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## **ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PROVIDING NATIONAL SECURITY TO INDIVIDUAL STATES: UKRAINE'S PERSPECTIVE**

The article considers the possibilities and available tools of international organizations to promote national security of individual states on the example of recent developments around Ukraine. The article considers transformation of the international system of international relations, caused by the revision of fundamental norms of international law by individual states as the reason and background for shifts in the role of international organizations in terms of national security.

In order to overcome these problematic aspects of imposing part of the obligations on international organizations aimed at ensuring national security goals, key areas of cooperation between state authorities of Ukraine and certain international structures were identified. It is considered that some international organizations still have capabilities to promote Ukraine's national security with the use of non-military means.

Given the projected preservation of the essential role of international organizations in crisis management and peacekeeping, it is considered appropriate to develop a consistent algorithm for cooperation of Ukrainian authorities with international organizations in areas that will contribute to national security of Ukraine.

**Keywords:** international organizations, national security of Ukraine, Ukrainian legislation, normative-legal base, non-military means of ensuring security, crisis settlement.

**Introduction.** The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and in particular the demonstration, on the example of the events in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait in November 2018, of the aggressor's readiness to switch from "hybrid" nature of actions against Ukraine to open use of military means to violate Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as significant difference in military capabilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, require all public authorities authorized to ensure national security to find ways to repel aggression, including the use of non-military measures.

At the same time, the importance of Ukraine's interaction with international organizations and structures to ensure national security is envisaged by Ukraine's guiding documents, which stipulate that "external security guarantees will be provided by forming a network of alliances with individual states and regional organizations and initiatives (by signing agreements on common defense or military assistance) and with international security organizations (through participation in collective security mechanisms)"<sup>1</sup>.

Despite the fact that Ukraine currently actively participates in the work of more than 70 international organizations<sup>2</sup>, some of which directly or indirectly are involved in matters of peace and security, developments around Ukraine since 2014, have shown very limited effectiveness of existing mechanisms for ensuring the national security of Ukraine through participation in the work of international organizations. This is due to a number of objective and subjective factors.

<sup>1</sup> Указ Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України "Про Стратегію національної безпеки України" 2015 (Президент України). Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>>. (2020, June, 08).

<sup>2</sup> Єдиний державний реєстр міжнародних організацій, членом яких є Україна.

<<https://data.gov.ua/dataset/89ea21a9-e0bf-4cac-a05e-c3da6e63d360/resource/eccd8762-2184-4fb3-8e73-6a491528d03d>>. (2020, June, 08).

Objective factors include organizational and political aspects that limit the ability of international organizations to protect world peace and security. In particular, the existing format of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) does not allow any decision to be taken against the interests of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, including Russian Federation. On the other hand, the curtailment of cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during 2010-2013, deprived our country of the opportunity to use existing NATO assistance programs to Partner countries, while existing international agreements, including the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the “Budapest Memorandum” did not envisage use of effective levers to influence the violator of these agreements.

The subjective factors include weak involvement of mechanisms of international organizations in addressing problematic issues of national security of the state by the relevant state authorities of Ukraine.

On the other hand, experience of international security structures has shown their ability to collectively prevent armed aggression against member countries, as well as to resolve conflicts at various stages of their development. This is evidenced by NATO’s ability to collectively ensure the security of even the smallest member states, in terms of their military potential, and the UN’s ability to resolve protracted armed conflicts.

Given the important role of international organizations in national security matters, as depicted in the legal framework of Ukraine, and stipulated by world leading analytical institutions, it is appropriate to identify possible areas of cooperation between Ukraine and international organizations in national security sphere.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** Some aspects of ensuring national security by non-military means have been studied by such domestic and foreign scientists as I. Ablazov<sup>1</sup>, E. Kondakov<sup>2</sup>, J. Nye<sup>3</sup>, D. Nanto<sup>4</sup>, M. Gonchar<sup>5</sup>, and on the issues of the international organizations possibilities in crisis settlement – G. Khomenko<sup>6</sup>, N. Sirota<sup>7</sup>.

At the same time, scientific literature leaves unresolved the issue of areas the state authorities of Ukraine have the opportunity to promote national security in the context of Ukraine’s participation in the activities of international organizations.

**The purpose of the article** is to identify areas of cooperation between authorities of an individual state and international organizations that can help solve national security problems on the example of Ukraine’s participation in international organizations, and based on the analysis of the legal framework of Ukraine and international organizations, as well as factual material.

