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POSITIONS OF EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES ON POLICIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

This article defines the positions of Eurosceptic parties on key policies of European integration. Eurosceptic parties from the United Kingdom criticized the EU and spread Eurosceptic ideas among citizens. Such parties' activities caused Brexit and provoked the discussion about the possibility of exit process in the other EU Member States and further European integration. To answer this question, I defined the positions of Eurosceptic parties to the key policies of European integration: single market and trade, economic and Monetary Union, Schengen area and migration, Common foreign policy and security, and supporting EU membership.

I analyzed policy documents, interviews, and public speeches. I divided all information into tables, which show parties' positions on policies of European integration. After Brexit, Eurosceptic parties weaken their harsh rhetoric towards the EU and call for reform policies. According to the results of the research, most parties support cooperation in the single market and trade. The parties suggest reforming Eurozone and the Schengen area. The Common foreign policy and security remain debatable policies of cooperation.

Most Eurosceptic parties support EU membership without further enlargement. The most radical positions on European integration have parties from East and South Europe. There are the Kotleba from Slovakia, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Freedom and Solidarity from the Czech Republic, the Bulgarian National Movement, the Human Shield from Croatia, the Greens and the Left Party from Sweden, the Left Alliance from Finland, the Party for the Animals from the Netherlands. Euroscepticism does not threaten further European integration, while most Eurosceptic parties propose reforming the EU policies and support European integration.

Keywords: European integration, Eurosceptic party, single market and trade, Eurozone, Schengen area.

The first manifestations of opposition to the EU appeared in the parties of the EU Member States. Subsequently, Eurosceptic political parties or influential political groups have registered in almost every EU country. The opponents of such information campaign announced leaving the Eurozone or the Schengen area, or even more radically, called for a referendum leaving the EU. However, the question remains open whether they are categorical or populist. Therefore, it is necessary to define how strong the influence of party Euroscepticism on EU policy is and whether it has not changed in the last years. The highest level of opposition to the EU is in Italy, Greece, and among the Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. Eurosceptic parties are also active in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Besides, the level of Euroscepticism depends on economic development, political stability, and region.

In the following paragraphs, I will examine the position of all Eurosceptic parties in each EU Member States according to the region and submit information in the three tables.

Party Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. Party Euroscepticism is associated with populism in Central and Eastern Europe. The reasons for the growing opposition to the EU in this region are the refugee quotas distribution, Russian influence, and the consequences of the economic crisis. Table 1 shows the positions of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies. Next, I will provide the analysis of party Euroscepticism in the region.

Hungary is one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the region. The two largest Eurosceptic parties, the Fidesz and the Jobbik, won seats in the national and European parliaments. Mostly, the positions of the parties to the European integration are similar. In particular, both parties support the single market and trade, strengthening cooperation in the economy. The Jobbik is in favour of joining the Eurozone. Both

parties condemn the EU policy towards migration and sanctions against Russia¹. The Fidesz² and the Jobbik cannot determine their positions to further cooperation but support European integration³. Other Eurosceptic parties, the Workers Party and the Green Party, strengthen their opposition to the EU, but they did not enter the European Parliament⁴. Despite that, Euroscepticism in Hungary has no real ideological or political basis.

There is also a high level of opposition to the EU in Austria. The largest and only Eurosceptic party in the European Parliament is the Freedom Party of Austria. Initially, the party opposed the EU integration, but after the 1990s changed its position and now is a representative of soft Euroscepticism. The Freedom Party of Austria is against accession to the Monetary Union and the migration policy of the EU but supports the Common foreign policy and membership in the EU. In addition, the Eurosceptic party stands for neutrality in defence and security policy⁵. The Eurosceptic parties are the Alliance for the Future of Austria, the Team Stronach, and the Reform Conservatives. All parties did not win seats in the European Parliament. The situation with the level of opposition to the EU in Austria is quite similar to Hungary. Austrian Eurosceptic parties want to keep ties with the EU.

