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IMPACT OF THE 2022 RUSSIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION ON CRIME TRENDS IN UKRAINE (ANALYSIS OF CRIME PREVENTION POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF CRIME STATISTICS FOR TEN MONTHS OF 2022)

This paper aims to research the crime trends in Ukraine in the period of January 2013-October 2022 where a focus is made on the impact of the 2022 Russian military aggression against Ukraine on criminality and national crime prevention policy. In addition to the previous author's conclusions, this paper is focused on issues of the personal characteristics of offenders where special attention is paid to changes in the social characteristics of offenders that occurred during wartime. This paper is based on the previous author's research of crime trends in Ukraine during the period of the 2022 War (Yagunov, Dmytro (2022)). The criminal justice system of Ukraine in the wartime: impacts and challenges. *European Political and Law Discourse*, V. 9, 4, P. 33-51; Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). Crime prevention policy in Ukraine in the light of crime statistics for the period of eight months of 2022. DOI 10.31558/2617-0248.2022.7.5). Having summarized the presented ideas, the author has come to the following conclusions that reflect the 2022 crime trends in Ukraine. Crime trends in war-time Ukraine seem to be a very interesting phenomenon for a researcher due to the dualistic nature of such trends. On one hand, in ten months of 2022, the same number of crimes has been committed in Ukraine as compared with the whole of 2021. Therefore, it can be more than clearly predicted that the number of crimes for the whole of 2022 would be bigger than the number of crimes that had been committed in 2021. On the other one, a traditional view of wartime society as a more criminogenic one is partly refuted by the official Ukrainian crime statistics. Even considering partial inaccuracies of official crime statistics, it is possible to define general crime trends in war-time Ukraine as those which prove that in the light of traditional views on war-time society we could have expected more crimes. Nevertheless, the crime statistics demonstrate a significant increase only in the numbers of those crimes which are directly concerned with the war (crimes against national security, war crimes, and crimes against mobilisation). In contrast, property crimes demonstrate a rapid decrease although it could have been expected that a lot of Ukrainian citizens would commit property crimes in the light of the ruin of traditional social and economic relations caused by the War. As far as drug-related crimes are concerned, the analysis of their trends gives more grounds in the favour of the argument that the 2022 War bared a real nature of drug-related criminality in Ukraine where the main idea is concerned with the fact that the illegal drug market is controlled by the police where the police use the potential drug offenders as a permanent source of illegal (corruptive) income of the policemen. Being deprived of other traditional corruptive sources of income, the police have reacted to the challenges caused by the War with a 'deeper attention' to drug offenders. A special place in the structure of Ukrainian criminality is occupied with crimes committed with the use of firearms and explosives. According to official crime statistics, only in ten months of 2022, more crimes with the use of firearms had been committed as compared with the period of 2018-2021. Such trends should be considered one of the most dangerous ones from the point of view of national security. One of the main conclusions from the research of crime trends in Ukraine for the period of ten months of 2022 is also that the 2022 War made criminality in Ukraine more rural. The ratio between crimes

committed in urban and rural areas in 2013 was 4,04. Consequently, the same ratio for the period of ten months of 2022 decreased to the point of 3,32.

Keywords: crime prevention policy, crime trends, crime statistics, criminology, the 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine, the police, policing, law enforcement agencies, drug-related crimes, crimes committed with the use of firearms, minor crimes against human health.

Introduction

This paper aims to research the crime trends in Ukraine in the period of 2013 – 2022 where a focus is made on the impact of the 2022 Russian military aggression against Ukraine (*hereafter – the 2022 War*) on criminality in Ukraine and national crime prevention policy.

In addition to the previous author's research and conclusions, this paper is focused on issues of the personal characteristics of offenders where special attention is paid to trends in personal and social characteristics of offenders that occurred during wartime.

This paper is based on the previous author's papers focused on crime trends in Ukraine in the period of seven months of 2022 (Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). *Criminal justice system of Ukraine in the wartime: impacts and challenges. European Political and Law Discourse, Volume 9, Issue 4, P. 33-51*) and eight months of 2022 (Yagunov, Dmytro (2022). *Crime prevention policy in Ukraine in the light of crime statistics for the period of eight months of 2022. Вісник ДонНУ імені Василя Стуса, Сер.: Політичні науки, 7. P. 28-46*).

Crime Rates

For the period of ten months of 2022, the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (*hereafter – LEA*) registered 312450 crimes with corresponding criminal proceedings where the above-mentioned numbers reflects both criminal proceedings with concrete suspects and so called "factual" criminal proceedings (without concrete suspects).

It should be noted that the number of registered crimes for the period of ten months of 2022 almost reached the level of 2021 (a whole year) (*Fig. 1*).

The above-mentioned fact seems to be of a big importance due to general presumption that negative social and economic consequences of the War would lead to increasing crime trends in Ukraine.

Official crime statistics for ten months of 2022 seem to refute official declarations of top officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the war-time restrictions imposed by the Government would *seriously* decrease criminality in Ukraine.




Fig. 1. Total number of registered crimes (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

At the same time, as official crime statistics demonstrate, the number of criminal proceedings *with concrete suspects* dropped almost two times as compared with 2021 which can serve an indicator of *decreasing effectiveness* of the national criminal justice system.

It could be also noted that a ratio between a general number of criminal proceedings and a number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects has had a stable trend towards decreasing until the 2022 Moskovian military invasion. As a result, the criminal justice system of Ukraine has demonstrated one of the highest ratios for the last ten years (*Fig. 2*).



Fig. 2. Ratio between registered crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Official crime statistics also demonstrate that crime rates increased every month after the beginning of the 2022 War having achieved the highest point in August 2022 with further decrease to levels of January 2022.

Geographical Distribution of Crime

One of the main conclusions from research of crime trends in Ukraine for the period of ten months of 2022 is that the 2022 War made criminality in Ukraine more rural although the difference is *not* so sufficient.

The ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas in 2013 was 4,04.

At the same time, the same ratio for the period of ten months of 2022 decreased to the point of 3,32 (*Fig. 3*).




Fig. 3. Geographical distribution of crime (1)

2022 has brought the minimum level of urban crime and maximum level of rural crime for the last ten years of national history of crime prevention. It seems that such changes have resulted from the 2022 Moskovian military aggression where many crimes had been committed by Russian soldiers and officers in *rural* areas.

Additionally, it can be concluded that in the period of 2013 – 2021 urban crimes occupied 77 – 78% in the general structure of criminality in Ukraine, the 2022 Moskovian invasion reduced urban crimes to 74,5% (Fig. 4).




Fig. 4. Geographical distribution of crime (2)

Nationality

As previously, the statistics of crimes committed by foreign nationals in Ukraine occupies an *insignificant* segment in the general structure of criminality.

It can be concluded that crimes of foreigners have occupied only 0,3 – 0,4% (Figure 5).

The exclusions were 2019 and 2021 when crimes of foreigners took 0,55 % and 0,65% correspondingly (Fig. 5).




Fig. 5. Crimes committed by foreigners

At the same time, the 2022 War has led to a significant reduction in crimes committed by foreign nationals (Fig. 6). Probably, official crime statistics for 2022 do *not* cover crimes committed by Russian military agents during the 2022 War. Nevertheless, there is *no* reference in official crime statistics of the Office of General Prosecutor that the mentioned indicator does *not* cover crimes committed by Moskovian occupiers.

