numerous Chapters of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which was registered in March 2022, decreased sharply for completely understandable reasons. Many types of crimes that *might have been* expected to increase after the start of the 2022 Moscovian military invasion saw a sharp drop.

Nevertheless, it appeared that drugs, drug offenders (especially petty offenders) and drug-related crimes (especially minor crimes) were *absolutely another matter*.

In 2022, more than 34 thousand drug-related crimes were registered in wartime Ukraine (34398 criminal proceedings in general, 22678 criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion) (Figure 37).





Fig. 37. Drug-related crimes


No less interesting is the fact that the ratio between the general number of registered criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion in 2022 appeared one of the highest for the last ten years (the exclusion is 2016 with ratio 1,66) (*Figure 38*).



**Fig. 38. Ratio between drug-related crimes and notifications**


Yes, the indicators of drug-related crimes in March 2022 are lower than for January 2022 and February 2022 (*Figure 39*).

However, already in May 2022, the indicators of drug crime have almost caught up with the pre-war indicators, and in July 2022 they significantly exceeded them (*Figure 39*).




**Fig. 39. Number of drug crimes and notifications**

It could also be noted that in 2022, the general number of criminal proceedings in minor drug-related offences and drug-related crimes increased rapidly (*Figure 40*). At the same time, the general number of criminal proceedings in grave and special grave drug-related offences decreased, but not significantly (*Figure 40*).




**Fig. 40. Drug-related crimes: distribution (2013-2022)**

Accordingly, the general number of criminal proceedings with suspects in minor drug-related offences and drug-related crimes increased (*Figure 41*). The general number of criminal proceedings with suspects in grave and special grave drug-related offences and drug-related crimes decreased, but not significantly (*Figure 41*).




**Fig. 41. Notifications in drug-related crimes: distribution**

It can be concluded from observing *Figure 42* that not only the biggest number of minor drug-related offences and drug-related crimes was registered in 2022 (for the period of 2014-2022).



**Fig. 42. Minor drug-related crimes and offences and notifications**

It could also be noted that in 2022 there was one of the biggest gaps between crimes and suspects (Figure 42, Figure 43).



**Fig. 43. Ratio between the number of criminal proceedings in minor drug-related crimes and offences and notifications**

Here, we would like to draw some conclusions.

The 2022 crime statistics demonstrate that 34398 drug-related crimes have already been committed in 2022 (Figure 37).

The importance of the fight against drug crime *cannot* be underestimated.

*However*, the main question here is: *does the National Police of Ukraine effectively manage its personnel's potential under wartime conditions?*

The question is on the surface: drug-related crimes are mostly the crimes of *peacetime*. Considering closed borders, border checks, curfews and roadblocks, the number of *registered* drug-related crimes should theoretically have decreased, not the other way around.

It seems that the mechanism of an artificial '*market*' for drug-related crimes, where criminals are very often victims at the same time, and where police officers know *who*, *where* and *under what conditions* will commit *the next* 'crime', '*should not stand idle*' even during the 2022 War.

### Offenses against of Military Service (Military Crimes)

Expectedly, the number of offenses against military service (*military crimes*) has also increased significantly in 2022.

Unfortunately, the increase took place due to purely ‘wartime’ Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine such as Article 407 (“*Abandoning a military unit or place of service*”), Article 408 (“*Desertion*”) and Article 402 (“*Disobedience*”).

Figure 44 demonstrates that increasing the personnel of the Military Forces of Ukraine expectedly led to an increase of crimes committed by Ukrainian military officials.




Fig. 44. Crimes against military service

It can be noted that crimes against military service during the period 2016-2021 were within reasonable limits, with a slight downward trend in 2021. It is quite expected that in 2022 the number of crimes against military service “jumped” sharply, which cannot be said for the number of criminal proceedings in which the suspicion was reported.

In general, it was in 2022 that war crimes mostly became “*factual*”, which raises the question of the *effectiveness* of military justice.




Fig. 45. Numbers of registered crimes against military service (by month)

A special attention is paid here to the number of crimes of *absence without leave from a military unit or place of service* (Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

The main conclusion here is that the number of registered crimes has increased (although *not* significantly; see the data, for example, of 2015) in parallel to the decrease of identified suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (Figure 46).




Fig. 46. Absence without leave from a military unit

Partly the same could be said about a more serious crime – *desertion* (Article 408 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). If, in 2021, 117 crimes of desertion were registered, the number of these crimes in 2022 increased up to the level of 3214 (Table 47).




Fig. 47. Desertion: registered crimes and suspicions

Here, we should mention that in 2014, the ratio between the number of registered crimes (*total number of criminal proceedings*) and the number of suspects (*criminal proceedings with notifications of suspicion*) was 1,4 (Figure 37).

In 2015, the same ratio was 1,1.

As far as 8 months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 11,6.

As far as 9 months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 11,2.

As far as 10 months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 12,2.

As far as 12 months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 11,4.

So, the main conclusion here is that the criminal justice system of Ukraine is mostly oriented now on the *quantitative* indicators rather than on the qualitative ones.

No fewer interesting criminological conclusions could be drawn from the analysis of crime foreseen by Article 426-1 of the Criminal Code (*Excess of power or official authority by a military official*). While in 2016, 65 crimes were registered with 17 suspects, in 2022, we can observe the increase in the distance between the number of crimes and number of suspects (*Figure 48*).




Fig. 48. Excess of power by a military official

As in the previous example with a crime of desertion, the ratio between the number of registered crimes (*total number of criminal proceedings*) and the number of suspects (*criminal proceedings with notifications of suspicion*) was 9,3 in 2021.

In 2022, the same indicator increased to the level of 21, which also raises an issue of effectiveness of the military justice system (*Table 49*).





Fig. 49. Excess of power by a military official: ratio between crimes and notifications


The 2022 Moscovian military invasion brought serious changes to practices of bringing military men to criminal liability for the offence of *unauthorised leaving of a battlefield or refusal to use weapons*. For the whole period of 2013-2022, only 2 criminal proceedings were registered (including 1 criminal proceeding with a given notification of suspicion). In 2022, the LEA registered 150 criminal proceedings (6 criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicion) (*Table 50*).



**Fig. 50. Unauthorised leaving of a battlefield or refusal to use weapons (Art. 429)**

The 2022 Moscovian military invasion brought serious changes to practices of bringing military men to criminal liability for the offence of *voluntary rendering oneself prisoner of war*.

For the whole period of 2013-2022, zero criminal proceedings were registered. In other words, this Article of the Criminal Code was absolutely “dead” from the practical point of view. In 2022, the LEA registered 16 criminal proceedings (with no concrete suspects) (*Table 51*).



**Fig. 51. Voluntary rendering oneself prisoner of war**

No less “dead” was Article 243 of the Criminal Code (*Marauding*).