The largest Eurosceptic parties in the Czech Republic are the Public Democratic Party, Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Communist Party of the Czech Republic and Moravia. All three Eurosceptic Czech parties are hard Eurosceptic and won seats in the national and European parliaments. The Public Democratic Party, the Freedom, and the Direct Democracy support the single market and trade⁶. The Communist Party of the Czech Republic and Moravia rejects cooperation in these fields. All parties oppose the Common foreign policy and defence and favour of leaving the EU⁷. However, the probability that the Czech Republic will leave the EU is low. The Czech Republic must hold a referendum. Even if the parties unite to get voters, they will not have enough to launch a process. Therefore, the idea of exit remains populist and unrealistic. Eurosceptics can threaten the integration, spreading Eurosceptic ideas among the citizens. The Czech Sovereignty, the Freedomites, the Party of Free Citizens, and the Workers' Party did not come to any parliaments. The most active party is the Public Democratic Party, founded by the Czech former president and Eurosceptic V. Klaus. A politician A. Babiš founded the ANO. His party joined the pro-European group in the European Parliament. But A. Babiš criticises the EU and has the pro-Russian position.

In Slovakia, two Eurosceptic parties, the Kotleba and the Freedom and Solidarity, entered the European Parliament. Both parties are radical and propose to stop integration and begin a process of withdrawal⁸. Eurosceptic nationalist parties with less support are the People Party Our Slovakia, the Slovak National Party, the New Majority Party, and We Are Family. Compared to previous parliamentary elections, the Slovaks Eurosceptics have lost their votes⁹.

¹ Dunai, M. (2017). Hungary's Jobbik supports EU deepening with voters' blessing. *Reuters* <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-jobbik-eu/hungarys-jobbik-supports-eu-deepening-with-voters-blessing-idUSKBN1CW1TR>> (2021, February, 01).

² Duro, J. (2016). Becoming mainstream? Euroscepticism among established Parties in V4 countries. *Eurasian Journal of Social Sciences* <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309659788_BECOMING_MAINSTREAM_EUROSCPTICISM_AMONG_ESTABLISHED_PARTIES_IN_V4_COUNTRIES/link/581c87c408aea429b291bed2/download> (2021, February, 03).

³ Kroet, C. (2016). Hungary's far-right Jobbik says leaving the EU is no longer on the agenda. *Politico* <<https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-far-right-jobbik-leader-gabor-vonasays-leaving-eu-no-longer-on-the-agenda/>> (2021, February, 01).

⁴ Hungary Today (2021). *Opposition LMP Changes Name*. <<https://hungarytoday.hu/opposition-lmp-changes-name/>> (2021, February, 01).

⁵ FPÖ (2016) *Parteiprogramm der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs*. <https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_web.pdf> (2021, March, 01).

⁶ SPD (2019). *Policy program* <<https://spd.cz/program/>> (2021, March, 01).

⁷ Duro, J. (2016). Becoming mainstream? Euroscepticism among established Parties in V4 countries. *Eurasian Journal of Social Sciences* <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309659788_BECOMING_MAINSTREAM_EUROSCPTICISM_AMONG_ESTABLISHED_PARTIES_IN_V4_COUNTRIES/link/581c87c408aea429b291bed2/download> (2021, February, 01).

⁸ Spac, P. (2016). Anti-Europeanism and Euroscepticism in Slovakia. *The Masaryk University* <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313772101_Anti-Europeanism_and_Euroscepticism_in_Slovakia/link/58a58848aca27206d988567e/download> (2021, February, 01).

⁹ Kollar, A. (2019). Slovakia, the EU, and the Slovak Paradox. *University College London* <<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/news/2019/oct/slovakia-eu-and-slovak-paradox>> (2021, February, 01).

A minimal level of Euroscepticism is in Slovenia. There are only two Eurosceptic parties: the Slovenian National Party and the Left. None of them entered the European Parliament, which shows the Slovenia pro-European policy¹.