Age

One of the surprising conclusions drawn from official crime statistics is that the percentage of crimes committed by persons in the age of 18 – 59 years had *not* changed at all since 2021. In other words, the 2022 War had *not* led to a change in the percentage of crimes committed by adults under 60 years (Fig. 7).

At the same time, the percentage of crimes committed by offenders over 60 has *increased* to a large extent which can be partly explained with involvement of such persons into collaboration with Moskovian occupiers before and during the 2022 War (Fig. 8).




Fig. 6. Percentage of crimes committed by foreigners




Fig. 7. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 60




Figure 8. Percentage of crimes committed by persons under 18 and over 60

For example, official crime statistics demonstrate a serious *decrease* of involvement of persons over 60 into crimes against life and health, against property, against public security (including illegal keeping of firearms) or drug-related crimes (*Table 1*).

Table 1

Crimes committed by offenders over 60

<i>Persons over 60 committed crimes</i>	Against national security	Against life and health	Property crimes	Against public security	Drug-related crimes	Against justice	War crimes
2016	8	846	723	173	535	22	0
2017	13	858	924	338	610	17	1
2018	7	935	1120	313	380	14	0
2019	16	997	1129	295	409	25	0
2020	8	1098	1124	271	487	32	5
2021	13	1125	1160	239	388	33	3
Oct 2022	141	839	595	157	313	18	156

At the same time, for the period of ten months of 2022, offenders over 60 committed much more *crimes against national security* as compared with a whole period of 2016 – 2021 (ratio is 2,17).

Likewise, for the period of ten months of 2022, persons over 60 committed much more *war crimes* as compared with a whole period of 2016 – 2021 (ratio is 17,33) (Table 2, Fig. 9).

Table 2

Crimes committed by persons over 60: general numbers and percentage

<i>Persons committed crimes</i>	Against national security (all offenders)	Against national security (offenders over 60)	War crimes (all offenders)	War crimes (offenders over 60)
2016	95	8	2	0
2017	107	13	20	1
2018	113	7	4	0
2019	117	16	6	0
2020	101	8	21	5
2021	111	13	35	3
Oct 2022	1033	141	531	156




Fig. 9. Number of offenders over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security

Figure 10 demonstrates statistical data concerning percentage of persons in the age over 60 who committed against national security and war crimes (Fig. 10).




Fig. 10. Percentage of offenders over 60 committed war crimes and crimes against national security

Crime statistics demonstrate that in relative numbers, persons under 60 committed much more crimes against national security and war crimes as compared with other types of crimes (Table 3).

Table 3

Percentage of crimes committed by persons over 60

	2021	October 2022
Crimes against human life and health	5,39	6,94
Crimes against property	2,38	2,97
Crimes against public order	2,44	6,03
Drug-related crimes	3,35	3,17
Crimes against public services	8,40	9,24
Crimes against justice	1,59	1,92
Crimes against national security	11,71	13,65
War crimes	8,57	29,38

Offenders under 18

Official crime statistics show that the number of property crimes committed by offenders under 18 years old had been reducing until 2022. Moreover, the number of such crimes dropped significantly in the ten months of 2022 as compared with 2021.

The number of crimes against human life and human health has also reduced (Fig. 11).




Fig. 11. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

In contrast, a number of drug-related crimes does not show such rapid trends to decrease which can prove a hypothesis that the 2022 War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market which is mostly controlled by the police (*Fig. 11*).




Fig. 12. Number of offenders under 18 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

Offenders in the age 18 – 28

Crime statistics show that the number of property crimes committed by offenders in the age of 18 – 28 years has also had a trend to reduce until 2022.

Moreover, the number of such crimes dropped significantly in the ten months of 2022 as compared with 2021.

The number of crimes against human life and human health has also reduced (*Fig. 13*).




Fig. 13. Number of offenders in the age 18 – 28 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

As in previous example with drug-related crimes of persons under 18 years, the number of drug-related crimes of persons in the age of 18 – 28 years does *not* demonstrate such rapid trends to decrease which can also prove a hypothesis that the 2022 War had *no* influence on the illegal drug market which is mostly controlled by the police (*Fig. 13*).




Fig. 14. Number of offenders in the age 18 – 28 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

A very indicative fact is a reduction in numbers of crimes against justice committed by offenders in the age of 18 – 28 in ten month of 2022 as compared with a whole period of 2021 (*Fig. 14*).

Offenders in the age 29 – 39

As far as offenders in the age of 29 – 39 are concerned, the corresponding crime rates reflect the general crime trends typical for Ukraine.

We can also point at reduction of persons in the age of 29 – 39 who committed crimes against human life and human health (*Fig. 15*).

At the same time, numbers of drug offenders seem to be *not* influenced by the 2022 War which gives us additional grounds to argue about the illegal control of the police over the illegal drug market and its ‘customers’ (*Fig. 15*).




Fig. 15. Number of offenders in the age 29 – 39 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

As far as crimes against public security, against public service and against justice are concerned, the number of the above-mentioned crimes committed by offenders in the age of 29 – 39 dropped significantly which can also be explained with the impact of the 2022 War on normal life of Ukrainian society (*Fig. 16*).




Fig. 16. Number of offenders in the age 29 – 39 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

Offenders in the age 40 – 54

The conclusions presented above could also be used in relation to offenders in the age of 40 – 54 years: rapid reduction in crimes against human life and human health as well as rapid reduction in property crimes (*Fig. 17*).




Fig. 17. Number of offenders in the age 40 – 54 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

In contrast, it is not surprising that the number of persons in the age of 40 – 54 years committed drug-related crimes had *not* changed significantly. Yes, we can observe a particular reduction but *not* so significant as compared with other crimes (*Fig. 18*).




Fig. 18. Number of offenders in the age 40 – 54 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

Offenders in the age 55 – 59

The same conclusions could be drawn from the crime statistics in relation to offenders in the age of 55 – 59 years (Fig. 19).




Fig. 19. Number of persons in the age 55 – 59 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

At the same time, as it was argued before, the crime trends of drug offenders seem to be not influenced by the 2022 War which gives us additional grounds to argue about the control of the police over the illegal drug market (Fig. 20).




Fig. 20. Number of offenders in the age 55 – 59 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

Offenders over 60 years

Finally, the number of offenders in the age over 60 years who committed crimes against human health and human life decreased significantly after the 2022 War started (Fig. 21).




Fig. 21. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against life and health, drug-related crimes and property crimes

The number of persons who committed drug-related crimes, as it could be predicted in the light of previously drawn conclusions, has not changed significantly (Fig. 22).




Fig. 22. Number of offenders over 60 committed crimes against public security, public service and justice

As far as we have paid a special attention to offenders committed drug-related crimes, we have decided to present the numbers of the above-mentioned offenders graphically on a separate Figure (Fig. 23).

Here, we can observe the numbers of offenders of the mentioned category for the period of 2016 – 2022.

If we exclude the pick of such persons in the age of 29 – 39 years registered in 2017, we can conclude that there had been no rapid changes in this number. In other words, the 2022 War has *not* significantly impacted the number of such persons.

As far as offenders in the age of 18 – 28 years and offenders in the age of 40 – 54 years are concerned, there is an obvious conclusion that the 2022 War has *not* impacted the numbers of detected drug offenders.