For the whole period of 2013-2022, only 2 criminal proceedings were registered with zero suspects (one criminal proceeding in 2014 and one criminal proceeding in 2022).

### Property Crimes

While considering *property crimes* in wartime Ukraine, the first hypothesis appears that the absence of well and properly organized policing *would* lead to a serious increase of the number of property crimes.

Nevertheless, the number of recorded property crimes has in fact significantly *decreased* (Figure 52, Figure 53).

For example, in January 2022, the police registered 18078 property crimes in Ukraine.

In February 2022, 14922 property crimes were registered.

Immediately after the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, the number of property crimes dropped: 141 property crimes in March 2022 and 514 property crimes in April 2022 (Figure 52).

At the same time, this number should be analysed together with the fact that the number of indictments in property crimes sent to court decreased by 56% (data for the six months of 2022).




Fig. 52. Property crimes (by month)

The impact of the War on property crimes is more than obvious: 158729 property crimes in 2021, 113137 property crimes in 2022 (Figure 53).




Fig. 53. Property crimes

The same way the War impacted the practices of crimes of *theft*: 113517 thefts in 2021, 69496 thefts in 2022 (*Figure 54*).




Fig. 54. Theft

The same way the War impacted the practices of *car thefts*: 5571 car thefts in 2021, 2001 car thefts in 2022 (*Figure 55*).




Fig. 55. Car theft

The same way the War impacted the practices of *robberies*: 4846 robberies in 2021, 2205 robberies in 2022 (*Figure 56*).




Fig. 56. Robbery

The same way the War impacted the practices of *aggravated robberies*: 952 aggravated robberies in 2021, 492 aggravated robberies in 2022 (*Figure 57*).




Fig. 57. Aggravated robbery

The same way the War impacted the criminal practices of *racketeering*: 606 crimes of racketeering in 2021, 366 crimes of racketeering in 2022 (*Figure 58*).




Fig. 58. Racketeering

Surprisingly, crimes of *fraud* in 2022 demonstrated absolutely another trend: the number of crimes of fraud in 2022 (32086) appeared much bigger than in 2021 (23847) (*Figure 59*).





Fig. 59. Fraud

Here we can mention that in February 2022, many Ukrainians tried to restore order by themselves in conditions of the War chaos through demonstrative corporal punishment of marauders. Namely, “*there is a War here, and they are making money here*”. Many Ukrainians supported such inhumane methods, and what is important, among these “*many*” there were lawyers.


Almost one year has passed, and crime statistics have proven that, it turns out, the problem of Ukrainian society during the War was completely *different*, and official statistics convincingly proved the existence of the problem of *moral and ethical foundations of Ukrainian society* during the 2022 War: 1) during the 2022 War, criminal behaviour was considered as *less permissible* by individuals who belonged to the “*criminally*

*addicted*” strata of the society; 2) criminal behaviour was considered as *more permissible* by individuals who were considered less inclined to commit crimes due to the presence of higher education, higher ‘social status’ and greater social adaptability (Figure 60).




**Fig. 60. Theft and fraud: criminal proceedings**

Moreover, this trend is partially confirmed by the latest corruption scandals at the highest levels of government, which proves that the War is by *no* means a guarantee of the quasi-elites' understanding of the society's problems, where the *moral demand* of “*the water law of the jungle during a drought*” comes first (Figure 61).




**Fig. 61. Fraud: offences and minor crimes**

Yes, be that as it may, the statistics of 2022 demonstrate the violation of, using Rudyard Kipling’s expression, the “*water truce in our jungle*”, namely: 1) a significant decrease in thefts (although, on the other hand, the tendency to decrease thefts existed even before the beginning of the war); 2) an explosive increase in cases of frauds; 3) a sharp decline in real estate fraud, which can be attributed to the war's impact on the real estate market.



**Fig. 62. Notifications in fraud: offences and minor crimes**


Considering the fact that the real estate market during the War stopped in fact, it is not surprising that the number of crimes of *real estate fraud* decreased rapidly (1312 crimes in 2020, 1356 crimes in 2021, 798 crimes in 2022) (*Figure 63*).



**Fig. 63. Real estate fraud**

### Economic Criminal Offences

It was predictable that the number of economic criminal offences would be also decreased: 5469 crimes in 2021, 3414 crimes in 2022 (*Figure 64*).



**Fig. 64. Economic criminal offences**

A much more interesting conclusion concerning economic criminal offences is that the ratio between the general number of criminal proceedings in economic crimes and criminal proceedings in economic crimes with notifications of suspicion remained mostly the same as in previous years (*Figure 65*).

In 2022, this ratio increased insignificantly to the point of 2,4 from the level of 2 in 2021 (the same ratio of 2,4 can be found in 2018) (*Figure 65*).




Fig. 65. Economic criminal offences: ratio between crimes and notifications

Criminal activities concerned with *the use of counterfeit money, government securities, state lottery tickets, excise tax stamps or holographic security features* (Art. 199) were also impacted with the War and reduced (859 crimes in 2019, 686 crimes in 2020, 494 crimes in 2021, 215 crimes in 2022) (Figure 66).





Fig. 66. Manufacture, storage, purchase, transportation, shipment, import to Ukraine for use in the sale of goods, sale of counterfeit money, government securities, state lottery tickets, excise tax stamps or holographic security features

The same could be said about *illegal actions in respect of remittance documents, payment cards and other means providing access to bank accounts, electronic money and equipment for their production* (Art. 200): 1577 crimes in 2021, 933 crimes in 2022.

On the other hand, it is surprising that the number of registered crimes of such a category did not decrease more, as could be expected (Figure 67).

There were 724 crimes in 2022, 711 crimes in 2019, and 609 crimes in 2018.


If we exclude the 2021 indicator, the number of crimes committed in 2022 was the biggest one for the period of 2013 – 2022 (Figure 67).



**Fig. 67. Illegal actions in respect of remittance documents, payment cards and other means providing access to bank accounts, electronic money and equipment for their production**

In 2022, in contrast, the number of crimes of *legalisation (laundering) of property proceeding from crime* (Art. 209) increased: 348 crimes in 2020, 395 crimes in 2021, and 437 crimes in 2022 (Figure 68).

It could also be said that the number of these crimes has been stable in its increase since 2018. The 2022 Moscovian military invasion, as it could be found, did not impact such a trend (Figure 68).



**Fig. 68. Legalisation of property proceeding from crime**

In 2022, crime of *financial fraud* (Art. 222) demonstrated a rapid reduction. In fact, the 2022 War led to zero indicators of such crimes in Ukraine (*Figure 69*).




Fig. 69. Financial fraud (Art. 222)

### Crimes Committed with Firearms

While analysing *crimes committed with firearms*, it could be expected that crime rates resulting from *illegal use of firearms* would extremely rise after February 2022.

Nevertheless, official Ukrainian crime statistics from the Office of General Prosecutor *partly* refute such a presumption.

