Narratives of the Russian Federation: from Military Strategy to War Crimes (Based on Statements at the OSCE Permanent Council Meetings)

DOI: 10.46340/eppd.2024.11.4.4

Alina Polukhina, PhD in Political Science
Department of Expert Analytical Activities, Georgian-Ukrainian Expert Center, Odesa, Ukraine
Viacheslav Tarasiuk
Vasyl’ Stus Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine

How to cite: Polukhina, A., & Tarasiuk, V. (2024). Narratives of the Russian Federation: from Military Strategy to War Crimes (Based on Statements at the OSCE Permanent Council Meetings). Evropský politický a právní diskurz, 11, 3, 35-40. https://doi.org/10.46340/eppd.2024.11.4.3

 

Abstract

The article examines the role of strategic narratives that the Russian Federation uses to legitimize its aggression against Ukraine, particularly through statements at the OSCE Permanent Council meetings in February-March 2022 and 2024. Strategic narratives play an important role in shaping the international image of the state and justifying its actions, especially in the conditions of information warfare. The research uses the method of qualitative content analysis, in particular the analysis of the texts of the statements of the Russian Federation at the meetings of the Permanent Council of the OSCE. Attention is focused on identifying and analyzing the main strategic narratives used to justify military actions and war crimes, as well as how these narratives change in response to the development of the international political situation. The results of the analysis showed that the Russian Federation systematically uses several key narratives to justify its aggression against Ukraine. Chief among them is the justification of military actions by the need to protect the Russian-speaking population from “genocide” and fight against “neo-Nazism”. In addition, Russia actively discredits international organizations such as the OSCE, accusing them of being biased and unable to resolve conflicts effectively. The analysis of the statements of 2024 shows an increase in the aggressiveness of the rhetoric, especially in the accusations against Western countries, which, according to Russia, allegedly contribute to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. These changes in rhetoric reflect the evolution of narratives aimed at adapting to new international challenges and increasing pressure on the international community. The revealed narratives confirm that the Russian Federation continues to actively use information warfare to justify its aggression against Ukraine and undermine the international consensus to condemn its actions. The evolution of these narratives reflects the adaptation of Russia’s strategy to new political realities and growing international pressure. Further monitoring and detailed analysis of these narratives is critical for developing effective strategies to counter Russian propaganda at the international level, which, in turn, will contribute to strengthening the international legal order and ensuring global security.

Keywords: narratives, Russian aggression against Ukraine, war crimes, OSCE, rhetoric, military strategy, information war.

 

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