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THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN DOCUMENTS: FROM EISENHOWER TO OBAMA

The article examines the attitude of the United States governments towards the European integration through the prism of the official documents, speeches and agreements analysis. The study found that the Eisenhower, Johnson, Carter, Reagan and Clinton Administrations considered united Europe primarily as a reliable partner for a joint opposition to the communist threat and global challenges to international security, trade, etc. Instead, Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. conducted the transatlantic dialogue superficially without a personal interest in European integration and cooperation. Under the presidency of Obama, the European vector was updated during his second cadence. Thus, the United States continued to monitor and participate in European affairs despite the periodic weakening of transatlantic exchanges.

Keywords: United States, European integration, transatlantic, American administration, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Obama.

Introduction

Since the 1940s, the U.S. has been remaining an active participant in events taking place in Europe and is directly or indirectly involved in the most of integration processes, being interested in a united Europe as a strong ally. Starting with the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO as the key lever of American influence on the European space, the United States continues cooperation with the EU countries. From the middle of the XX century, transatlantic relations have undergone a long evolutionary path that is highly determined by the American attitude towards the concept of a united Europe. Examining the U.S. governmental and other official documents and statements allows explaining this evolution and forecasting the further situation regarding transatlantic cooperation.

The Analysis of Recent Studies. Analysing official document and considering such factors as the change of presidential administrations in Washington, the communist threat, the gradual post-war reconstruction of Europe and the beginning of European integration processes, the evolution of transatlantic relations was described in the monographs and studies of the following American scientists: Ambrose, Gaddis, Greene, Delahunty, Giaouque, Larivé, Larsen, Madison, Martin, Mirzadegan, Moravcsik, Nelson, Paterson, Pauly, Tilford, and others. The period of Obama's presidency was examined by Friedman, who noted that the European integration project was primarily designed by the United States¹. The other Americans, Cowles and Egan, were engaged in researching transatlantic cooperation and analysis of the foreign policy activities under the Obama Administration. They noted that Obama as well as Nixon, Clinton and Bush Jr. departed from cooperation with Europe because of intentions to raise the level of security in other regions². However, Europe has been remaining the partner of the American first hope.

European school is represented by De Wijk, Dobson, Larres, Reichard, Levy and Roseman, Ludlow, Lundestad, Oxenford, Prist, Rachman, Ginsberg and Schneider, etc., who studied the evolution of transatlantic interactions considering the post-war reconstructing, the gradual enlargement of NATO, and the restructuring of political space in the 1990's – 2000's. The U.S. domestic and external policy vectors (in particular, under the Obama administration) are discussed by such Ukrainian scholars as Dudko, Kaminskyi, Kantseliaruk, Lakishyk, Marynina, Mernikov, Pavliuk, Pogorska, Fesenko, Shevchuk, and others.

¹ Friedman, G. (2016). Obama and the European Union. *GPF: Geopolitical Futures*.

<<https://geopoliticalfutures.com/obama-and-the-european-union/>> (2018, November, 25).

² Cowles, M.G., Egan, M. (2012). The Transatlantic Relationship and the Future Global Governance. *Transworld*, September, 18.

The Purpose. The current study focuses on governmental documents, speeches by the U.S. presidents and other high-level officials in order to complement the scientific developments on the evolution of transatlantic relations. Additionally, the purpose of research is a comparative analysis of the approaches of various American administrations (from the Eisenhower period to President Obama) to the interpretation of integration processes in Europe and the determination of the U.S. participation in the Western European states' consolidation.

The Core of Research. The United States has expressed an interest in uniting Europe since the very end of the Second World War, intending to monitor and influence the situation in Europe and to dictate the rules of transatlantic relations, particularly, within NATO. Official speeches by the following U.S. presidents: Eisenhower¹, Johnson², Carter³, Reagan⁴, Clinton⁵, and the U.S. diplomat and Secretary of State Kissinger⁶ have become a confirmation of the American resolve to support European integration processes, confronting the communist threat.