Yes, it is obvious that the number of crimes with weapons has seriously risen for the twelve months of 2022 compared with 2021 or 2020.

On the other hand, Ukrainian history knows examples when the number of crimes with weapons was *higher* even in peacetime (for example, in 2014).

At the same time, it should also be noted that the number of crimes committed with the use of firearms in 2015 (in the period of the continuing Moscovian invasion to Eastern Ukraine) was less than even for twelve months of 2022 (*Figure 70*).





Fig. 70. Crimes committed with the use of firearms

Additionally, it should be noted that in 2022, alongside an increase in the number of crimes committed by the use of firearms, the number of suspects in the same criminal proceedings decreased, which could also raise an issue concerning the effectiveness of LEA activities.

Official crime statistics of 2022 demonstrate to which extent the number of registered *intentional homicides committed with the use of firearms* has risen.

In 2021, there were 36 intentional homicides committed by the use of firearms.

In 2022, the same indicator increased to the level of 247 crimes (*Figure 71*).




**Fig. 71. Intentional homicide with the use of firearms**

The same could be said about *intentional serious bodily harm committed with firearms* (*Figure 72*).

Here, it should be noted that, on one hand, 2022 has brought a bigger number of such crimes.

On the other hand, the 2014 data shows the same numbers of crimes even in the absence of open Moscovian military aggression (*Figure 72*).



**Fig. 72. Intentional grievous bodily harm committed with the use of firearms**

*Figure 73* demonstrates the number of *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms and numbers of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings.

On one hand, we can observe a significant increase in *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms as compared with 2021.

On the other one, official crime statistics for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 demonstrate much bigger numbers of *aggravated robberies* even when Ukrainian society was not so deeply saturated with firearms as in 2022 (*Figure 73*).




Fig. 73. Aggravated robbery with the use of firearms

Figure 74 demonstrates data on the number of *crimes committed with the use of explosives* and the numbers of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (Figure 74).




Fig. 74. Crimes with the use of explosives

The saturation of Ukrainian society with firearms and an increase in the numbers of military men in the country is used by organized crime groups which commit crimes not only with the use of firearms but also with the use of military or police uniform.

Here, it should also be stressed on one aspect of post-war life of any state. It is not only about social rehabilitation of former soldiers who directly participated in military actions but also potentially possible criminal activity of persons with post-war traumatic disorders where some of them will not find themselves in post-war society.

The danger from illegal firearms in Ukraine is *not* concerned only with firearms with *Ukrainian origins*. Due to so-called “*partial mobilization*” declared in Russia, many Ukrainian citizens forcibly taken into the so-called “*peoples’ militia*” of the so-called “*Donets Peoples’ Republic*” and “*Luhansk Peoples’ Republic*”, received unregistered firearms following deserting from “*the militia*”.

Figure 75 demonstrates trends in different crimes committed with firearms and explosives in comparison.

Here, we can conclude that if crimes with the use of explosives and aggravated robberies with the use of firearms increased to a large extent (in absolute numbers), nevertheless, the vast majority of crimes committed with firearms are *intentional homicides* (Figure 75).




Fig. 75. Different crimes committed with the use of firearms

### Crimes against Peace, Security of Mankind and International Legal order (War Crimes)

According to official data of the Office of General Prosecutor, as of 7 August 2022, the Ukrainian authorities were investigating almost 26,000 cases of suspected war crimes committed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Figure 76).




Fig. 76. War crimes; number of registered criminal proceedings

### Sex Crimes

As far as *sex crimes* are concerned, the number of mentioned crimes decreased significantly, as could be expected from wartime society (Figure 77).

At the same time, we have the lowest level of sex crimes in the ten-year history of crime prevention in Ukraine (Figure 77).

Moreover, in December 2022, there were only 2 sex crimes registered in Ukraine: 621 sex crimes for the period of eleven months of 2022, and 623 sex crimes for the period of twelve months of 2022.




Fig. 77. Sex crimes

It is obvious that 2021 brought many restrictions concerned with the COVID pandemics which led to the closing of all nightclubs, discos and restaurants where sex offences were often committed. Nevertheless, the number of sex crimes registered in 2021 was one of the highest in the previous ten years of crime prevention.

At the same time, restrictions imposed due to the wartime period led to a rapid decrease in the crimes of rape in Ukrainian society (Figure 78).




Fig. 78. Rape

### Crimes against National Security of Ukraine

No less interesting is official statistics of *crimes against national security* for 2013-2022

In 2013, as many as 8 crimes against national security were registered, in which only *one* criminal proceeding had a *concrete suspect*. The rest were so-called “*factual*” criminal proceedings.

That is, the ratio between all cases and cases with concrete suspects was 8.

Here, we have visual additional – current *criminological* – evidence of the *anti-state orientation* of the political regime in Ukraine that was overthrown in 2014. A big country in the centre of Europe with great potential, having a dangerous neighbour to the East, could not have such performance indicators of the Security Service of Ukraine and other LEA.

Immediately after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia and before the start of a full-scale military invasion of Russia in 2022 – and regardless of which President was in power – both the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with suspicion had the same ratio (Figure 79).



**Fig. 79. Crimes against national security**


At the same time, official crime statistics demonstrated contradictory data concerning the numbers of crimes against national security registered in 2022.

So, for example, 18748 crimes against national security were registered for the period of ten months of 2022.

18887 crimes against national security were registered for the period of eleven months of 2022.

17422 crimes against national security were registered for the period of eleven months of 2022.

Such an illogical reduction in the number of registered crimes could probably be explained that in the end of the year, law enforcement agencies tried to focus more on quality than quantity in this area. Nevertheless, the ratio between the total number of criminal proceedings and the number of criminal proceedings with suspicion remains the highest in 10 years. The situation when only *eight* criminal proceeding has a judicial perspective raises an issue of the effectiveness of the LEA in the field of combatting crimes against national security (*Figure 80*).




**Fig. 80. Crimes against national security: ratio between crimes and notifications**

### **Crimes in the Sphere of Protection of State Secrets, Inviolability of State Borders, Provision of Conscription and Mobilization**

It was clearly expected that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion would bring a serious increase in the numbers of military forces of Ukraine and transportation of military units within Ukrainian territory.

Consequently, it was clearly expected that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion would bring an increase in the numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization*.

As a result, as we can observe, the number of the above crimes in 2021 is 2,5 times bigger as compared with 2021 (*Figure 81*).




**Fig. 81. Crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization**

### Crimes against Justice

During the 2022 War, *crimes against justice* have mostly gone into the shadows in Ukraine.

Official crime statistics demonstrate a rapid decrease in crimes against justice (more than two times as compared with 2021) although we tend to analyse such a decrease in the light of factual sabotage of the LEA in registering such crimes: 7198 crimes in 2021, and 2626 crimes in 2022 (*Figure 82*).