Fig. 23. Persons committed drug-related offences (1)

The same generally could be said in relation to drug offenders in the age under 18 years and drug offenders over 55 years. It is obvious that the 2022 War has impacted to a *little extent* the numbers of drug offenders but such an impact was *not* sufficient one (Fig. 24, Table 4).




Fig. 24. Persons committed drug-related offences (2)

Table 4

Percentage of crimes committed by persons over 60

Age of persons committed drug crimes	Over 60	55 – 59	40 – 54	29 – 39	18 – 28	Under 18
2016	535	364	2638	4715	2814	118
2017	610	455	3767	6970	3722	147
2018	380	365	3290	6016	3140	104
2019	409	352	3437	5777	3145	111
2020	487	354	3 019	5018	3193	100
2021	388	270	2886	4935	2993	107
Oct 2022	313	227	2380	4205	2681	61

With an aim to compare trends in numbers of offenders committed *drug-related crimes* (Fig. 23, Fig. 24), we can demonstrate the same Figures but with offenders committed *property crimes* (Fig. 25, Fig. 26).




Fig. 25. Number of offenders committed property crimes (1)

Here, we can note how the 2022 War significantly impacted the numbers of property offenders where the number of such persons dropped to a large extent (Fig. 26, Table 5).




Fig. 26. Number of offenders committed property crimes (2)

Table 5

Number of crimes committed by persons in different age groups

Offenders committed property crimes	Under 18	18 – 28	29 – 39	40 – 54	55 – 59	Over 60
2016	3224	18858	18623	9409	1194	723
2017	3400	20098	23358	11447	1398	924
2018	3050	19035	24576	12687	1657	1120
2019	2570	15861	22703	12063	1437	1129
2020	2080	13209	19329	10963	1363	1124
2021	1793	11808	17994	10524	1273	1060
Oct 2022	617	4864	8203	5116	640	595

Educational Background

The wartime period has put on the agenda a very interesting aspect concerned with *educational background* of offenders (Fig. 27, Table 6).

A percentage of offenders with *professional (technical) education* for the period of ten months of 2022 is the same as compared with 2021 while a percentage of offenders with *university degree* increased to the level of 13,73 % (Fig. 27, Table 6).

Moreover, for the period of 2016 – 2022 there is a trend of increasing of proportion of offenders with *university degree*.

In contrast, for the period of 2016 – 2022 there is a trend of decreasing of proportion of offenders with *no education*.

Table 6

Educational level of offenders

	University degree	Technical education	Secondary school	No education
2016	9,21	24,39	63,33	3,06
2017	9,74	24,09	63,18	2,98
2018	9,33	24,32	63,72	2,63
2019	9,71	24,45	63,39	2,45
2020	9,99	22,45	65,24	2,32
2021	10,67	18,71	68,63	1,98
Oct 2022	13,73	18,11	66,65	1,51

Crimes against Human Life and Health

For the period of ten months of 2022, more than 35 thousand *crimes against human life and public health* had been committed.

At the same time, notes of suspicion were given only 13 thousand criminal proceedings.

We can observe how the 2022 War “cut” the number of crimes against human life and health in March 2022 because of the reasons mentioned above. As a result, in July 2022, the number of crimes against human life and health, previously dropped in March 2022, has reached the level of January 2022 in July 2022 (Fig. 28).

Intentional Homicide

A special attention should be paid to the statistics on *intentional homicides* where, as it was stressed earlier, numbers of intentional homicides committed by Russian soldiers and officers were incorporated into the general numbers of all crimes of the same type.

Figure 29 presents the number of registered intentional homicides registered in ten months of 2021 and 2022.

At the same time, having approximately the same numbers of suspects for ten months of each year, we can point at the fact that in 10 months of 2021 the 4th criminal was detected having committed this grave crime (Fig. 29).

In contrast, only the 16th criminal was identified for the period of 10 months 2022 which indicates an obvious operational weakness of the national criminal justice system in the wartime (Fig. 29).




Fig. 27. Percentage of offenders with university degree and with no education




Fig. 28. Crimes against life and health (2022, by month)




Fig. 29. Intentional homicide: crimes and suspects (Oct 2021, Oct 2022)

One more important conclusion from the above-mentioned comparison is a big difference in numbers of intentional homicides which is obviously concerned with the 2022 Russian invasion to Ukraine. At the same time, it is difficult to separate the number of murders committed by Russian *military* agents from those which were committed by Ukrainian ‘*civilian*’ criminals.

Minor Crimes against Human Health

As far as interaction between victims and the LEA is concerned, after the 2022 Russian military invasion, Ukrainians applied to the law enforcement agencies with claims of minor injuries much less (Fig. 30).

These trends can also be explained that people generally understood the priorities of the law-enforcement system in the wartime period where the police officers would be probably expected to *sabotage* registering minor crimes and minor offences.

Here, we present crime statistics of all minor crimes against human health committed in 2013 – 2022 (statistics of 2020 – 2022 includes data on minor crimes and minor offences against health, according to Article 12 of the Criminal Code (“*Classification of criminal offences*”)).

Another important conclusion from the above crime statistics is that the Ukrainian criminal justice system has adapted to the war-time conditions and challenges and “*swum out*” from the deep crisis. At least, the fact that the police had turned back again to registering minor crimes and minor offences against human health can be considered as a normalization of the police routine (Fig. 30, Table 7).




Fig. 30. Minor crimes and minor offences against health (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

The number of minor crimes and minor offences against human health in 2022 can reach the minimum level for the period of 2013 – 2022 (Fig. 30).

Zero registered minor crimes and minor offences against human health in March 2022 proves more than persuasively the priorities of the Ukrainian criminal justice system in the first weeks of the 2022 Russian invasion.

Table 7

Minor crimes and minor offences against human health (2022, by month)

	Minor crimes and minor offences against human health – Crimes (2022)	Minor crimes and minor offences against human health – Suspects (2022)
January	3774	1109
February	2848	860
March	0	204
April	509	601
May	1383	986
June	1834	1423
July	2539	1367
August	2623	1550
September	1159	1563
October	1977	1557

It is obvious that official crime statistics did *not* even reflect number of minor crimes and minor offences committed in March 2022 for mentioned above reasons.

Crimes against Will, Honour and Dignity of a Person

At the same time, the number of crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person has increased significantly – from 741 crimes (ten months of 2021) to 1486 crimes (ten months of 2022).

At the same time, the number of criminal proceedings where offenders were handled the notes of suspicion dropped significantly – from 375 criminal proceedings (ten months of 2021) to 176 criminal proceedings (ten months of 2022) (*Fig. 31*).




Fig. 31. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (Oct 2021, Oct 2022)

Figure 32 demonstrates that the highest indicator of crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person was registered in 2014 which could be explained with the political and social consequences of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity when people were regularly arbitrary deprived of their freedom.

What is more important is the fact that after the 2022 Moskovian military invasion the average level of such crimes has doubled as compared with any year for the period of 2016 – 2021 (1486 crimes in ten months of 2022, 782 crimes in 2021, 712 crimes in 2020, 981 crimes in 2019, 939 crimes in 2018, 918 crimes in 2017, 734 crimes in 2016) (*Fig. 32*).




Fig. 32. Crimes against will, honour and dignity of a person (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

It should also be stressed on the detection level of such crimes.

Even though the general number of such crimes in 2022 was less than in 2014, the ratio between the number of registered crimes and the number of suspects in 2022 is much higher as compared with 2014, not talking about other periods.