**Discussion.** The architecture of the system of international relations, built in the middle of the twentieth century, provided that the leading role in ensuring peace, preventing conflicts and resolving them would be played by supranational entities and international organizations with appropriate powers.

In the period between 1991 and 2014, Ukraine also had high hopes for intergovernmental organizations and international agreements with regards to issues of guaranteeing peace and stability on its territory. These provisions were laid down in the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Security” and in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine<sup>8</sup>. In particular, in the wording of the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, which was in force in the period from 2003 to 2018, one of the principles of national security of Ukraine was defined as “use of interstate systems and mechanisms of international collective security”<sup>9</sup>. In addition, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, which remained active in the period from 2004

<sup>1</sup> Аблазов, И.В. (2007). Военно-политичні цілі держави та невоєнні засоби їх досягнення. *Трибуна*, 9-10, 16-17.

<sup>2</sup> Кондаков, Е.Е. *Невоенные меры обеспечения военной безопасности Российской Федерации и основные проблемы их реализации*. <<https://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/safety/11.htm>>. (2020, June, 08).

<sup>3</sup> Nye, J. The Benefits of Soft Power. *Harvard Business School Web Site*. <<http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>>. (2020, June, 08).

<sup>4</sup> Nanto, Dick K. (2011). *Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy*. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

<sup>5</sup> Гончар, М.М. (2016). Гибрессия Путина. Невоенные аспекты воен нового поколения. *Фрагмент дослідження в рамках проекту «Антарес»*. Київ: Центр глобалістики «Стратегія ХХІ».

<sup>6</sup> Хоменко, Г.Д. (2008). *Основи миротворчості: навчальний посібник*. Київ: Видавничий дім «DEMID».

<sup>7</sup> Сирота, Н.М. (2015). *Политическая конфликтология: учебное пособие*. Москва.

<sup>8</sup> Закон Про основи національної безпеки України 2003 (втратив чинність) (Верховна Рада України). *Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України*. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15>> (2020, June, 10); Указ Про Военну доктрину України (втратив чинність) (Указ Президента України). *Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України*. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004>>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>9</sup> Закон Про основи національної безпеки України 2003 (втратив чинність) (Верховна Рада України). *Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України*. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15>> (2020, June, 10).

to 2015, as one of the main ways to prevent military conflicts identified “participation in international political, security, economic, cultural and other organizations whose activities do not contradict international law and legislation of Ukraine”<sup>1</sup>, and to deter a potential aggressor Ukraine’s Law stated that Ukraine “may apply to the UN Security Council, other international and regional organizations, security guaranteeing states of Ukraine in accordance with the Memorandum on Security Guarantees... (hereinafter – the Budapest Memorandum) to conduct measures to prevent the use of military force against Ukraine”<sup>2</sup>.

At the same time, the violation of norms and provisions of international law by the Russian Federation, as a result of the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine, has led to a sharp increase in tensions in international relations, revision of national and collective security concepts by some countries and unions and to a large extent compromises existing mechanisms of international organizations and agreements to promote peace.

Despite the decline in the authority of international organizations as guarantors of peace and security caused by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine, the world’s leading analytical and research institutions<sup>3</sup> agree that supranational entities will continue to play a role in international relations: “International institutions will struggle to adapt to a more complex environment but will still have a role to play. They will be most effective when the interests of the major powers align on issues like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance”<sup>4</sup>. Based on this, international organizations can be used to ensure the national security of individual states in the areas defined by the national legislation.

In determining the areas of concentration of state efforts to protect national interests within international organizations, it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of the functioning and decision-making of such structures.

The only universal intergovernmental body with security powers, despite demands for its reorganization, including those of Russia, remains the United Nations.

The unconditional legitimacy of the UN, associated with the comprehensive nature of its membership, as well as the fact that it is an organization with universal competence, as states have the opportunity to include in its agenda virtually any issue related to military-political, social-economic, humanitarian and other areas<sup>5</sup>.