**Fig. 82. Crimes against justice**

At the same time, the ratio between a number of crimes against justice and the number of suspects in related criminal proceedings decreased (*Figure 83*).




Fig. 83. Crimes against justice: ratio between crimes and notifications

### Intentional Non-Execution of the Court Decisions

*Non-execution of court decisions* remains a chronic problem of the Ukrainian justice system, which was repeatedly noted by the Council of Europe and the ECtHR.

If 2021 was an exception, then during the entire period of 2013-2022, the number of criminal proceedings opened under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, fluctuated at approximately the same level, having reached the highest position in 2019 (4212 registered crimes against justice), after which the number of registered crimes against justice of the mentioned type started to consistently decrease.

On the other hand, applying the classic approach that crime within certain limits (both upper and lower) is a *normal* social phenomenon, one can conclude about the extent to which the 2022 Moscovian aggression has *hit* the justice system in Ukraine, significantly destroying what had been worked on for years both Presidents of Ukraine, legislators, executive power, international and national experts, international and national NGOs (*Figure 84*).




Fig. 84. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision


However, the number of crimes registered in 2022 indicates the objective and obvious priorities of wartime society, and here we have a *dualistic trend*.

On the one hand, we have a record low number of registered crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, where such a few registered crimes do *not* at all indicate an improvement in the situation in the field of execution of court decisions.

On the other hand, we have an interesting situation.

Thus, since 2017, there has been a consistent trend of decreasing the ratio between the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects. That is, there were reasonable suspicions, and we assume that there were grounds for them. That is, the criminal justice system began functioning better.

Since 2022, there has been a sharp upward jump in this indicator, which reflects how deeply destabilized the Ukrainian justice system has become due to the escalation of the Moscovian military aggression against Ukraine (Figure 85).




**Fig. 85. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision: ratio between crimes and notifications**

Registering crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine has become *much easy*, and even in already registered criminal proceedings, as crime statistics prove, there are *no* prospects. Crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine has become much *more latent*.

#### **‘White-Collar Crimes’ (Crimes against Public Services)**

Here, we provide an analysis of crime statistics related to Section XVII of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“*Criminal offences in the area of official and professional activity related to the provision of public services*”), which are following: abuse of authority or office (Article 364), abuse of power by an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 364-1), excess of authority or official powers by a law enforcement officer (Article 365), abuse of power by persons providing public services (Article 365-2), forgery in office (Article 366), neglect of official duty (Article 367), accepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official (Article 368), (unlawful enrichment (Article 368-2), bribery of an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 368-3), abuse of influence (Article 369-2), provocation of bribery (Article 370) and others.

A significant decrease in *crimes against public services* points to the fact that most of such crimes have gone into the shadows (Figure 86).



**Fig. 86. ‘White-collar’ crimes**

Crimes against public services are very latent ones by nature but the 2022 Moscovian military invasion made them *less* latent, which is surprising (Figure 87).




Fig. 87. 'White-collar' crimes: ratio between registered crimes and notifications

Crimes of receiving a bribe have also gone into the shadows: 1566 registered crimes in 2021, and 988 registered crimes in 2022 (*Figure 88*).




Fig. 88. Receiving a bribe

A crime of *bribery* reflects a *dualistic trend* – a decrease in registered 'white-collar' crimes and an increase in the ratio between registered crimes and the suspects in related criminal proceedings (*Figure 89*).




Fig. 89. Receiving a bribe: ratio between registered crimes and notifications

### Corporate Raiding

In the general structure of criminality in Ukraine, a special place is occupied with crimes concerned with *corporate raiding*.

Here, we focus attention on two articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: *obstruction of legitimate economic activity* (Article 206) and *illegal seizure of property of an enterprise, institution, or organisation* (Article 206-2).

Firstly, it should be stressed that the mentioned articles are *not* concerned only with activities of big corporations. Moreover, as practice shows, they are used for the aims of prevention of illegal “conquests” of *small legal entities*.

Secondly, it should be stressed that Ukraine is a big agricultural country, which supplies food to many states of the European Union. Ukraine is one of the three largest exporters of agricultural products to the EU (the USA and Brazil occupy the first places). According to the European Commission’s statistics, Ukraine has supplied production to the EU by 7 billion euros.

Therefore, the EU is interested in a *transparent and stable agricultural market* in Ukraine, which is important from the point of view of safety of products and minimizing money-laundering in the agricultural sector. At the same time, one of the most dangerous problems both for Ukrainian justice and the agricultural market is the problem of *corporate raiding*.

Of course, this is an issue *mostly* of *peacetime*, but at the same time, the 2022 War also exacerbates this issue as much as possible. If, in peacetime, national and local *quasi-elites* were highly interested in the existence of the *permanent* phenomenon of corporate raiding in Ukraine, then during the 2022 Moscovian military aggression this phenomenon hid even more in the twilight.

Every year the spring-summer-autumn news from Ukraine demonstrated numerous examples of corporate raiding of lands, fields, enterprises, utility premises, agricultural machinery, plants, factories etc., which is often “supported” by violent actions and the use of firearms.

But what about official crime statistics?

Unfortunately, official crime statistics say *nothing* about corporate raiding in Ukraine. As a result, it *seems* that there is *no* corporate raiding in Ukraine.

Instead of corporate raiding, there is only a Soviet-style shaped ‘*unauthorised action*’ (Article 356 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) which provides punishment for “*unauthorised action, that is doing anything contrary to the rules established by law, where the lawfulness of such acts is challenged by an individual citizen, an enterprise, institution or organisation, and where such acts caused any substantial damage to the interests of a citizen, state and public interests, or interests of the owner*”.

Let us analyse an issue of the corporate raiding in Ukraine in the light of official crime statistics.

Crime statistics from the Office of Public Prosecutor for the last 10 years indicate that, on average, for the period 2013-2021, notes of suspicion were handed in almost 40% of *all* criminal proceedings open in Ukraine.

The same indicator for 2022 is 36,5%.


At the same time, the same indicator under Article 206 of the Criminal Code for the period of 2013-2021 is 3,64%. The same indicator for 2022 is 3,57%.

A similar indicator under Article 206-2 of the Criminal Code for the period 2014-2021 is 10,04% and 6,66% for the period of twelve months of 2022.


Having analysed the percentage of criminal proceedings under Articles 206 and 206-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (in light of the total number of criminal proceedings), we receive *disappointing* conclusions, especially considering that, firstly, these crimes are *not* latent (because of the activities of the victims), and, secondly, the police investigators and prosecutors ‘*drive*’ the most crimes of corporate raiding under simple ‘*unauthorised action*’.

Here, we have another clear example that the presence in the Criminal Code of Ukraine related prohibitions does *not* guarantee that *quasi-elites* will be interested in restricting themselves in the use of such an illegal source of income.