After joining the EU in 2008, the level of Euroscepticism in Bulgaria rose. However, after 2014, the level of opposition to the EU is declining. In the 2019 elections, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Bulgarian National Movement entered the European Parliament. The Bulgarian Socialist Party supports EU policy but censures migration policy and sanctions against Russia. The Bulgarian National Movement is more Eurosceptic and does not support strengthening integration². Both the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Bulgarian National Movement are soft Eurosceptic. The Union of Communists in Bulgaria, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria and the Attack are also Eurosceptic.

The situation is twofold in Romania. The Eurosceptic parties, the New Republic, the Greater Romania Party, and the New Right entered neither the Romanian nor the European parliaments. However, the pro-government Social Democratic Party, which led Romania to membership in 2008, condemn EU institutions last few years. The reasons were not the migration or economic crises but the internal situation in the country. Romanian politicians tried to circumvent their legislation in the run for the Prime Minister's chair, and the EU condemned it. The Social Democratic Party also criticises the EU³. It won 9 of the 33 seats in the European Parliament and almost half in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Social Democratic Party does not call for the withdrawal from economic unions or the EU but accuses the EU of bureaucracy and social inequality⁴.

Although, the anti-European sentiment is not widespread in Croatia. Several Eurosceptic parties registered, such as the Human Shield, the M. Shkoros People's Movement, the Croatian Christian Democratic Party, the Independence for Croatia, the Croatian Party of Rights, the Croatian Pure Party of Rights, the Autochthonous Croatian Party of Rights, the Croatian Democracy, Only Croatia – Movement for Croatia. The Eurosceptic parties that entered the European Parliament are the Human Shield and the People's Movement of M. Shkoros. The Human Shield is hard Eurosceptic and does not support the strengthening of cooperation in any area and calls for withdrawal from the EU⁵. The M. Skoros People's Movement reformed from the Croatian sovereignists in February 2020, which later joined the Croatian Growth Party, the Croatian Conservative Party, and the Croatian Party of Rights. Not all these parties are Eurosceptic, only the Croatian Conservative Party. They won a seat in the European Parliament after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. The party is unknown and does not have a position on the EU policies, but is a member of the Eurosceptic parliamentary group European Conservatives and Reformists and fully supports its policy.

In Poland, the level of distrust EU has also increased in the last years. The Right Wing of the Republic, the Congress of the New Right and the Confederation of Freedom and Independence are hard Eurosceptic parties, but not members of the European Parliament. The parties do not support any EU initiative and propose to leave the EU. An ambiguous situation is with the Law and Justice. The party supports the single market but opposes the Eurozone. Members of the Law and Justice want to strengthen military cooperation but weaken political integration⁶. Two other soft Euroscepticism parties, United Poland and the Agreement won seats in the European Parliament. These parties criticize the EU economic policy and call for more protectionism⁷.

In Latvia, the level of opposition to the EU grows last years. The National Alliance is the only Eurosceptic party in the European Parliament. The party mainly criticises migration policy and calls

¹ Haček, M. (2020). The Difficult Look Back: Slovenian Democratic Path after European Union Accession. *Politics in Central Europe* <<https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/pce/15/3/article-p419.xml?language=en>> (2021, February, 01).

² Yordanova, N. (2019). Bulgaria: Neither a Protest nor a European Vote. *Centro Italiano*. (2021, February, 01).

³ Gherghina, S. (2019). Friends or Foes? *Romania and the Council Presidency*. <https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vkw8cuqf4jqw/nieuws/friends_or_foes_romania_and_the_council> [in English]. (2021, March, 01).

⁴ Gurzu, A. (2019). Romania's rulers take a Eurosceptic turn. *Politico* <<https://www.politico.eu/article/romania-rulers-take-eurosceptic-turn/>> (2021, March, 01).

⁵ Picule, B. (2018). Živi zid: socijal-populizam na hrvatski način. *Tportal* <<https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/zivi-zid-socijal-populizam-na-hrvatski-nacin-20150120>> (2021, February, 21).

⁶ Coomarasamy, J. (2016). The increasing Euro-scepticism in Poland. *BBC* <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36331903>> (2021, March, 01).