Monitoring and attempts to control interstate relations and processes of regionalization in Europe caused the U.S. foreign policy initiatives of Eisenhower, whose official position was to take care of Europe's issues and protect it from the communist threat⁷. President Eisenhower was convinced that the success of the further transatlantic cooperation could depend on maintaining the U.S. positions in Europe through NATO instruments and the willingness of Western European countries to create a single supranational power – the United States of Europe. In fact, it was set up an informal *Transatlantic Agreement*, which was purposed at granting the United States the right to participate in European affairs in exchange for military cooperation and security guarantees. The American President was assured that a united Europe would meet the national interests of the United States, and therefore supported the establishment of a tighter political and economic integrated system. However, the initial passivity of Europeans forced Eisenhower to reexamine foreign policy priorities and, at the same time, to make a step towards improving relations with the USSR. Washington urged European leaders to coordinate forces and measures for their further coherence with the interests of NATO and the actual subordination to the U.S. leadership⁸. Therefore, President Eisenhower contributed to the accession of Germany to NATO and led a policy of balancing, trying to control European affairs and not to oppose the West European leaders. His external steps proved that, despite the circumstances and working misunderstandings, Europe traditionally occupied one of the key points in the U.S. foreign policy.

The further restoration of post-war Europe, General De Gaulle's opposition to the U.S. intervention and several other circumstances contributed to the changeable successes of the transatlantic dialogue. The European space remained a zone of interest for President Johnson, who expressed hope for a strong Europe as an ally, and President Carter, who focused on the trilateralism concept (the strengthening of relations along the America-Japan-Western Europe axis). Moreover, under the Reagan Administration,

¹ "The Chance for Peace" Address Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16th, 1953. *Eisenhower Presidential Library, Museum & Boyhood Home*. <https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/chance_for_peace.pdf> (2018, November, 25).

² Johnson, L.B. (1965, January, 04). Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. *The American Presidency Project*. <<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-the-union-26>> (2018, November, 25).

³ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1978, Book II – June 30 to December 31, 1978*. (1979). Washington: Government Printing Office, 2246.

⁴ Reagan, R. (1982, June 8). Address to Members of the British Parliament. *The American Presidency Project*. <<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-members-the-british-parliament>> (2018, November, 25).

⁵ Clinton, B. (1994, January, 9). Remarks to Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe. Brussels. *U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany*. <<http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-940109.htm>> (2018, November, 25).

⁶ Address given by Henry A. Kissinger (New York, 23 April 1973). *The University of Luxembourg's CVCE*. <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/9/30/dec472e3-9dff-4c06-ad8d-d3fab7e13f9f/publishable_en.pdf> (2018, November, 25).

⁷ Eisenhower, D. D. (1953, February 2). State of the Union Addresses. *Portal Domínio Público*. <<http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/download/texto/gu005040.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

⁸ Eisenhower, D.D. (1955, April, 13). Letter to the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation with NATO on Atomic Information. *The American Presidency Project*. <<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-the-chairman-the-joint-committee-atomic-energy-the-proposed-agreement-for>> (2018, November, 25).

the U.S. petrodollar monopoly became the factor of European Monetary System creation, which in turn contributed to the healing of transatlantic relations and the U.S. cooperation with the conservative Western European governments at a qualitatively new level. The tendency to support the transatlantic dialogue was supported by President Clinton in the post-bipolar period. As well as Eisenhower, he believed that a strong Europe would be more in line with American national interests than the unification of average economies and unstable military capabilities.