As a conclusion to this part of our criminological analysis, we should point out that the problem of corporate raiding is a ‘*face*’ of a broader problem of *corruption* in the field of justice and LEA activities (Figure 90, Figure 91).



**Fig. 90. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings from total number of related criminal proceedings**



**Fig. 91. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings with suspects from total number of criminal proceedings with suspects**

### Family Violence Crime

In recent years, *family violence* has become an object of special attention by the Parliament, the Government and Ukrainian society in general. Moreover, on 1 November 2022, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (*the Istanbul Convention*) came into force for Ukraine (signed in November 2011, ratified in July 2022).

Therefore, family violent crimes could be a very attractive object of criminological research in the context of the impact of the 2022 War on Ukrainian society.

As the crime statistics show, 4800 family violent crimes were registered in 2021.

After ten months of 2022, 2808 family violent crimes were registered in Ukraine.

After twelve months of 2022, 3360 family violent crimes were registered in Ukraine.

Such a reduction could be explained by different factors like the mass migration of many *potential* victims to other European countries and the participation of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions. In any case, the *traditional social basis* for family violence was minimised to a large extent with the 2022 War (Figure 92).




Fig. 92. Family violence: registered crimes and notifications (2013 – 2022)

As far as family violence is concerned, two interesting facts are drawn from the analysis of official crime statistics: 1) the number of family violence crimes in 2022 decreased 1,42 times as compared with 2021; 2) the number of family violence crimes in 2022 is 1,7 times higher as compared with an average number of the same crimes in the period of 2012-2021 (Figure 93).




Fig. 93. Family violence: registered crimes (2013 – 2022, 2022)

On the other hand, crime statistics demonstrate that family violent crimes, having become latent at the beginning of the 2022 War, went out later from the shadows and became *less latent*. At the same time, many Ukrainian women returned to Ukraine after several months of forced escape (Figure 94).




Fig. 94. Family violence: registered crimes and notifications (by month)

### Hooliganism

No less interesting for the aims of the analysis of the criminological situation in Ukraine is the crime of *hooliganism* (according to Article 296 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – “*a serious disturbance of public order based on motives of explicit disrespect to community in a most outrageous or exceptionally cynical manner*”) which can be used as an example of impacts of harsh wartime restrictions with curfews, military and the police patrols as well as roadblocks on *normal* social life.

Generally concluding, criminal acts of hooliganism have had a permanent trend to decrease for the last ten years when the 2021 restrictions resulting from the COVID pandemic should also be noted.

In 2022, a particular decrease of acts of hooliganism should be considered as a consequence of the next Moscovian military invasion. If, in 2021, acts of hooliganism were widely prevented by closing public spaces (shopping centres, cinemas, public transport etc.), the COVID pandemic was almost ‘*forgotten*’ by the general population at the end of February 2022. Accordingly, the end of February 2022 has led to harsher physical restrictions on *possible* actions aimed at violation of public order (*Figure 95*).




Fig. 95. Hooliganism: registered crimes and notifications


On the other hand, the number of acts of hooliganism almost disappeared from social life in February – March 2022, has appeared again in April 2022 with a trend to further increase.

Correspondingly, such a trend should be considered an indicator of a partial *stabilization* of social life in Ukraine, mostly in areas more or less far from the front line.

Certainly, the last two months of 2022 will prove (or not) such a hypothesis. At least data for 2022 has given reasonable grounds to shape it in the above form.

On the other hand, one more conclusion could be drawn from the above situation described. Yes, a number of acts of hooliganism dropped to a particular extent due to the harshest social control measures in Ukrainian history. For example, comparative analysis of crimes of hooliganism for ten months of 2021 and 2022 shows that the number of detected acts of hooliganism decreased.

Nevertheless, the drop was not too insignificant to make a statement that the harshest police restrictions have resulted in decreasing such acts to a minimum level that could be expected from a point of view of proponents of harsher police control over society (*Figure 96*).



**Fig. 96. Hooliganism: registered crimes and notifications (by month)**

### Smuggling

Smuggling from Ukraine to the rest of Europe has been an obvious problem for the stability of public order in the EU for a long time. Therefore, *crimes of smuggling* are no fewer interesting cases for researching the impact of the 2022 War because they reflect the state of *protection of the borders* of Ukraine, which, in its turn, reflects the general potential of the *State* to keep its territory safe.


Accordingly, Europol has paid enough attention to the issue of smuggling from Ukraine. For example, in April 2017, over 578 firearms and 776 pieces of ammunition were seized as part of a joint operation targeting the illegal movement of firearms, explosives, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material through the Ukraine – Moldova border.

From the perspective of the EU – Ukraine relations, the issue of smuggling is becoming more topical in light of the Moscovian military aggression because of the large number of firearms and explosive materials in the zone of military actions. On July 11, 2022, the EU Home Affairs Commissioner announced a hub in Moldova to battle crime, particularly arms smuggling from war-torn Ukraine.

Later, in its official statement of July 22, 2022, Europol said that “*a potential threat observed in war zones in the past is that firearms can fall into the wrong hands. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Europol has warned that the proliferation of firearms and explosives in Ukraine could lead to an increase in firearms and munitions trafficked into the EU via established smuggling routes or online platforms. This threat might even be higher once the conflict has ended*”.

Official Ukrainian crime statistics show that the crime of smuggling had occupied a permanent segment in the general structure of the Ukrainian crime statistics until 2022.

In the period of 2016-2021, there has been an increase in detected crimes of smuggling with its highest point of 151 crimes in 2021 (*Figure 97*).




**Fig. 97. Smuggling: registered crimes and notifications**

It seems this trend could have continued even in 2022 if the 2022 Moscovian invasion did not occur. In fact, in 2022, the number of crimes of smuggling dropped significantly in February-March 2022 with further increase to the pre-war indicators.

Comparative analysis of the crimes of smuggling for twelve months of 2022 (60 registered criminal proceedings) shows that the number of detected crimes decreased 2,5 times as compared with the same period in 2021.

Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased more than 3,8 times (16 criminal proceedings with suspects in 2021).

On the other hand, the sharp shock caused by the 2022 Moscovian invasion and that resulted in a decrease in detected crimes of smuggling seems to disappear soon, considering the rapid increase of detected crime of smuggling in the middle of 2022. Moreover, the number of crimes of smuggling in July 2022 overwhelmed the same indicator for January 2022. Later (August-December 2022), as we can see, the number of detected crimes decreased again (*Figure 98*).



**Fig. 98. Smuggling: registered crimes and notifications (by month)**

Here, it should be noted that in 2018, the Criminal Code of Ukraine was supplemented with Article 201-1 according to the Law “On the introduction of amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the preservation of Ukrainian forests and the prevention of the illegal export of unprocessed timber”

which has stated a criminal liability for *smuggling of timber*. Therefore, in this paper, data for 2020-2022 also reflect the numbers of both crimes of smuggling – the ‘classical’ one and the *smuggling of timber*.