⁷ Zycie Stolicy (2020). *Solidarna Polska: Unia Europejska chce skolonizować Polskę, a niemieckie korporacje zarabiają miliardy w Polsce* <<https://zyciestolicy.com.pl/solidarna-polska-unia-europejska-chce-skolonizowac-polske-a-niemieckie-korporacje-zarabiaja-miliardy-w-polsce/>> (2021, February, 21).

for strengthening security policy. The National Alliance is against federalisation¹. The other Eurosceptic parties in Latvia, the Union of Greens and the Farmers and For Latvia from the heart, did not enter the European Parliament.

We can observe a similar situation in Estonia. Two Eurosceptic parties, the Centre Party and the Conservative People's Party of Estonia, entered the European Parliament. The Centre Party is not entirely Eurosceptic, although its leaders criticise the EU policy but do not oppose any level of integration. The members of the Centre Party consider that Brexit caused a domino effect, and it would be possible that in 5 years' Estonia can consider an exit plan. The Centre Party is Eurosceptic because of its ties with Russia². However, its popularity has been declining last time. If in 2016 the party leader won the election of the Prime Minister of Estonia, in 2019, his support fell by 30 %. The Conservative Party of Estonia supports economic integration and membership in the EU, completely rejects the European migration policy³. The Eurosceptic Estonian Independence Party did not win seats in the European Parliament. The party members support economic integration and are not against membership. They warn, the EU economy can negatively affect the development of Estonia, which will lead to withdrawal. Estonia has a low level of party Euroscepticism compared to other EU member states.

I observe the lowest level of Euroscepticism in Lithuania. Only the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance entered the European Parliament and won one seat out of 11. The party upholds close relations with Polish Law and Justice and receives financial help from Russian politicians. The party censures the EU but does not have prevailing views on further cooperation. I define several other Eurosceptic parties, the Welfare of Lithuania Party, The Centre Union of Lithuania, and the Lithuanian Nationalist and Republican Union, but their electoral support is low. Eurosceptic parties support the single market and trade, but they discuss migration policy, the Common foreign and security policies. Eurosceptic parties from The Czech Republic, Croatia and Slovakia do not support European integration. However, the parties review their positions on policies because of the pandemic of Covid-19 and growing tensions with Russia.

Party Euroscepticism in South Europe. Economic and migration crises affected Southern Europe. It contributed to the growing dissatisfaction with the EU that Eurosceptics have successfully used. Table 2 presents the positions of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies with further detailed explanation.

Italy is one of the most Eurosceptic states in this region, while its Eurosceptic parties won the most seats in European Parliament among other Eurosceptic parties. The League or North League is a typical nationalist and Eurosceptic party. The party upholds protectionism in trade policy, deportation of migrants and calls for a referendum to membership in the Eurozone. The League supports a Common foreign policy and EU membership⁴. The Five Star Movement, which Journalists and Europeans immediately named the party Eurosceptic, supports the single market, Monetary Union, Common foreign policy and EU membership but calls for reform of the Schengen Area and the system of migrants quotas. And the last Eurosceptic party, which won seats in the Italian and the European parliaments, is the newly formed Brothers of Italy. The party supports nationalist ideas that often contradict European values. Thus members of the party want to weaken economic cooperation to withdraw from the Eurozone while maintaining membership in the EU⁵. The Eurosceptic parties are the New Force, the National Front, the National Movement for Sovereignty, and the Communist Party of Italy. But their influence on European and Italian politics is low, as they did not win seats in any parliament. The parties criticise the EU ineffective policy on resolving the migration and debt crisis and call for reforms. It is also worth noting that the parties in their rhetoric and programs do not focus on Common foreign policy and security but do not deny this format of cooperation. By the way, none

¹ Vikmanis, G. (2016). Euroscepticisms – no ideoloģijas par politisku līdzekli. *Latvijas Mediji* <<https://www.la.lv/eiroscepticisms-no-ideologijas-par-politisku-lidzekli>> (2021, February, 21).

² Veebel, V. (2017). Opposing the European Union or looking for more reforms: Different facets of Euroscepticism in Estonia. *Baltic Defence College*, 89-90. <<https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=hTfpDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA89&lpg=PA89&dq=Estonian+Centre+Party+Euroscepticism&source=bl&ots=HQaLt1KeSn>> (2021, March, 01).