Drug-Related Crimes

Situation with *drug-related crimes* partly refutes the thesis that the 2022 War ‘cut’ all indicators of crime statistics. According to many sections of the Criminal Code, the number of crimes registered in March 2022 decreased sharply for completely understandable reasons. Many types of crimes that *might have been* expected to increase after the start of the 2022 Moskovian military invasion saw a sharp drop.

Drugs, drug offenders and drug-related crimes are absolutely another matter.

Yes, the indicators for March 2022 are lower than for January 2022 and February 2022 (*Fig. 33*).




Fig. 33. Drug-related crimes (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

However, already in May 2022, the indicators of drug crime almost caught up with the pre-war indicators, and in July 2022 they significantly exceeded them (*Fig. 34*).




Fig. 34. Number of drug crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

The 2022 crime statistics demonstrate that 32393 drug-related crimes have been already committed in the period of January – October (*Fig. 33*).

If we analyse crime statistics for the period of January 2013 – October 2022, it turns out that the number of registered drug-related crimes in 2022 is expected to be much more as compared with any year for the period of 2013 – 2021 (*Fig. 33*).

At the same time, there has never been such a gap between the number of registered drug-related crimes (total number of criminal proceedings) and the number of suspects in drug-related crimes (criminal proceedings with concrete suspects) in recent years.

The importance of the fight against drug crime *cannot* be underestimated.

However, the main question here is: does the National Police of Ukraine effectively manage its personnel’s potential under war-time conditions?

The question is on the surface: drug-related crimes are mostly the crimes of the *peacetime*. Considering closed borders, border checks, curfews and roadblocks, the number of *registered* drug-related crimes should theoretically have decreased, not the other way around.

It seems that the mechanism of artificial ‘market’ of drug-related crimes, where criminals are very often victims at the same time, and where police officers know *who, where and under what conditions* will commit *the next* ‘crime’, ‘*should not stand idle*’ even during the 2022 War (Fig. 34).

For example, in September 2022, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office sent an indictment to the court against several detectives of the Security Service of Ukraine (*SBU*) for receiving a bribe. It was established that the *SBU* detectives incited a person to give a bribe to judges in the amount of USD 10,000 for change of preventive measures in a criminal proceeding. In addition, in order to implement the criminal plan, the *SBU* detectives had to throw a psychotropic substance to a person in a place pre-determined by the *SBU* detectives, which would entail further illegal prosecution of such a person.

Offenses against of Military Service (Military Crimes)

Expectedly, the number of offenses against military service (*military crimes*) also increased significantly.

Unfortunately, the increase took place due to purely ‘wartime’ Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine such as Article 407 (“*Abandoning a military unit or place of service*”), Article 408 (“*Desertion*”) and Article 402 of the Criminal Code (“*Disobedience*”).

Figure 35 demonstrates that increasing the personnel of the Military Forces of Ukraine expectedly led to an increase of crimes committed by Ukrainian military officials (Fig. 35).



Fig. 35. Numbers of registered crimes against military service (2022, by month)

Figure 36 below presents the number of crimes against military service registered for ten months of 2020, 2021 and 2022 (Fig. 36).




Fig. 36. Crimes against military service (Oct 2022, Oct 2021, Oct 2022)

A special attention is paid here to the number of crimes of *absence without leave from a military unit or place of service* (Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

The main conclusion here is that the number of registered crimes has increased (although *not significantly*; see the data, for example, of 2015) parallel to the decrease of identified suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (Fig. 37).




Fig. 37. Absence without leave from a military unit (Jan 2014 – Oct 2022)

Partly the same could be said about a more serious crime – *desertion* (Article 408 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

Here, we can mention that in 2014, the ratio between the number of registered crimes (*total number of criminal proceedings*) and the number of suspects (*criminal proceedings with concrete suspects*) was 1,4 (Fig. 38).

In 2015, the same ratio was 1,1.

As far as eight months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 11,6 (Fig. 38).

As far as nine months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 11,2 (Fig. 38).

As far as ten months of 2022 is concerned, the same ratio was 12,2.

So, the main conclusion here is that the criminal justice system of Ukraine is mostly oriented now at the quantitative indicators rather than on the *qualitative* ones (Fig. 38).




Fig. 38. Desertion: registered crimes and suspects (Jan 2014 – Oct 2022)

No fewer interesting criminological conclusions could be drawn from the analysis of crime foreseen by Article 426-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (*Excess of power or official authority by a military official*). While in 2016, 65 crimes were registered with 17 suspects, in 2022 we can observe the increase in the distance between number of crimes and number of suspects (*Fig. 39*).




Fig. 39. Excess of power by a military official (Jan 2016 – Oct 2022)

Property Crimes

While considering *property crimes* in wartime Ukraine, the first hypothesis appears that the absence of the well and properly organized policing *would* lead to serious increase of the number of property crimes.

Nevertheless, the number of recorded property crimes has in fact significantly *decreased* (*Fig. 40*).

At the same time, this number should be analysed together with the fact that the number of indictments in property crimes sent to court decreased by 56% (*data of the six months of 2022*).




Fig. 40. Crimes against property (2022, by month)

Figure 41 presents the number of *crimes against property* registered in ten months of 2020, 2021 and 2022 correspondingly (*Fig. 41*).




Fig. 41. Property crimes (October 2020, October 2021, October 2022)

Figure 42 demonstrates the number of *thefts* registered in ten months of 2020, 2021 and 2022 correspondingly (Fig. 42).




Fig. 42. Property crimes (Sep 2020, Sep 2021, Sep 2022)

Figure 43 demonstrates the number of *aggravated robberies* registered in ten months of 2020, 2021 and 2022 correspondingly (Fig. 43).




Fig. 43. Aggravated robbery (Oct 2020, Oct 2021, Oct 2022)

Crimes Committed with Firearms

While analysing crimes committed with firearms, it could be expected that crime rates resulting from *illegal use of firearms* would extremely rise after February 2022.

Nevertheless, official Ukrainian crime statistics from the Office of General Prosecutor partly refutes such a presumption.

Yes, it is obvious that the number of crimes with weapons has seriously risen for the ten months of 2022 compared with the whole year of 2021 or the whole year of 2020.

On the other hand, Ukrainian history knows examples when the number of crimes with weapons was higher even in peacetime (for example, in 2014).

At the same time, it should also be noted that the number of crimes committed with the use of firearms in 2015 (in the period of the continuing Russian invasion to the Eastern Ukraine) was less than even for ten months of 2022 (Fig. 44).




Fig. 44. Crimes committed with the use of firearms (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Additionally, it should be noted that in 2022 alongside an increase of the number of crimes committed with firearms, the number of suspects in the same criminal proceedings *decreased* which could also raise an issue concerning the *quality* of the activities of the LEA.

Official crime statistics of 2022 demonstrate to which extent the number of registered *intentional homicides* has risen (Fig. 45).




Fig. 45. Intentional homicide with the use of firearms (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

The same could be said about *intentional serious bodily harm committed with firearms* (Fig. 46).

Here, it should be noted that on one hand, ten months of 2022 have brought a bigger number of such crimes.

On other hand, the 2014 data shows the same numbers of crimes even in the absence of open Russian military aggression (Fig. 46).




Fig. 46. Intentional grievous bodily harm committed with the use of firearms

Figure 47 demonstrates data number of *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms and number of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings.

On one hand, we can observe a significant increase of *aggravated robberies* committed with the use of firearms as compared with 2021.