Additionally, we would like to make a conclusion that seems to be of great importance in the context of analysis of smuggling in a broader context of Ukrainian criminality.

For the period of 2013-2021, the average ratio between all detected crimes of smuggling (including so-called ‘*factual cases*’) and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 2,25.

In 2022, the same indicator increased to 3,74 (that is 1,7 times higher).

Considering the fact that crimes of smuggling are often concerned with concrete persons who are crossing the border with smuggled goods, such a state of things poses reasonable questions concerning the effectiveness of the LEA.

Moreover, in the wartime period when all law-enforcement bodies operate in a state of a heightened alertness, such a gap between the mentioned indicators seems to be of an *artificial nature* (Figure 99).




Fig. 99. Smuggling: ratio between crimes and notifications

Here, we would also like to analyse crimes of *smuggling of drugs*.

Drug-related offences have already been analysed in a separate chapter of this paper. Nevertheless, here, a focus is made not on drugs but mostly on *smuggling*. Therefore, both crimes – smuggling and smuggling of drugs – are discussed together in a broader context of *immovability of the state borders of Ukraine* in the wartime period.

The first conclusion that could be drawn from statistics is that the number of detected crimes of smuggling of drugs decreased (183 criminal proceedings in 2021, 115 criminal proceedings in 2022) (Figure 100).




Fig. 100. Smuggling of drugs: crimes and notifications

A comparative analysis of crimes of smuggling of drugs in 2021 and 2022 proves that the number of detected crimes decreased 1,6 times. Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased 2 times.

As in previous examples, the rapid drop in registered crimes of smuggling in March 2022 was changed with the increase in the mentioned crimes (*Figure 101*).




Fig. 101. Smuggling of drugs: crimes and notifications (by month)

As in the previous example with smuggling, in the *period of 2013-2021*, the average ratio between detected crimes (so called ‘*factual*’) and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 1,55 (*Figure 102*). In 2022, the same indicator increased to 2,05 (*Figure 102*).




Fig. 102. Smuggling of drugs: ratio between crimes and notifications

### Human Trafficking: “New Markets, New Perspectives”

According to general stereotypes, which are *not* far from reality, Ukraine has traditionally been used as a *transit country* for the aims of human trafficking. In its recent judgment of 16 February 2021 in «*V.C.L. and A.N. v. the United Kingdom*» (*applications nos. 77587/12 and 74603/12*), the European Court of Human Rights pointed at the similarities in the route to the United Kingdom taken by the victims of human trafficking where *Ukraine* was defined as a *transit country* to Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany and France.

What is stressed in declarations of many political leaders from the EU, Ukraine and other Europeans states that the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine has handed the future of many Ukrainian women and children over to criminal elements because of the chaos in Ukraine that took place in the first period of the 2022 War.

The author's personal sources prove that some humanistic initiatives of several NGOs and individuals on bringing Ukrainian refugees to new homes or at least safe places in the states of the EU were halted because new 'opportunities' of sheltering were proposed by persons who can be arguably suspected in human trafficking and forced labour.

On the other hand, in academic sources, the authors rightly assert that shaped in mass-media imagination about '*an innocent victim*' of human trafficking, in fact, does not meet the reality (Haverkamp, Rita (2019). *Victims of Human Trafficking: Consideration from a Crime Prevention Perspective*, in 'What is Wrong with Human Trafficking? Critical Perspectives on the Law', R. Haverkamp, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Lernestedt (Eds.). London: Hart, 280pp.).

Accordingly, the 2022 Moscovian invasion of Ukraine has moved the concept of '*innocent victim*' of human trafficking more far from the reality.

It is generally accepted that human trafficking is mostly a *well-organized criminal activity* which demands different forms of criminal '*cooperation*' among perpetrators in *different border states*. At the same time, with the beginning of the 2022 War, trying to control the wave of refugees, the Ukrainian Government severely restricted border crossing for *males* while *males* were mostly involved in this criminal activity.

On the other hand, a new slave market was opened in occupied Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine, obviously under informal authorization and control of the Moscovian regime. There is mass evidence of arbitrary arrests of not only military men but also civilians, with further putting them into a state of forced military service. Moreover, there were further informal demands of a large sum of money for each person (up to 30,000 US dollars) with corresponding formal letters from Russian officials that "*N. resisted the Special Military Operation conducted by the Military Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Therefore, N. will be deprived of freedom for an unpredictable period until the Special Military Operation ends*".

As far as Ukraine is concerned, crime statistics show that a period of 2013-2016 was stable in the aspect of numbers of registered crimes of human trafficking as well as of numbers of suspects in related criminal proceedings.

In 2017, there was a rapid increase in human trafficking crimes, which slowly ended in 2021. Nevertheless, as Ukrainian crime statistics say, even for twelve months of 2022, the number of crimes was almost the same as it was in 2013 – 2016 (Figure 103).




Fig. 103. Human trafficking: crimes and notifications

For example, if in 2016 there were 59 suspects in human trafficking, 2022 has already shown 93 suspects. Moreover, we can argue concerning a factual *increase* in THB cases considering the fact that 6,5 million Ukrainians left the country and '*created*' new '*opportunities*' for human traffickers.

At the moment, it is difficult to say how human trafficking was affected by the 2022 Moscovian invasion. On one hand, the number of registered THB crimes decreased to *zero* immediately after the Russian military forces crossed the Ukrainian border (Figure 75). On the other hand, serious concerns arise around the fact that THB cases continue to be registered in the light of closed borders, police checks, curfews and hundreds of military and police roadblocks.

At the same time, it should be pointed that 133 THB crimes in 2022 are more than insufficient in light of 6,5 million Ukrainian refugees, which could lead to the conclusion that something is obviously *wrong* with the police intelligence in the sphere of THB prevention as well as with intelligence of the Ukrainian border service.

Numerous official statements by the EU leaders stressed that *human traffickers from many EU states are waiting for new victims from Ukraine* due to the victims' vulnerable position, and such official statements should be taken for granted. Therefore, it could be said that THB crimes are *more latent* ones than the LEA officials declare (Figure 104).




Fig. 104. Human trafficking: number of registered crimes (by month)

The factor of *corruption* should also be considered – both in the police and border service. There were many reports in numerous mass media that a ‘*price*’ for illegally crossing the Ukrainian border varies from 2000 to 5000 US dollars.

The situation with ‘*satellite crimes*’ is different.

Firstly, let us demonstrate the official statistics of a crime of *creating or running brothels and procuring*.

The period of 2013-2021 could be described as a permanent decrease in the mentioned crimes where the 2022 War ‘*cut*’ corresponding crime trends (Figure 105).