³ Hloušek, V., Kaniok, P. (2019). *The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe: Second-Order Euroscepticism*, 66. <https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007%2F978-3-030-40858-9_4> (2021, March, 01).

⁴ Vdovychenko, V. (2019). Through the Lenses of Italy's Euroscepticism or a Tale for the Future of the European integration project. *Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowskalublin – Polonia* <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333067546_Through_the_Lenses_of_Italy's_Euroscepticism_or_a_Tale_for_the_Future_of_the_European_integration_project> (2021, March, 10).

⁵ MacKenzie, A. (2018). Which side is the Five Star Movement on? *Deutsche Welle* <<https://www.dw.com/en/which-side-is-the-five-star-movement-on/a-45664189>> (2021, March, 10).

of the parties supports the idea of leaving the EU. The consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic negatively affect relations between Italy and the EU, but the scenario of withdrawal from the EU remains unlikely.

There is also a high level of Euroscepticism in Greece. The increasing Euroscepticism in Greece began because of the financial crisis, especially after the debt crisis. The popularity of Euroscepticism grows, and even pro-European leaders condemn the EU. Greece's largest Eurosceptic party is Syriza, which has a nationalist vision of Greek policy and criticises the EU for ineffectively resolving the debt and migration crises. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, Syriza lost first place to the more pro-European party, the New Democracy. It shows a decline in the popularity of its policy. Considering the consequences of the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis, Syriza supports Common foreign policy and membership in the EU. The Greek Solution, the Golden Dawn and the Independent Greeks are also Eurosceptic parties. The Greek Solution wants to leave the Eurozone and the Schengen Area and has an idea to launch a free trade zone with China, Russia and India. The Greek Solution wants Greece to leave the EU. The Golden Dawn Party and Independent Greeks entered neither parliament. The Golden Dawn Party is a representative of hard Euroscepticism and supports leaving the EU. The Independent Greek party agrees with the integration process with multilateral cooperation¹. There are many Eurosceptic parties in Greece but with different views on key policies. Therefore it is impossible to strengthen the Eurosceptics influence on Greece policy.

There is a high level of opposition to the EU in Spain, where the largest Eurosceptic parties are the Podemos, the Vox and the United Left. The Podemos promotes the idea of repealing the Lisbon Treaty, but it supports European integration and calls for the unification of legislation in all areas. However, the party calls for reforming the single market, the Monetary Union and the Schengen Area. The Vox party has a dual-position on migration, which denies migration from the Middle East but supports migration from Latin America. The party wants Spain to remain a member of the EU, but without further integration². Other Eurosceptic parties are the Catalan party and the Popular Unity Candidacy with low support.

Eurosceptic parties from Portugal are the Left Bloc and the Communist Party in coalition with the Green Party. The Left Bloc and the Communist Party are representatives of hard Euroscepticism and oppose EU membership. The parties also criticize the single market and trade, want Portugal to leave the Eurozone, and are against the Common foreign and defence policies. Although, parties have a desire to cooperate with pro-European forces. In particular, the Left Bloc party joined the pro-European Social Democratic Party³. The other two Eurosceptic parties, the National Renewal Party and the Green Party, did not enter the European Parliament.

In the Mediterranean region, I also observe a certain level of Euroscepticism in the Republic of Cyprus. No Eurosceptic party from Cyprus entered the European Parliament. The Eurosceptic parties are the Solidarity Movement and the National Popular Front. The parties are soft Eurosceptic and support leaving the Eurozone, but not the EU.

Malta is one of those Member States, which has a low level of Euroscepticism. None of the opposition parties to the EU entered the European Parliament or the national parliament and has low electoral support. In the past, before EU membership, the Liberal Party did not support membership. Currently, all parties fully support membership and all EU initiatives. The Communist Party of Malta, the State Actions, Liberal Malta and the Alliance for Change are Eurosceptic parties, but they are not active⁴.