On the other one, official crime statistics for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 demonstrate much bigger numbers of *aggravated robberies* even when Ukrainian society was not so deeply saturated with firearms as in 2022 (Fig. 47).




Fig. 47. Aggravated robbery with the use of firearms (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Figure 48 demonstrates data on number of *crimes committed with the use of explosives* and the numbers of suspects in corresponding criminal proceedings (Fig. 48).

Saturation of Ukrainian society with firearms and an increase in the numbers of military men in the country is used by the organized crime groups which commit crimes not only with the use of firearms but also with the use of military or police uniform. In September 2022, in Kharkiv, a group of criminals that robbed the citizens' homes under the guise of representatives of law enforcement agencies of Ukraine was arrested.




Fig. 48. Crimes with the use of explosives (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Here, it should also be stressed on one aspect of post-war life of any state. It is not only about social rehabilitation of former soldiers who directly participated in military actions but also potentially possible criminal activity of persons with the post-war traumatic disorders where some of them will not find themselves in the post-war society.

The danger from illegal firearms in Ukraine is *not* concerned only with firearms with *Ukrainian origins*. Due to so called “*partial mobilization*” declared in Russia, many Ukrainian citizens forcibly taken into the so called “peoples’ militia” of so-called “Donets Peoples’ Republic” and “Luhansk Peoples’ Republic” received unregistered firearms with following deserting from “*the militia*”.

Figure 49 demonstrates trends in different crimes committed with firearms and explosives *in comparison* (Fig. 49).

Here, we can conclude that if crimes with the use of explosives and aggravated robberies with the use of firearms increased to a large extent (in absolute numbers), nevertheless, the vast majority of crimes committed with firearms are *intentional homicides* (Fig. 49).




Fig. 49. Different crimes committed with the use of firearms

Crimes against Peace, Security of Mankind and International Legal order (War Crimes)

According to official data of the Office of General Prosecutor, as of 7 August 2022, the Ukrainian authorities were investigating almost 26,000 cases of suspected war crimes committed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 (Fig. 50).




Fig. 50. War crimes (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Sex Crimes

As far as *sex crimes* are concerned, the number of mentioned crimes decreased significantly as it could be expected from the war-time society (Fig. 51).

Nevertheless, the final conclusions will be drawn only in January 2023.

If we have the same trends continued until the end of 2022, it would be the lowest level of sex crimes for the ten years history of crime prevention in Ukraine (Fig. 51).




Fig. 51. Sex crimes (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

No less interesting conclusion could be drawn from the above statistics.

It is obvious that 2021 brought many restrictions concerned with the COVID pandemic which led to closing of all night clubs, disco and restaurants where sex offences were often committed. Nevertheless, the number of sex crimes registered in 2021 was one of the highest for the previous ten years of crime prevention (Fig. 52).




Fig. 52. Rape (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

At the same time, restrictions imposed due to the war-time period led to rapid decrease of rapes crimes in Ukrainian society.

Crimes against National Security of Ukraine

No less interesting is official statistics of *crimes against national security* for 2013 – 2022

In 2013, as many as 8 crimes against national security were registered, in which only *one* criminal proceeding had a *concrete suspect*. The rest were so-called “*factual*” criminal proceedings.

That is, the ratio between all cases and cases with concrete suspects was 8.

Here, we have visual additional – currently *criminological* – evidence of the *anti-state orientation* of the political regime in Ukraine overthrown in 2014. A big country in the centre of Europe with a great potential, having a dangerous neighbour on the East, could not have such performance indicators of the Security Service of Ukraine and other LEA.

Immediately after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia and before the start of a full-scale military invasion of Russia in 2022 – and regardless of which President was in power – both the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with suspicion had the same ratio (*Fig. 53*).




Fig. 53. Crimes against national security (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

The situation when only *every tenth* criminal proceeding has a perspective raises an issue of effectiveness of the LEA in the field of combatting the crimes against national security (*Fig. 54*).




Fig. 54. Crimes against national security: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Crimes in the Sphere of Protection of State Secrets, Inviolability of State Borders, Provision of Conscription and Mobilization

It was clearly expected that the 2022 War would bring an increase in the numbers of military forces of Ukraine and transportation of military units within Ukrainian territory.

Consequently, it was clearly expected that the 2022 War would bring an increase in numbers of *crimes in the sphere of protection of state secrets, inviolability of state borders, provision of conscription and mobilization*.

As a result, as we can observe, the number of the above crimes in ten months of 2022 is two times bigger as compared with the whole of 2021 (Fig. 55).




Fig. 55. Crimes against national security: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Crimes against Justice

During the 2022 War, *crimes against justice* have mostly gone to shadow.

Official crime statistics demonstrate a rapid decrease of crimes against justice (more than two times as compared with 2021) although we tend to analyse such a decrease in the light of a factual sabotage of the LEA in registering such crimes (Fig. 56).

At the same time, a ratio between a number of crimes against justice and a number of suspects in related criminal proceedings had increased which proves the above idea (Fig. 57).




Fig. 56. Crimes against justice (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)




Fig. 57. Crimes against justice: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Intentional Non-Execution of the Court Decisions

Non-execution of the court decisions remains a chronic problem of Ukrainian justice system, which was repeatedly noted by the Council of Europe and the ECtHR.

If 2021 was an exception, then during the entire period of 2013 – 2022, the number of criminal proceedings opened under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, fluctuated at approximately the same level, having reached the highest position in 2019 (4212 registered crimes against justice), after which the number of registered crimes against justice of the mentioned type started to consistently decrease.

On the other hand, applying the classic approach that crime within certain limits (both upper and lower) is a *normal* social phenomenon, one can conclude about the extent to which the 2022 Russian aggression has *hit* the justice system in Ukraine, significantly destroying what had been worked on for years both Presidents of Ukraine, legislators, executive power, international and national experts, international and national NGOs (Fig. 58).




Fig. 58. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

However, the number of crimes registered in 2022 indicates the objective and obvious priorities of the war-time society, and here we have a *dualistic trend*.

On the one hand, we have a record low number of registered crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, where such a small number of registered crimes does *not* at all indicate an improvement in the situation in the field of execution of court decisions.

On the other hand, we have an interesting situation.

Thus, since 2017, there had been a consistent trend of decreasing the ratio between the number of registered crimes and the number of criminal proceedings with concrete suspects. That is, there were reasonable suspicions, and we assume that there were grounds for them. That is, the criminal justice system began functioning better.

Since 2022, there has been a sharp upward jump in this indicator, which reflects how deeply destabilized the Ukrainian justice system has become due to the escalation of the Moskovian military aggression against Ukraine (Fig. 59).




Fig. 59. Intentional non-execution of a judicial decision: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Registering crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine has become *much less*, and even in already registered criminal proceedings, as crime statistics show, there are no prospects. Crimes under Article 382 of the Criminal Code have become much *more latent*.

‘White-Collar Crimes’ (Crimes against Public Services)

Here, we provide an analysis of crime statistics related to Section XVII of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“*Criminal offences in the area of official and professional activity related to the provision of public services*”), which are following: abuse of authority or office (Article 364), abuse of power by an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 364-1), excess of authority or official powers by a law enforcement officer (Article 365), abuse of power by persons providing public services (Article 365-2), forgery in office (Article 366), neglect of official duty (Article 367), accepting an offer, promise or receiving an improper advantage by an official (Article 368), (unlawful enrichment (Article 368-2), bribery of an official of a legal entity of private law, regardless of the organizational and legal form (Article 368-3), abuse of influence (Article 369-2), provocation of bribery (Article 370) and others.