Fig. 105. Creating or running brothels and procuring


Comparative analysis of the above crime statistics for 2021 and 2022 proves the trend of decreasing numbers of crimes of running brothels, which are traditionally considered as ‘*shadow crimes*’ or ‘*satellite crimes*’ in relation to THB crimes.

The same could also be said about a crime of *pimping or engaging the person in prostitution*.

Trends of this type of crime are not the same as trends in crimes of creating or running brothels and procuring. Nevertheless, after 2018, there has been a decrease in numbers of this type of crime that was finally confirmed with the 2022 data (*Figure 106, Figure 107, Figure 108, Figure 109, Figure 110*).



**Fig. 106. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution**



**Fig. 107. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution (by month)**




Fig. 108. Engaging minors in criminal activity (Art. 304)




Fig. 109. The use of a minor for begging (Art. 150-1)




Fig. 110. Exploitation of children (Art. 150)

Crime trends in Ukraine for the last ten years are a good example to prove the common social nature of THB crimes and ‘satellite (‘shadow’) crimes’ discussed above. The common feature of all the mentioned crime trends is the fact that they are changing almost the same way (Figure 111, Figure 112, Figure 113, Figure 114, Figure 115).




Fig. 111. THB crimes and “satellite” crimes




Fig. 112. Suspects in THB crimes and "satellite" crimes




Fig. 113. THB crimes and notifications in THB crimes




Fig. 114. Creating or running brothels and procuring: crimes and notifications





Fig. 115. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution: crimes and notifications

#### Law-enforcement agencies in the light of crime statistics

Here are presented the numbers of criminal proceedings opened by different law-enforcement agencies, with corresponding analysis.

In 2022, prosecution offices registered 9586 criminal proceedings (7870 criminal proceedings in 2021).


At the same time, the police registered fewer criminal proceedings (2022 criminal proceedings in 2022, 44027 criminal proceedings in 2021) (*Figure 116*).



**Fig. 116. Criminal proceedings opened by Prosecution Service and the Police**


Investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) registered many more criminal proceedings in 2022 (11841 criminal proceedings) as compared with 2021 (5035 criminal proceedings) (*Figure 117*).

In contrast, investigators of the tax police registered much fewer criminal proceedings in 2022 (218 criminal proceedings) as compared with 2021 (1324 criminal proceedings) (*Figure 117*).



**Fig. 117. Criminal proceedings opened by the Security Service and the Tax Police**

In 2022, Investigators of the State Investigation Bureau (DBR) and detectives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) registered approximately the same number of criminal proceedings as in 2021 (*Figure 118*).




**Fig. 118. Criminal proceedings opened by the DBR and the NABU**

As far as the situation with notifications of suspicions given to suspects in criminal proceedings, official crime statistics provide us with the following results.

Police investigators decreased the number of notes of suspicion (28633 notifications in 2022, 36562 notifications in 2021) (*Figure 119*).

The number of notifications of suspicion given in criminal proceedings opened by prosecutors in 2022 was mostly the same as in 2021 (*Figure 119*).




**Fig. 119. Criminal proceedings opened by the Prosecution Service and the Police where concrete suspects were given notes of suspicion**

The number of notifications of suspicion given in criminal proceedings opened by investigators by the tax police and the Security Service of Ukraine is very controversial in the context of its transformation.

In 2013, both LEAs started with the same numbers of criminal proceedings with given notifications of suspicions (*Figure 122*).


In 2022, the differences between them have reached a historical point.

The indicators of the tax police almost reached zero level. At the same time, the indicators of the security service (SBU) reached its historical maximum (*Figure 120*).



**Fig. 120. Criminal proceedings opened by the Security Service and by the Tax Police where concrete suspects were given notes of suspicion**

Indicators of the State Investigation Bureau (DBR) and detectives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), as statistics demonstrate, were not significantly impacted by the War (Figure 121).




**Fig. 121. Criminal proceedings opened by the DBR and by the NABU where concrete suspects were given notes of suspicion**

### Quality and Quantity of Criminal Investigation after the 2022 Moscovian Military Invasion

No less interesting is the issue of researching the impact of the War on the indicators of the work of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, where, according to statistical forms, we take as a basis two indicators – the total number of criminal proceedings opened by one or another law enforcement agency (prosecutor's office, the police, security service, tax police, the State Bureau of Investigation, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine), and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects opened by the relevant law enforcement agency.


It can be concluded that during the year of the Moscovian military invasion, the prosecutor's office opened significantly more criminal proceedings (9586 criminal proceedings in 2022, as compared to 7870 criminal proceedings in 2021).

However, the number of criminal proceedings in which suspicion was reported decreased (1420 criminal proceedings in 2021, 1354 criminal proceedings in 2022) (*Figure 122*).




**Fig. 122. Criminal proceedings opened by Prosecution Service: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

In 2022, the police registered 39800 criminal proceedings (28633 criminal proceedings with concrete suspects), which is less than in 2021 (44027 criminal proceedings, of which there were 36562 criminal proceedings with suspects) (*Figure 123*).




**Fig. 123. Criminal proceedings opened by the Police: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

At the same time, for very clear reasons, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) registered 11841 criminal proceedings in 2022, while only 5035 criminal proceedings were registered in 2021 (*Figure 124*).




**Fig. 124. Criminal proceedings opened by Security Service: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

If we talk about the performance indicators of the tax police, then, for objective reasons, the indicators have reached almost zero level (especially criminal proceedings with suspects) (*Figure 125*).




**Fig. 125. Criminal proceedings opened by the Tax Police: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

Since 2017, statistics on the results of crime investigations by investigators of the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) have begun to be published, which show quite indicative results. Thus, despite the annual increase in the number of registered criminal proceedings, the ratio between the total number of cases and cases with suspects increased every year, which proves the thesis of the transformation of the State Bureau of Investigation into a body investigating mainly "factual" cases. At the same time, the War actually left the indicators at the same level as last year (1341 criminal proceedings in 2021, 1130 criminal proceedings in 2022). At the same time, the beginning of the War further increased the distance between actual criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with specific suspects (2021 – 672 criminal proceedings with suspects, 2022 – 525 criminal proceedings with suspects) (*Figure 126*).



**Fig. 126. Criminal proceedings opened by the DBR: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, on the contrary, demonstrated an increase in both the total number of criminal proceedings and the number of criminal proceedings involving suspects. In general, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine has demonstrated stability in both indicators since its establishment, which the war does not seem to have affected (*Figure 127*).



**Fig. 127. Criminal proceedings opened by the NABU: general numbers and proceedings with suspects**

### Conclusions

Having summarized the above developments presented, we have come to the following conclusions that reflect the 2022 crime trends in Ukraine.

Following up on our conclusions shaped in previously published papers, we have to stress again that the 2022 Moscovian military invasion of Ukraine became *the first full-scale war* in the centre of the European continent after World War II with direct and open participation of the biggest European states which has become an absolutely new broad field for criminological research *on the impacts of a contemporary war on contemporary digital and technological societies*.