Eurosceptic parties from South Europe support the single market and trade, but they criticise the Eurozone and the Schengen Area. The Podemos and the Vox have weak positions on these policies. The most radical positions have the Left Bloc and the Communist Party from Portugal. They do not support cooperation at all and call for withdrawal from the EU. Most Eurosceptic parties support a Common foreign policy and defence, as well as EU membership.

¹ Ekathimerini (2019). *Small Eurosceptic, far-right Greek Solution party may squeeze into Euro Parliament* <<https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/240887/small-eurosceptic-far-right-greek-solution-party-may-squeeze-into-euro-parliament/>> (2021, March, 10).

² Arribas, J. (2020). Spexit or Spanish nationalists finally coming out of the Eurosceptic Closet. *The European Student Think Tank* <<http://www.esthinktank.com/spexit-or-spanish-nationalists-finally-coming-out-of-the-Eurosceptic-closest/>> (2021, March, 10).

³ Dennison, S. (2019). The instinctive multilateralist: Portugal and the politics of cooperation. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. <https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/instinctive_multilateralist_portugal_politics_cooperation> (2021, March, 10).

⁴ Attard, J. (2019). From mainstream to margins: the evolution or decline of Euroscepticism in Malta's party system. *The University of Malta* <<https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/46387>> (2021, March, 10).

Party Euroscepticism in the Nordic and Central Europe. The states from North and Central Europe are donors for weaker member states. It provokes increasing Eurosceptic movement in this region. The consequences of the economic crisis and the migration crisis only exacerbated this feeling. I show the Eurosceptic attitudes towards the European integration in Table 3 with the analysis of party Euroscepticism in the region.

In Sweden, the Left Party, the Swedish Democrats and the Greens entered the European Parliament. Swedish parties are soft Eurosceptic as they oppose the functioning of the Eurozone and call for reform of EU migration policy. The Left Party, the Swedish Democrats and Greens, partially support the Common security policy and EU membership, but without further political integration¹. The level of opposition to the EU declines in Sweden. The Left Party has changed its position since 2019 and supports membership in the EU.

Several Eurosceptic parties entered the European Parliament from Finland: the Finns Party and the Left Union. Eurosceptic parties criticise the migration policy and the Eurozone. However, parties support membership in the EU, albeit under certain conditions². The members of the Left Union have more anti-European views and do not support further economic integration. Mainly, the Eurosceptic parties from Finland are representatives of soft Euroscepticism.

Denmark Eurosceptic parties are the People's Movement Against the EU, the New Law, the Red-Green Alliance and the Danish People's Party. The only Red-Green Alliance and the Danish People's Party won seats in the European Parliament. The Danish People's Party supports only the single market and noting that it is only a matter of time before Denmark leaves the EU. The Red-Green Alliance has a similar position but still supports Danish membership³. Denmark has much in common with the United Kingdom, and they have long been the most Eurosceptic states in the EU.

I noticed an ambiguous situation with manifestations of Euroscepticism in Ireland. After Brexit, Eurosceptic parties weakened their opposition to the EU. In particular, the Sinn Féin supports cooperation with the EU and refuses to leave the EU. However, several new Eurosceptic parties, which have low electoral support, call for leaving the EU. The party Solidarity-People more important to profit is against implementing the Lisbon Treaty and the EU militarisation. Other parties, such as the Socialist Party, the Irish Freedom Party, and the Right to Change, tried to form a coalition among other parties to leave the EU. But their support among citizens is not significant⁴.

The Euroscepticism in Belgium bases on the national-ethnic factor. The country has Eurosceptic parties from the Flanders and the Wallonia. Flemish Eurosceptic parties are the Flemish Interest and the New Flemish Alliance. The New Flemish Alliance is a long-standing pro-European trend, but in 2011 they switched to soft Euroscepticism. The Walloon Eurosceptic parties are the Nation, the National Front, the People's Party, the Libertarian Party. There is also the Workers' Party of Belgium, which is communist and not a member of the European Parliament. In the European Parliament entered only the New Flemish Alliance. The party supports all policies of European integration with partial reforms. The Belgian parties are soft Euroscepticism.