A significant decrease of *crimes against public services* points at the fact that most of such crimes have gone to shadow (Fig. 60).

Crimes against public services are very latent ones by nature but the 2022 War made them *much more latent* (Fig. 61).

The fact that the ratio between the number of crimes against public services and the number of suspects in related criminal proceedings has increased to the highest point for the last ten years proves the above hypothesis (Fig. 62).




Fig. 60. “White-collar crimes” (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)




Fig. 61. “White-collar crimes”: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)




Fig. 62. Receiving a bribe (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

A crime of *bribery* reflects the same trends which have been explained earlier where we have a *dualistic trend* – a decrease of registered ‘white-collar crimes’ crimes and an increase of the ratio between registered crimes and the suspects in related criminal proceedings (Fig. 63).




Fig. 63. Receiving a bribe: ratio between registered crimes and suspects in related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Corporate Raiding

In the general structure of criminality in Ukraine a special place is occupied with crimes concerned with *corporate raiding*.

Here, we focus attention on two articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: *obstruction of legitimate economic activity* (Article 206) and *illegal seizure of property of an enterprise, institution, or organisation* (Article 206-2).

Firstly, it should be stressed that mentioned articles are *not* concerned only with activities of big corporations. Moreover, as practice shows, they are used for the aims of prevention of illegal “conquests” of *small legal entities*.

Secondly, it should be stressed that Ukraine is a big agricultural country which supplies food to many states of the European Union. Ukraine is one of the three largest exporters of agricultural products to the EU (the USA and Brazil occupy the first places). According to the European Commission’s statistics, Ukraine has supplied to the EU production by 7 billion euro.

Therefore, the EU is interested in a *transparent and stable agricultural market* in Ukraine which is important from the point of view of safety of products and minimizing money-laundering in the agricultural sector. At the same time, one of the most dangerous problems both for Ukrainian justice and the agricultural market is a problem of *corporate raiding*.

Of course, this is an issue *mostly* of *peacetime*, but at the same time, the 2022 War also exacerbates this issue as much as possible. If in peacetime national and local *quasi-elites* were highly interested in the existence of the *permanent* phenomenon of corporate raiding in Ukraine, then during the 2022 Moskovian military aggression this phenomenon hid even more in the twilight.

Every year the spring-summer-autumn news from Ukraine demonstrated numerous examples of corporate raiding of lands, fields, enterprises, utility premises, agricultural machinery, plants, factories etc., which is often “supported” with violent actions and the use of firearms.

But what about official crime statistics?

Unfortunately, official crime statistics say *nothing* about corporate raiding in Ukraine. As a result, it *seems* that there is *no* corporate raiding in Ukraine.

Instead of corporate raiding, there is only a Soviet-style shaped ‘*unauthorised action*’ (Article 356 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) which provides punishment for “*unauthorised action, that is doing anything contrary to the rules established by law, where the lawfulness of such acts is challenged by an individual citizen, an enterprise, institution or organisation, and where such acts caused any substantial damage to the interests of a citizen, state and public interests, or interests of the owner*”.

Let us analyse an issue of the corporate raiding in Ukraine in the light of official crime statistics.

Crime statistics from the Office of Public Prosecutor for the last 10 years indicate that, on average, for the period 2013 – 2021, notes of suspicion were handed in almost 40% of *all* criminal proceedings open in Ukraine.

The same indicator for the period of ten months of 2022 is 35%.

At the same time, the same indicator under Article 206 of the Criminal Code the period of 2013 – 2021 is 3,64%.

The same indicator for the period of ten months of 2022 is 2,78%.

A similar indicator under Article 206-2 of the Criminal Code for the period 2014 – 2021 is 10,04% and 4,76% for the period of ten months of 2022.

While analysing the percentage of criminal proceedings under Articles 206 and 206-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the total number of criminal proceedings, the conclusions are *disappointing*, especially considering that, firstly, these crimes are *by no means* characterized by latency (because of the activities of the victims), and, secondly, most of crimes of corporate raiding ‘*are driven*’ by the police investigators and prosecutors under abstract ‘*unauthorised action*’.

Here, we have another clear example that the presence in the Criminal Code of Ukraine related prohibitions does *not* guarantee that *quasi-elites* will be interested in restricting themselves in the use of such an illegal source of income.

As a conclusion to this part of our criminological analysis, we should point out that the problem of corporate raiding is a ‘*face*’ of a broader problem of *corruption* in the field of justice and the LEA activities (Fig. 64, Fig. 65).




Fig. 64. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings from total number of related criminal proceedings (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)




Fig. 65. Corporate raiding: percentage of criminal proceedings with suspects from total number of criminal proceedings with suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Family Violence Crime

In recent years, *family violence crime* has become an object of special attention of the Parliament, the Government and Ukrainian society in general. Moreover, on 1 November 2022, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (*the Istanbul Convention*) came into the force for Ukraine (signed in November 2011, ratified in July 2022).

Therefore, family violent crimes could be a very attractive object of criminological research in the context of the impact of the 2022 War on Ukrainian society.

As crime statistics show, 4800 family violent crimes were registered in 2021.

In ten months of 2022, 2808 family violent crimes were registered in Ukraine.

Such a reduction could be explained with different factors like a mass migration of many *potential* victims to other European countries and participation of many *potential* perpetrators in military actions. In any case, the *traditional social basis* for family violence was minimised to a large extent with the 2022 War (Fig. 66).




Fig. 66. Family violent: registered crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

On the other hand, crime statistics demonstrate that family violent crimes having become latent in the beginning of the 2022 War went out later from shadows and became *less latent* (Fig. 67).

At the same time, many Ukrainian women returned back to Ukraine after several months of forced escape (Fig. 67).




Fig. 67. Family violent: registered crimes and suspects (2022, by month)

Hooliganism

No less interesting for the aims of the analysis of the criminological situation in Ukraine is the crime of *hooliganism* (according to Article 296 Criminal Code of Ukraine – “a serious disturbance of the public order based on motives of explicit disrespect to community in a most outrageous or exceptionally cynical

manner”) which can be used as an example of impacts of harsh wartime restrictions with curfews, military and the police patrols as well as roadblocks on *normal* social life.

Generally concluding, criminal acts of hooliganism had a permanent trend to decrease for the last ten years where the 2021 restrictions resulting from the COVID pandemic should be also noted.

In 2022, a particular decrease of acts of hooliganism should be considered as consequences of the next Moskovian military invasion. If in 2021 acts of hooliganism were widely prevented by closing public spaces (shopping centres, cinemas, public transport etc.), the COVID pandemic was almost ‘*forgotten*’ by the general population in the end of February 2022. Accordingly, the end of February 2022 has led to harsher physical restrictions of *possible* actions aimed at violation of public order (*Fig. 68*).




Fig. 68. Hooliganism: registered crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

On the other hand, the number of acts of hooliganism almost disappeared from social life in February – March 2022, has appeared again in April 2022 with a trend to further increase.

Correspondingly, such a trend should be considered an indicator of a partial *stabilization* of social life in Ukraine mostly in areas more or less far from the frontline.

Certainly, the last two months of 2022 will prove (or not) such a hypothesis. At least data for the ten months of 2022 has given reasonable grounds to shape it in the above form.