One of the most significant shortcomings of the UN decision-making process on key issues of peace and security is the mandatory lack of disagreement of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council (UNSC), which is decentralized, therefore, decisions on such issues are often delayed and sometimes are impossible. An example of such a situation is the inability of the UN Security Council to authorize actions to resolve or facilitate the settlement of the civil war in Syria due to opposition from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, as well as the inability to adopt a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Due to the existing contradictions within the UN Security Council, we can say that this international organization is experiencing a deep crisis. In addition, in the face of aggression by the Russian Federation, Ukraine was faced with the urgent need to resist not only military but also information and diplomatic pressure from the Russian Federation. The United Nations has become the scene of such a diplomatic struggle. At the same time, the anti-Ukrainian activity of the Russian Federation in the UN Security Council focuses on the following main areas:

- blocking the adoption of resolutions aimed at condemning Russia’s aggression and prosecuting violators of the ceasefire;
- disruption of peacekeeping initiatives of other member states of the UN Security Council, including through the accelerated submission to the UN Security Council of its own draft resolutions, which are already being prepared by other delegations;

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<sup>1</sup> Указ Про Воєнну доктрину України (втратив чинність) (Президент України). Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004>>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>2</sup> Указ Про Воєнну доктрину України (втратив чинність) (Президент України). Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. <<http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004>>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>3</sup> Global Trends 2035: Paradox of Progress (2017). Washington D.C. <<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>4</sup> Global Trends 2035: Paradox of Progress (2017). Washington D.C. <<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf>>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>5</sup> Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. <<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>>. (2020, June, 10).

- use of the UN Security Council as a platform for disseminating knowingly false information about the situation in eastern Ukraine and about the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- creation within the UN of “a loyal group of member countries”, who periodically give program speeches aimed at spreading Russian propaganda, and to change the emphasis in the discussion of a particular topic.

Despite the existence of a systemic crisis within the UN and its deepening, caused by the Russian Federation’s violation of international law and systemic opposition to restoring the UN Security Council’s status as the main body for international conflict resolution, the UN retains significant potential to promote national security to certain states.

In particular, the possibility of influencing the aggressor through the mechanisms of the UN General Assembly is preserved by adopting relevant resolutions, which, despite their non-binding nature, are transformed into practical restrictive sanctions against the aggressor within international organizations (including UNESCO and the International Civil Aviation Organization /ICAO/). In addition, the UN, as an international platform for disseminating information, should be actively used to refute the disinformation of the aggressor country and to bring to the attention of the world community the position of the Ukrainian state on the events in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict zone.

Against the background of the actual blocking of UN activities to resolve certain conflicts involving permanent members of the UN Security Council, the importance of regional organizations in matters of peace and security is growing. NATO, the OSCE and the EU are the leading regional organizations whose opportunities can be used in the interests of Ukraine’s national security.

Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formally established as a collective defense organization aimed at protecting member states from external aggression and assisting them in the event of natural disasters and catastrophes, NATO’s role has been somewhat different since the early 1990s: it has transformed and began to include a wider range of tasks. In particular, NATO began operations in the 1990s that did not fall under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty<sup>1</sup>, in order to prevent the spread of conflict and prevent destabilization of Member States or partner countries.

As a result of transformation processes in the world and within the organization, at the level of NATO documents, the possibility of a more active mandate of NATO to ensure peace and security outside the territory of member countries has been approved. Thus, the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 broadens NATO’s understanding of crisis management and provides for NATO’s involvement in all stages of the crisis: “Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts”<sup>2</sup>. It also encourages more structures and organizations to participate and coordinate, and provides for a wider range of tools. In a more general sense, the concept takes a complex, comprehensive approach to crisis management, with a greater emphasis on training, building local forces, and strengthening civilian-civilian planning and engagement.

Since 2014, in view of the growing level of threat from the Russian Federation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has intensified its activities aimed at preventing the involvement of member states in conflicts and crises. Thus, Estonia, fearing the destructive influence of the Russian Federation, has significantly increased its activity within NATO. For instance “Tallinn has worked hard to secure as great a NATO (or bilateral allied) troop presence in Estonia as possible; clarify as much as possible NATO’s obligations towards members who consider themselves to be at risk from Russia”<sup>3</sup>.

At the same time, promoting more active involvement of NATO in the settlement of the conflict on the territory of Ukraine will require long-term work to convince the leadership and the population of each individual NATO member country of the expediency of such participation.

Thus, at this stage, Ukraine’s capabilities within NATO can focus on informational and educational activities aimed at shaping the need to deepen the organization’s involvement in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict using a wide range of non-military and civil-military NATO instruments.