However, not all U.S. governments linked the well-being of the American nation with the pro-European political vector. President Kennedy, as well as President Nixon, who contributed to the reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy towards China and the USSR¹, did not consider the necessity to invest resources in support of European integration processes. Transatlantic relations transformed into good-neighborliness and lost strategic significance. After the end of the two superpowers confrontation epoch, Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. were forced to support the transatlantic dialogue without a personal interest in European integration processes and cooperation. President Bush Sr. acknowledged the inevitability of deepening integration and the subsequent coexistence of NATO and the EU as two neighboring structures. In that regard, his foreign policy priorities were purposed at strengthening the American position in Europe and determining the place of NATO in the system of transatlantic relations. The modernization of NATO's position, while preserving the key role of the Atlantic institute, was secured by the signing of the London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance on 6 July, 1990². Furthermore, the period of President Bush Jr. was characterized as the beginning of *the transatlantic split*, due to the reorientation of the U.S. external policy priorities and the adoption of *the hard power* as the primary tool of foreign policy, which meant Europe's loss of priority in the policy guidelines of the American administration. Refusal from the consolidated decision-making and the right to sole action were fixed in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2002, which declared the possibility of a preventive strike by the United States³.

The reason for the aforementioned dualistic attitude to European integration was the realization that a strong Europe was both a desirable business partner and a competitor. Thus, Kennedy gave no guarantees to Europe at his time of presidency⁴, and President Ford emphasized cooperation within NATO, but did not endorse the very eurointegration⁵. However, the United States continued to support the Europeans with varying degrees of success, and in the 1990s they were forced to admit that Europe would continue to seek independence and unity in defending its interests. Thus, despite the weakening of the transatlantic cooperation since the early 2000s, President Bush's Jr. visit to Brussels and his speech to support the European integration have confirmed generally positive intentions of the United States⁶.

Trends in strengthening the U.S. credibility among Europeans were also preserved under the Obama Administration. Despite the reorientation of the foreign policy vector towards the Asia-Pacific region (APR), in particular during the term of Obama's first cadence, the American leader sought support (including on the eve of elections) in Europe, as evidenced by his speeches in Berlin⁷ and Prague⁸, emphasizing the significance of consolidated attempts to prevent and combat the modern security

¹ Colucci, L. (2012). *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future. Volume 2*. California: ABC-CLIO, 358.

² Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration"), London, 6 July 1990. *The University of Luxembourg's CVCE*. <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_london_declaration_on_a_transformed_north_atlantic_alliance_6_july_1990-en-9c5fa86b-12a0-4f59-ad90-e69503ef6036.html> (2018, November, 25).

³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002). Washington: The White House. <<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

⁴ Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy. Washington, D.C. January 20, 1961. <<https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx>> (2018, November, 25).

⁵ Ford, G. (1975, May 23). Interview with European Journalists. *The American Presidency Project*. <<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-european-journalists-0>> (2018, November, 25).

⁶ Bush, G.W. (2005, February, 21). President Discusses American and European Alliance in Belgium. Brussels. *U.S. Department of State. Archive*. <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/42518.htm>> (2018, November, 25).

⁷ Obama's Speech in Berlin (2008, July 24). *The New York Times*. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/us/politics/24text-obama.html>> (2018, November, 25).

⁸ Obama's Speech in Prague. April 5th, 2009. <<https://pgs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/obama-prague-speech-apr-09.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

challenges. In 2009, at a summit in Strasbourg, President Obama commended the military-defense integration in Europe and argued the substantiation of the transatlantic relations improvement¹. However, in 2010, Obama recalled the priority of American interests, stressing the right of independent decision-making in crisis situations². Later, Secretary of State Clinton³ and the first President of the European Council Van Rompuy⁴ pointed out the obvious priority for the U.S. relations with Europe (regardless of the current foreign policy course).