On the other hand, one more conclusion could be drawn from the described above situation. Yes, a number of acts of hooliganism dropped to a particular extent due to the harshest social control measures for the whole contemporary Ukrainian history. For example, comparative analysis of crimes of hooliganism for ten months of 2021 and 2022 shows that the number of detected acts of hooliganism decreased.

Nevertheless, the drop was an insignificant to make a statement that the harshest police restrictions has resulted in decreasing of such acts to a minimum level that could be expected from a point of view of proponents of harsher police control over the society (*Fig. 69*).




Fig. 69. Hooliganism: registered crimes and suspects (2022, by month)

Smuggling

Smuggling from Ukraine to Europe has been an obvious problem for the stability of public order in the EU for a long time. Therefore, *crimes of smuggling* are no fewer interesting cases for researching the impacts of the 2022 War because they reflect the state of *protection of borders* of Ukraine which, in its turn, reflects the general potential of the State to keep its territory safe.

Accordingly, Europol has paid enough attention to the issue of smuggling from Ukraine. For example, in April 2017, over 578 firearms and 776 pieces of ammunition were seized as part as a joint operation targeting the illegal movement of firearms, explosives, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material through the Ukraine – Moldova border.

From the perspective of the EU – Ukraine relations an issue of smuggling is becoming more topical in the light of the Moskovian military aggression because of large number of firearms and explosive materials in the zone of military actions. On July 11, 2022, the EU Home Affairs Commissioner announced a hub in Moldova to battle crime, particularly arms smuggling from war-torn Ukraine.

Later, in its official statement of July 22, 2022, Europol said that “*a potential threat observed in war zones in the past is that firearms can fall into the wrong hands. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Europol has warned that the proliferation of firearms and explosives in Ukraine could lead to an increase in firearms and munitions trafficked into the EU via established smuggling routes or online platforms. This threat might even be higher once the conflict has ended*”.

Official Ukrainian crime statistics show that a crime of smuggling had occupied a permanent segment in the general structure of the Ukrainian crime statistics until 2022.

In the period of 2016 – 2021, there has been an increase of detected crimes of smuggling with its highest point in 151 crimes in 2021 (*Fig. 70*).




Fig. 70. Smuggling: registered crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

It seems this trend could have continued even in 2022 if the Russian invasion did not occur. In fact, in 2022, the number of crimes of smuggling dropped significantly in February – March 2022 with further increase to the pre-war indicators.

Comparative analysis of crimes of smuggling for ten months of 2022 shows that the number of detected crimes decreased 2,6 times as compared with the same period of 2021.

Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased more than 3 times.

On the other hand, the sharp shock caused by the 2022 Russian invasion and resulted in decrease of detected crimes of smuggling seems to disappear soon considering the rapid increase of detected crime of smuggling in the middle of 2022. Moreover, the number of crimes of smuggling in July 2022 overwhelmed the same indicator for January 2022 (*Fig. 71*).




Fig. 71. Smuggling: registered crimes and suspects (2022, by month)

Here, it should be noted that in 2018, the Criminal Code of Ukraine was supplemented with Article 201-1 according to the Law “On the introduction of amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the preservation of Ukrainian forests and the prevention of illegal export of unprocessed timber” which has stated a criminal liability for *smuggling of timber*. Therefore, in this paper data for 2020 – 2022 also reflect the numbers of both crimes of smuggling – ‘classical’ one and *smuggling of timber*.

Additionally, we would like to make a conclusion that seems to be of a great importance in the context of analysis of smuggling in a broader context of Ukrainian criminality.

For the period of 2013 – 2021, an average ratio between all detected crimes (including so-called ‘factual cases’) and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 2,25.

In 2022, the same indicator increased to 5,63 (that is 2,5 times higher).

Considering the fact that crimes of smuggling are often concerned with concrete persons who are crossing the border with smuggled goods, such a state of things poses reasonable questions concerning effectiveness of the LEA.

Moreover, in the wartime period when all law-enforcement bodies operate in the state of heightened alertness such a gap between mentioned indicators seems to be of *artificial nature* (Fig. 72).




Fig. 72. Smuggling: ratio between crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Here, we would also like to analyse crimes of *smuggling of drugs*.

Drug-related offences have been already analysed in a separate chapter of this paper. Nevertheless, here, a focus is made not on drugs but mostly on *smuggling*. Therefore, both crimes – smuggling

and smuggling of timber – are discussed together in a broader context of *immovability of the state borders of Ukraine* in the wartime period.

The first conclusion that could be drawn from statistics is that the number of detected crimes of smuggling of drugs decreased (183 criminal proceedings in 2021, 108 criminal proceeding in ten months of 2022) (*Fig. 73*).




Fig. 73. Smuggling of drugs: crimes and suspects (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Comparative analysis of crimes of smuggling of drugs for 2021 and ten months of 2022 shows that the number of detected crimes decreased 1,69 times. Correspondingly, the number of suspects in smuggling for the same period decreased 2,4 times.

As in previous examples, the rapid drop in registered crimes of smuggling in March 2022 was changed with the increase of mentioned crimes (*Fig. 74*).




Fig. 74. Smuggling of drugs: crimes and suspects (2022, by month)

As in the previous example with smuggling, for the period of 2013 – 2021, an average ratio between detected crimes (so called '*factual*') and criminal proceedings with concrete suspects was 1,55 (*Fig. 75*). In 2022, the same indicator increased to 2,35 (*Fig. 75*).




Fig. 75. Smuggling of drugs: ratio between crimes and suspects

At the beginning of October 2022, the Polish (Subcarpathian) National Tax Administration prevented the smuggling of 272 kg of hashish. Contraband, worth PLN 13 million, was hidden in a truck. The car was entering Poland from Ukraine and, according to the documents, it was transporting over 20 tons of frozen elderberries. The problem is that the Ukrainian authorities allowed the driver to leave Ukraine without any problem.

Human Trafficking: “New Markets, New Perspectives”

According to general stereotypes, which are *not* far from the reality, Ukraine had traditionally been used as a *transit country* for the aims of human trafficking. In its recent judgment of 16 February 2021 in «*V.C.L. and A.N. v. the United Kingdom*» (*applications nos. 77587/12 and 74603/12*), the European Court of Human Rights pointed at the similarities in the route to the United Kingdom taken by the victims of human trafficking where *Ukraine* was defined as a *transit country* to Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany and France.

What is stressed in declarations of many political leaders from the EU, Ukraine and other European states that the 2022 Russian invasion to Ukraine has handed the future of many Ukrainian women and children over to criminal elements because of the chaos in Ukraine that took place in the first period of the 2022 War.

The author’s personal sources prove that some humanistic initiatives of several NGOs and individuals on bringing of Ukrainian refugees to new homes or at least safe places in the states of the EU were halted because new ‘opportunities’ of sheltering were proposed by persons who can be arguably suspected in human trafficking and forced labour.

On the other hand, in academic sources, the authors rightly assert that shaped in mass-media imagination about ‘*innocent victim*’ of human trafficking in fact does not meet the reality (*Haverkamp, Rita (2019). Victims of Human Trafficking: Consideration from a Crime Prevention Perspective, in ‘What is Wrong with Human Trafficking? Critical Perspectives on the Law’, R. Haverkamp, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Lernestedt (Eds.). London: Hart, 280pp.*).