In the last few years, party Euroscepticism has grown in the Netherlands. The most eurosceptic parties in the EU are the Forum for Democracy and the Party for the Animals. The first one, the Forum for Democracy, proposes deeper cooperation in the single market and holds a referendum on leaving the EU. The Party for the Animals only supports membership in the EU without further integration. The Eurosceptic parties oppose strengthening cooperation in Common foreign and defence policies.

The level of opposition to the EU in Luxembourg is the lowest among all member states. It registered only two parties of soft Euroscepticism, such as the Alternative Democratic Reform Party and the Left, which

¹ Winnerstig, M. (2019). Sweden's New Government and Its Possible Consequences for Swedish Defence and Security Policy. *The Swedish Defence Research Agency* <<https://icds.ee/swedens-new-government-and-its-possible-consequences-for-swedish-defence-and-security-policy/>> (2021, March, 10).

² The Economist (2019). *The right-wing Finns Party does well in Finland's election* <<https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/04/17/the-right-wing-finns-party-does-well-in-finlands-election>> (2021, March, 10).

³ Christiansen, P., Elklit, E. (2020). *The Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics. p.336-337* <[https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=XyvsDwAAQBAJ&lpq=PA336&ots=nSI66FqfDI&dq=Red%E2%80%93Green%20Alliance%20\(Denmark%20Euroscepticism&hl=uk&pg=PA336#v=onepage&q=Red%E2%80%93Green%20Alliance%20\(Denmark%20Euroscepticism&f=false](https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=XyvsDwAAQBAJ&lpq=PA336&ots=nSI66FqfDI&dq=Red%E2%80%93Green%20Alliance%20(Denmark%20Euroscepticism&hl=uk&pg=PA336#v=onepage&q=Red%E2%80%93Green%20Alliance%20(Denmark%20Euroscepticism&f=false)> (2021, March, 10).

⁴ Khan, S. (2020). What Sinn Féin's election success means for Irish relations with the EU – and Brexit. *The Conversation Trust* <<https://theconversation.com/what-sinn-feins-election-success-means-for-irish-relations-with-the-eu-and-brex-131507>> (2021, March, 10).

did not enter the European Parliament. Members of the Alternative Democratic Reform Party support EU membership and cooperation in the single market, but the EU must consider the interests of Luxembourg, especially in financial issues. The Left Party also supports membership in the EU but notes the ineffectiveness of social policy, including migration policy. The parties are in opposition and with a low level of support among citizens.

The National Front, the Left, the Movement for France, the Popular Republican Union, the French Communist Party, the New Anticapitalist Party, The Citizen, and the Republican Movement are Eurosceptic parties from France. The National Front and the Left have sufficient influence on state policy and won seats in the national parliament and the European Parliament. In 2019, the leader of the National Front, M. Le Pen, rejected the idea of leaving the European Union. However, the National Front remains one of the most Eurosceptic parties, and its leaders call for reform of the Monetary Union. Party opposes the EU migration policy and the Schengen Area but supports EU membership¹.

In Germany, the situation is similar to the one in France. The two anti-European parties, the Alternative for Germany and the Left, entered the European Parliament. None of the parties supports leaving the EU. The Left does not have clear Eurosceptic views, but there are some disintegration ideas. The members of the Alternative for Germany represent soft Euroscepticism. They oppose the Common defence policy, do not have a distinct position on economic and trade, but support EU membership².

Party Euroscepticism in Northern and Western Europe is not high. Almost all parties are ready to continue cooperation in the single market. Eurosceptic parties from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark oppose the Eurozone and the Common foreign and security policy. The Common foreign policy and defence are still debatable policies of European integration, where the positions of Eurosceptic parties differ radically. Almost all parties, except the Dutch Forum for Democracy and the Danish People's Party, support EU membership. The most Eurosceptic countries in the region are the Netherlands and Denmark.

The Eurosceptic parties positions on policies of European integration. I identified five formats of cooperation and described how Eurosceptic parties support or do not support these policies.