During President Obama second term, Washington began to pay more attention to European affairs. It was due to the appointment of Republican's Kerry to the post of U.S. Secretary of State⁵ and Hagel to serve as Secretary of Defense⁶, both were interested in transatlantic cooperation, as evidenced by their hearings in the U.S. Congress. Moreover, the issues of NATO (the speech of the 13th Secretary General of NATO Stoltenberg⁷) and economic transatlantic integration (the speech of the European Commissioner for Trade, Malmström, at the hearings on the issues of transatlantic trade and investment partnership)⁸ were updated; the process of *Brexit* was launched (President Obama's appeal to Prime Minister Cameron to abandon Great Britain's withdrawal from the EU)⁹, and so on. Finally, we could highlight the significance of Barroso and Kerry meeting with the European Commission representatives, when the former President of the European Commission and the former U.S. Secretary of State have possessed an opportunity to favor the creation of a transatlantic free trade area emphasizing that the EU market is large and promising, and TTIP is a great opportunity to jointly improve the global economic situation¹⁰.

Within the framework of American-Ukrainian relations, the speeches of President Obama and American diplomat Russell were illustrative. Thus, Obama acknowledged the expediency of implementing economic reforms in Ukraine for its further integration into the European community and cooperation with the United States¹¹, and Russell highlighted the significance of a strong and independent Ukraine for the European space¹².

¹ Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall. (2009). *The White House: Office of the Press Secretary*. <<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-strasbourg-town-hall>> (2018, November, 25).

² Obama, B. H. Nobel Lecture. Oslo. 10 December 2009. *The Nobel Prize*. <<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2009/obama/26183-nobel-lecture-2009/>> (2018, November, 25).

³ Clinton, H.R. (2012, February, 4). Remarks at Euro-Atlantic Security Community Initiative and Keynote Session. Munich, *U.S. Department of State*. <<https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/183326.htm>> (2018, November, 25).

⁴ Van Rompuy, H. (2012, May 31). Europe on the World Stage. *Speech at Chatham House*. London. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/130552.pdf> (2018, November, 25).

⁵ Nomination of John. F. Kerry to be Secretary of State. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session. January 24, 2013. (2014). Washington: *U.S. Government Printing Office*. <<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86451/pdf/CHRG-113shrg86451.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

⁶ Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee, First session, 113th Congress. January 31; February 12, 14, 28; April 11; July 18, 25, 30; September 19; October 10, 2013. (2014). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. <<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg87878/pdf/CHRG-113shrg87878.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

⁷ Stoltenberg, J. (2014). NATO: a unique Alliance with a clear course. *NATO official website*. <https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_114179.htm> (2018, November, 25).

⁸ Malmström, A.C. (2015, June 3). The Geopolitical aspect of TTIP. EP Brussels – ALDE hearing on TTIP. *Directorate General for Trade*. <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/june/tradoc_153511.pdf> (2018, November, 25).

⁹ Remarks by the President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron in Joint Press Conference (2016). *The White House: Office of the Press Secretary*. <<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-joint-press>> (2018, November, 25).

¹⁰ Remarks with European Commission President Manuel Barroso at Meeting with European Commission Fellows (2013). *U.S. Department of State: Archived Content*. <<https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207849.htm>> (2018, November, 25).

¹¹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Barack Obama 2010 (In two books). Book I – January 1 to June 30, 2010* (2013). Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 482.

¹² Russell, D.A. (2010). Ukraine and Its Relations with the United States. *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*. <<https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/TESTIMONY.Russell.pdf>> (2018, November, 25).

Conclusion

During the study, it has been concluded that the prehistory of the modern transatlantic relations dates back to the first half of the XX century and has been determined by the following factors: the need to restore post-war Europe; the U.S. priority intentions to expand the zone of influence and to strengthen the position in the European region; the creation of NATO as an instrument of American influence on the Western European governments; the American need for a strong ally in confronting the Soviet threat; and the conclusion of the so-called Great Transatlantic Agreement, etc. The evolution of transatlantic relations was characterized by variable success in international exchanges. However, after each weakening of the U.S.-European cooperation, a period of interactions renewing took place. Forced or sincerely, the U.S. has supported European integration, preferring to settle the common cases with a consolidated force, which could act as a strong ally. Finally, it is proved that the American governments are interested in those integration projects that could be implemented under their control and the U.S. direct or indirect participation.

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