Accordingly, the 2022 Moskavian invasion to Ukraine has moved the concept of ‘*innocent victim*’ of human trafficking more far from the reality.

It is generally accepted that human trafficking is mostly a *well-organized criminal activity* which demands different forms of criminal ‘*cooperation*’ among perpetrators *in different border states*. At the same time, with the beginning of the 2022 War, trying to control the wave of refugees, the Ukrainian Government severely restricted border crossing for *males* while *males* were mostly involved in this criminal activity.

On the other hand, a new slave market was opened on occupied Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine, obviously under informal authorization and control of the Moskavian regime. There is mass evidence of arbitrary arrests of not only military men but also civilians with further putting them into a state of forcible military service. Moreover, there were further informal demands of a big sum of money for each person (up to 30,000 US dollars) with corresponding formal letters from Russian officials that “*N. resisted the Special Military Operation conducted by the Military Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Therefore, N. will be deprived of freedom for an unpredictable period until the e Special Military Operation end*”.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, crime statistics show that a period of 2013 – 2016 was stable in the aspect of numbers of registered crimes of human trafficking as well as of numbers of suspects in related criminal proceedings.

In 2017, there was a rapid increase in crimes of human trafficking which slowly ended in 2022. Nevertheless, as Ukrainian crime statistics say, even for ten months of 2022, the number of crimes was almost the same as it was in 2013 – 2016 (Fig. 76).




Fig. 76. Human trafficking: crimes and suspects in criminal proceedings

For example, if in 2016 there were 59 suspects in human trafficking, the ten months of 2022 have already shown 75 suspects. Moreover, we can argue concerning a factual *increase* of THB cases considering the fact that 6,5 million Ukrainians left the country and ‘created’ new ‘opportunities’ for human traffickers.

At the moment, it is difficult to say how human trafficking was affected by the 2022 Russian invasion. On one hand, the number of registered THB crimes decreased to zero point immediately after the Russian military forces crossed the Ukrainian border (Figure 77). On the other one, serious concerns arise around the fact that THB cases continue to be registered in the light of closed borders, police checks, curfews and hundreds of military and police roadblocks.

At the same time, it should be pointed that 118 THB crimes in ten months of 2022 are more than insufficient number in the light of 6,5 million of Ukrainian refugees which could lead to the conclusion that something is obviously *wrong* with the police intelligence in the sphere of THB prevention as well as with intelligence of the Ukrainian border service.

For example, in September 2022, the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine informed that it initiated at least 49 criminal proceedings on the facts of illegal transportation of persons to Poland and other countries who declared themselves as volunteers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, therefore, had a right to leave Ukraine for the needs of their volunteer activities.

Numerous official statements of the EU leaders stressed: *human traffickers from many EU states are waiting for new victims from Ukraine* due to victims’ vulnerable position, and such official statements should be taken for granted. Therefore, it could be said that THB crimes are *more latent* ones as the LEA officials declare (Fig. 77).

The factor of *corruption* should also be considered – both in the police and border service. There were many reports on numerus mass media that a ‘price’ for illegal crossing the Ukrainian border varies from 2000 to 5000 US dollars (Fig. 78).

A situation with ‘satellite crimes’ is different.

Firstly, let us demonstrate the official statistics of a crime of *creating or running brothels and procuring*.

The period of 2013 – 2021 could be described as permanent decrease of mentioned crimes where the 2022 War ‘cut’ corresponding crime trends (Fig. 79).




Fig. 77. Human trafficking: number of registered crimes (2022, by month)




Fig. 78. Human trafficking: number of crimes (Oct 2020, Oct 2021, Oct 2022)




Fig. 79. Creating or running brothels and procuring (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Comparative analysis of the above crime statistics for ten months of 2021 and 2022 proves the trend of decreasing numbers of crimes of running brothels which are traditionally considered as “*shadow crimes*” or “*satellite crimes*” in relation to THB crimes. (Fig. 80).




Fig. 80. Creating or running brothels and procuring (Oct – 2020, 2021, 2022)

The same could be also said about a crime of *pimping or engaging person in prostitution*.

Trends of this type of a crime are not the same as trends in crimes of creating or running brothels and procuring. Nevertheless, after 2018 there has been a decrease in numbers of this type of a crime that was finally confirmed with the 2022 data (Fig. 81, Fig. 82, Fig. 83).



Fig. 81. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Crime trends in Ukraine for the last ten years are a good example to prove a common social nature of THB crimes and “*satellite*” (“*shadow*”) crimes discussed above where a common feature of all crime trends that the above-mentioned trends almost changing the same way (Fig. 84).




Fig. 82. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution (Oct – 2020, 2021, 2022)




Fig. 83. Pimping or engaging person in prostitution (2022, by month)




Fig. 84. THB crimes and "satellite" crimes (Jan 2013 – Oct 2022)

Conclusions

Having summarized the presented above ideas, we have come to the following conclusions that reflect the 2022 crime trends in Ukraine.

Firstly, the 2022 Moskavian military invasion to Ukraine is in fact *the first full-scale war in the centre of the European continent* after II World War with declared open participation of the biggest European states which has become as an absolutely new broad field for criminological research concerning the impacts of a contemporary war on contemporary digital and technological societies.

Secondly, crime trends in war-time Ukraine have become a much more very interesting criminological phenomenon for a researcher due to a *dualistic nature* of such trends.

On one hand, in ten months of 2022 the same number of crimes has been committed in Ukraine as compared with the whole of 2021. Therefore, it can be more than clearly predicted that the number of crimes for the whole of 2022 would be *bigger* than the number of crimes which had been committed in 2021.

On the other one, a traditional view on the war-time society as a *more criminogenic* one is *partly* refuted by the official crime statistics.

Even considering partial inaccuracies of official crime statistics, it is possible to define general crimes trends in wartime Ukraine as those which proves that in the light of traditional views on war-time society we *could have* expected more crimes. Nevertheless, official crime statistics demonstrate a significant increase only in the numbers of those crimes which are *directly concerned with the war* (crimes against national security, war crimes and crimes against the mobilisation).

In contrast, *property crimes* demonstrate a rapid *decrease* although one could have expected that a lot of Ukrainian citizens *would* commit *more* property crimes in the light of the deep ruin of traditional social and economic relations caused by the War.

As far as *drug-related crimes* are concerned, the analysis of their trends gives more grounds in the favour of the argument that the 2022 War 'bared' a *real social and political nature* of drug-related criminality in Ukraine where the main idea is concerned with the fact that the illegal crime drug market is strictly controlled by the police where the police use the potential drug offenders as a permanent source of *illegal (corruptive) income* of the policemen. Being deprived of *other* traditional corruptive incomes, the police have reacted to the challenges caused by the War with a '*deeper attention*' to drug offenders.

A special place in the structure of the Ukrainian criminality is occupied with *crimes committed with the use of firearms and explosives*. According to official crime statistics, only in ten months of 2022, more crimes with the use of firearms had been committed as compared with a period of 2018 – 2021. Such trends should be considered as one of the most dangerous ones from the point of view of national security *not* only Ukraine but also the EU.

One of the main conclusions from research of crime trends in Ukraine for the period of ten months of 2022 is that the 2022 War made criminality in Ukraine *more rural*. The ratio between crimes committed in urban and rural areas in 2013 was 4,04. Consequently, the same ratio for the period of ten months of 2022 decreased to the point of 3,32.