Over forty Eurosceptic parties won seats in the European Parliament. And twenty-two parties of them support the single market and trade. Despite the harsh rhetoric, the parties from Greece and Hungary are also ready to continue cooperation in the single market. The Alternative for Germany cannot form its position on this issue because of differences among party members. Opponents of the single market are the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Freedom and Solidarity from the Czech Republic, the Kotleba from Slovakia, the Bulgarian National Movement, the Human Shield from Croatia, the Greens and the Left Party from Sweden, the Left Alliance from Finland, the Party for the Animals from The Netherlands and the French National Front. The most Eurosceptics position to single market and trade have the parties from Eastern and Northern Europe.

The Eurosceptic parties focus mainly on the negative consequences of the Eurozone. Almost half of the parties do not support the Eurozone and call for the exit. The Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Swedish Democrats and the Greens, the Animal Party and the Forum for Democracy, the Finnis Party and the Left Alliance, the Red-Green Union and the Danish People's Party are against any cooperation in economic and monetary unions.

Most Eurosceptic parties support the reform of the Schengen Area and the migration policy of the EU and call for the fight against illegal migration. The hard Eurosceptic parties support the withdrawal from the Schengen Area and the reforming EU migration policy. There are the Bulgarian National Movement, the Human Shield from Croatia, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Freedom and Solidarity from the Czech Republic, the Kotleba from Slovakia, the Greens and the Left Party from Sweden, the Left Alliance from Finland, Party for the Animals from the Netherlands and the French National Front. The states from Northern and Eastern Europe have a much more radical position on this stage of cooperation.

The parties from Portugal, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and France oppose the Common foreign policy. Parties from North and Eastern Europe, namely, Poland, Latvia, Sweden and the Netherlands, support the Common defence and security policy, but Eurosceptics from Germany and Finland oppose it. The debatable issue is the sanctions against Russia, which the Bulgarian

¹ Sapin, C. (2019). Le Rassemblement national abandonne définitivement la sortie de l'euro. *Le figaro* <<https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2019/01/16/01002-20190116ARTFIG00326-le-rn-abandonne-la-sortie-de-l-euro.php>> (2021, March, 10).

² Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2018). *Die Programmatik der AfD*. <<https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273132/programmatik>> (2021, March, 10).

Socialist Party and the Hungarian Fidesz want to lift. Northern states are against the accession of Turkey. By the way, Eurosceptic parties offer to choose multispeed Europe.

Nearly all parties exclude the possibility of withdrawal from the EU. Seventeenth parties are ready to strengthen integration, but eleventh parties want to keep current cooperation. Over twelfth parties from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, Portugal, Croatia, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands oppose membership. The more Eurosceptic position party has, the fewer seats it won in national and European parliaments. It shows that the citizens do not support the disintegration views of its party leaders.

After Brexit, Eurosceptic parties lost the support among the citizens and the influence on the national and European parliaments. Therefore, the exit from the EU remains unlikely. Last year the parties weakened their strong criticism of the EU. Thus, the French National Front and Hungary Fidesz begin to support the EU membership. Eurosceptics do not unite and can not promote anti-European ideas. A much bigger problem may be that Eurosceptic parties can not agree on future cooperation. We can find Eurosceptic parties with similar ideologies and goals like the communist parties from Central and Eastern Europe, but it is not enough to act as a single force against the EU. The manifestation of Euroscepticism has decreased in the European Parliament and the EU, compared to previous years.

Conclusions. In this article, I identified and analysed the positions of Eurosceptic parties towards the policies of European integration. Eurosceptic parties criticise the EU for the lack of response to crises and propose reforming those policies. The Eurozone and migration policy denounce the most. Eurosceptic parties positions diverge on the Common foreign and security policy. Members of hard Eurosceptic parties call for withdrawal from the EU. However, they do not have enough support among the citizens in the national and European parliaments to launch that process. Eurosceptic parties do not have a single vision of the future European Union. The leaders of Eurosceptic parties have not taken leadership roles in governing the countries. It shows a lack of a single tool for implementing their Eurosceptic policies. Consequently, there is a declining level of party Euroscepticism in the EU.

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