<sup>1</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty. <[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?)>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>2</sup> The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. <[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68580.htm?](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm?)>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>3</sup> Ahto, L. (2015). Estonia: Fearing “Decoding” by Russia. *The different faces of “soft power”*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 205.

Given that the main responsibility for international monitoring of the implementation of the Minsk Agreements is vested in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), its role in Ukraine's national security system is expected to grow.

At the same time, due to the limited possibilities of this organization to objectively and impartially cover the development of events in eastern Ukraine under current conditions, which is associated with the obstruction of OSCE observers by militants of self-proclaimed republics<sup>1</sup> and some aspects of staffing of the Special Monitoring Mission at the initial stage of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict<sup>2</sup>, there is an urgent need to intensify Ukraine's activities within the OSCE in the following areas: creating preconditions for increasing the number of non-biased OSCE observers from neutral countries; expansion of the information and explanatory campaign to bring the actual state of affairs in the zone of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to the participants of the organization; use of the OSCE's crisis management mechanisms to facilitate effective ceasefires.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union (EU) has been playing an increasingly important role in ensuring national security. The establishment of the EU as a global center of economic influence led to the strengthening of its political role on the world stage, including in the field of security and stability in Europe and neighboring regions. Currently, among the most popular mechanisms for resolving EU crises and conflicts are flexible political, economic, military and civilian instruments, as well as a set of preventive actions, including diplomatic efforts and development assistance, a combination of civilian and military instruments. The development of European security and defense policy is aimed at creating such comprehensive and flexible tools<sup>3</sup>. In the field of crisis management, the EU specializes in acting at the intersection of military and civilian aspects of crisis management, which is currently most in demand (civil administration, civilian police and other administrative experts needed in a situation of stabilizing society in post-conflict recovery).

Given the significant experience of the EU in promoting national security and crisis management using economic levers and instruments of civil-military cooperation, it is considered appropriate to take a set of measures aimed at involving economic and military-civil mechanisms of the EU to ensure national security of Ukraine which is a part of the vital interests of the EU and may affect the security situation of EU member states. Regarding the need for more active commissioning of the EU's economic levers to create a security environment in the regions close to the EU, the researchers note: "the EU and its Member States have failed on a number of occasions to offer superior economic incentives to its neighbours, remaining a beacon but not a direct provider of prosperity, while Russia despite its economic inferiority has been able to offer more substantial economic carrots although these have already come with political costs in the short-term, and economic ones in mid-term"<sup>4</sup>.

**Conclusion.** Despite the internal systemic crisis in the UN Security Council, as well as the destructive actions of the Russian Federation, which significantly reduce the credibility of existing international systems and institutions involved in preserving peace and providing national security to individual states, international organizations with security powers are expected to play a significant role in international relations. In view of the above, it is considered that there are prerequisites for the inclusion of mechanisms of international organizations in the system of national security of Ukraine in the following areas: information, military-civil and economic.

**Prospects for further research.** Based on the analysis of the legal framework of international organizations and factual material, it is envisaged that further development of an algorithm for measures of state authorities of individual states to ensure national security in the framework of participation in international organizations could be developed.

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<sup>1</sup> 75 percent of cases of interference in OSCE SMM work took place in Donbas: Interview with OSCE SMM head Ertugrul Apakan on September 7, 2017. <<https://112.international/conflict-in-eastern-ukraine/75-percent-of-cases-of-interference-in-osce-smm-work-took-place-in-donbas-20532.html>>. (2020, June, 10); Sagramoso, D. (2020). *Russian Imperialism Revisited: From Disengagement to Hegemony*. Abington, Oxon: Routledge.

<sup>2</sup> 80% of OSCE observers in Mariupol are Russians. Interview with Vasyl Budyk (advisor to Minister of Defense of Ukraine) on November 11, 2014. *Zik.ua*.

<[https://zik.ua/en/news/2014/11/11/80\\_of\\_osce\\_observers\\_in\\_mariupol\\_are\\_russians\\_539601](https://zik.ua/en/news/2014/11/11/80_of_osce_observers_in_mariupol_are_russians_539601)>. (2020, June, 10).

<sup>3</sup> Новикова, Д.О. (2009). *Новые инструменты международного кризисного урегулирования: опыт Европейского Союза*. Москва: МГИМО, 48.

<sup>4</sup> Rostoks T., Potjomkina, D. (2015). Soft power of the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe. *The different faces of "soft power"*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 247.

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