The crime trends in wartime Ukraine have become a much more interesting criminological phenomenon for researchers due to the *dualistic nature* of such trends.

On one hand, the number of crimes committed in Ukraine in 2022 exceeded the number of crimes committed in 2021 (321443 crimes) and crimes committed in 2020 (360662 crimes).

On the other hand, the number of criminal proceedings *with concrete suspects (with given notification of suspicion)* dropped almost 1,5 times as compared with 2021 which can serve as an indicator of the *decreasing effectiveness* of the national criminal justice system.

At the same time, a traditional view of wartime society as a *more criminogenic* one is *partly* refuted by the official crime statistics.

Even considering partial inaccuracies of official Ukrainian crime statistics, it is possible to define general crime trends in wartime Ukraine as those which prove that, in the light of traditional views on wartime society, we *could have* expected more crimes. Nevertheless, official crime statistics demonstrate a significant increase only in the numbers of those crimes which are *directly concerned with military service and military defence*.

The 2022 War made criminality in Ukraine *more rural*, although the difference is *not* so sufficient.

The percentage of crimes committed by persons at the age of 18-59 years had *not* changed at all since 2021. At the same time, the percentage of crimes committed by offenders over 60 has *increased* to a large extent, which can be partly explained by involvement of such persons in collaboration with Moscovian occupiers before and during the 2022 War.

The percentage of offenders with *professional (technical) education* for the period of twelve months of 2022 is the same as compared with 2021, while the percentage of offenders with *university degrees* increased. In general, for the period of 2016-2022, there was a trend of increasing the proportion of offenders with *university degrees*. In contrast, for the period of 2016-2022, there was a trend in the decrease in the proportion of offenders with *no education*.

In 2022, there was a rapid increase in crimes of *intentional homicide*. At the same time, in 2021, every 3<sup>rd</sup> offender was detected having committed this grave crime. In contrast, only the 20<sup>th</sup> criminal was identified in 2022, which indicates an operational weakness of the national criminal justice system in wartime.

After the 2022 Moscovian military invasion, the average level of *crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person* has doubled as compared with any year for the period of 2016-2021.

Expectedly, the number of *offenses against military service (military crimes)* increased significantly in 2022.

In contrast, *property crimes* demonstrated a rapid *decrease*, although one could have expected that a lot of citizens *would* commit *more* property crimes in the light of the deep ruin of traditional social and economic relations caused by the War. The statistics of 2022 demonstrated: 1) a significant decrease in thefts; 2) a sharp decline in real estate fraud.

The 2022 War 'bared' the *real social and political nature* of *drug-related crimes* in Ukraine. The criminal drug market is *strictly controlled by the police*, where the police use potential drug offenders as a permanent source of *illegal (corruptive) income*. Being deprived of *other* traditional corruptive incomes, the police have reacted to the challenges caused by the War with a '*deeper attention*' to drug offenders.

A special place in the structure of Ukrainian criminality is occupied with *crimes committed with the use of firearms and explosives*. According to crime statistics, only in ten months of 2022, more crimes with the use of firearms had been committed as compared with the whole period 2018-2021.

The number of *economic criminal offences* has decreased. At the same time, the ratio between the general number of criminal proceedings in economic crimes and notifications of suspicions appeared mostly the same as in previous years.

In contrast, the number of *crimes of legalisation (laundering) of property proceeding from crime* increased in 2022.

As far as *war crimes* are concerned, 854 war crimes were registered for the whole period of 2013-2021. In 2022, 62128 war crimes were registered, which clearly demonstrate the difference between pre-war Ukraine and wartime Ukraine.

The number of *sex crimes* decreased significantly, as could be expected from wartime society.

Official statistics of *crimes against national security* for 2013-2022 provide us with evidence of the anti-state orientation of the political regime in Ukraine, overthrown in 2014. Moreover, 3376 crimes against national security were registered in the period 2013-2021. In 2022, 14422 crimes of such category were registered. At the same time, the ratio between the total number of criminal proceedings and criminal proceedings with notifications of suspicions remains the highest in 10 years.

The 2022 Moscovian military invasion has brought a serious increase in numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization* (the number of the above crimes in 2021 is 2,5 times bigger as compared with 2021).

*Crimes against justice* have mostly gone into the shadows. Official crime statistics demonstrate a rapid decrease of crimes against justice (more than two times as compared with 2021) although we tend to analyse such a decrease in the light of factual sabotage of the LEA in registering such crimes.

A significant decrease in *crimes against public services* points to the fact that most of such crimes have also gone into the shadows. Crimes of receiving a bribe have also gone into the shadows (1566 registered crimes in 2021, 988 registered crimes in 2022). A crime of bribery reflects a dualistic trend – a decrease in registered ‘white-collar’ crimes and an increase in the ratio between registered crimes and the suspects in related criminal proceedings (2,62 in the period of 2013-2021 and 4,08 in 2022).

Reduction in *family violence* could be explained by different factors, like the mass migration of many *potential* victims to other European countries and participation of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions. In any case, the *traditional social basis* for family violence was minimised to a large extent with the 2022 War. At the same time, as far as family violence is concerned, two facts could be drawn from the analysis of official crime statistics: 1) the number of family violence crimes in 2022 decreased 1,42 times as compared with 2021; 2) the number of family violence crimes in 2022 is 1,7 times higher as compared with an average number of the same crimes in the period of 2012-2021.

The crime of *smuggling* has occupied a permanent segment in the general structure of the Ukrainian crime statistics until 2022. In the period of 2016-2021, there has been an increase of detected crimes of *smuggling*, with its highest point of 151 crimes in 2021. In 2022, the number of crimes of smuggling dropped significantly in February – March 2022 with further increase to the pre-war indicators. The number of detected crimes decreased 2,5 times as compared with the same period of 2021. Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased more than 3,8 times.

The number of crimes of *smuggling of drugs* decreased from 183 criminal proceedings in 2021 to 115 criminal proceedings in 2022. Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased 2 times.

It is difficult to say how human trafficking was affected by the 2022 Moscovian aggression. On one hand, the number of registered THB crimes decreased to zero point immediately after the Russian military forces crossed the Ukrainian border. On the other one, serious concerns arise around the fact that THB cases continue to be registered in the light of closed borders, police checks, curfews and hundreds of military and police roadblocks. At the same time, it should be pointed out that 133 THB crimes in 2022 are more than insufficient in light of 6,5 million Ukrainian refugees, which could lead to the conclusion that something is obviously *wrong* with the police intelligence in the sphere of THB prevention as well as with intelligence of the Ukrainian border service.

Crime trends in Ukraine for the last ten years are a good example to prove the common social nature of THB crimes and ‘*satellite* (*shadow*) *crimes*’. Trends of all the mentioned crimes have been changing almost the same way.